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Abstract 
China has been introducing antibiotic stewardship policies since the early 2000s 
to address the persistent and pervasive problem of irrational antibiotic use in hospitals. 
A recent set of antibiotic stewardship policies were set out between 2011 and 2013 in 
the Nationwide Special Rectification Campaign on Hospital Antibiotic Use (The 
Campaign). 
Drawing on implementation theories, this thesis examines the implementation of 
The Campaign in respect of factors pertinent to both its context and process, and how 
these factors interacted. The thesis is based on qualitative data gathered using in-
depth interviews and semi-structured interviews over two phases of fieldwork. Phase 1 
analysed the perspectives of multiple actors at central (governmental organisations) 
and hospital levels (6 hospitals in urban Beijing, including a national tertiary hospital). 
Phase 2 – a case study focused on a signle hospital – analysed the perspectives of 
actors from a typical secondary hospital in urban Shanghai.  
It was found that top-down implementation – characterised by clear line of 
accountability, target approach, punitive measures and redundancy of policies – was 
evident at both the central and hospital levels. However, The Campaign’s approach to 
focus on secondary and tertiary hospitals was strongly shaped by the organisation, 
delivery and financing of China’s healthcare system and its relevant reforms. 
Implementation at the hospital level was heavily influenced by contextual factors at 
system (healthcare system), organisation (hospital and clinical settings) and individual 
levels (prescribers and patients). Rational prescribing practices were driven in part by 
The Campaign’s interaction with some of those factors, but more crucially by frontline 
implementers’ active adaptation in response to the local context and needs. In 
recognising the potential of the top-down approach, the findings also highlight the need 
to better involve frontline implementers, align wholistic healthcare reforms and 
understand the complexity of policy interactions in the implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis presents an analysis of the implementation of antibiotic stewardship 
policies in China. To establish the rationale for, and the importance of this research, the 
introductory chapter first describes what antibiotics are, and establishes how problems 
in antibiotic use contribute to the problem of rising antibiotic resistance and how 
antibiotic stewardship policies can solve this problem by regulating antibiotic use in 
hospitals. Focusing on China, one of the biggest consumers of antibiotics, faced with 
huge challenges in rising antibiotic resistance, this chapter summarises existing 
knowledge of antibiotic use, resistance and policies in this country. With the research 
gaps identified, this chapter then describes the research aim, objectives and questions, 
and the study design used to address these questions. Finally, this chapter 
summarises the contents of each of the ensuing chapters.  
 
1.2 Antibiotics, antibiotic resistance and antibiotic stewardship 
policies 
The term “antibiotic”, which has been considered to be synonymous with 
“antibacterial” (Fleming, 1929; Waksman & Flynn, 1973; Blair et al., 2015), refers to a 
vital class of pharmaceuticals that can inhibit or kill bacteria through specific 
interactions with bacterial molecular targets (Davies & Davies, 2010). In recent policy 
parlance, it is common for the term “antimicrobial” to be used with strong emphasis on 
“antibacterial” (MacDougall & Polk, 2005; Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2017), despite the fact that in a strict scientific sense, “antimicrobial” is a more inclusive 
term that encompasses chemical agents against microbes besides bacteria including 
viruses, fungi and parasites (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 2010:428; 
World Health Organization 2016). Taking this into account, this thesis uses “antibiotic” 
as the predominant term to describe antibacterial; where “antimicrobial” is used in a 
policy context, it is considered to be equivalent to “antibiotic”, unless explained 
otherwise.  
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Antibiotic resistance refers to the ability of bacteria to become less susceptible 
than their counterparts to a specific antibiotic; in a clinical context, this refers to the 
ability of infectious bacteria to survive exposures to clinically relevant concentrations of 
antibiotics that would kill otherwise sensitive organisms of the same strain (Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academies 2010:428). At the molecular level, antibiotic 
resistance is a natural phenomenon that unavoidably arises through Darwinian 
selection, where bacteria react to the selection pressure of antibiotics (World Health 
Organization, 2012). At the individual human level, the emergence and spread of 
antibiotic resistance is accelerated by inappropriate exposure to antibiotics absorbed 
from the external world (Holmes et al., 2016).  
In formal healthcare settings, antibiotics are prescribed by prescribers and 
taken by patients to treat bacterial infections. However, antibiotic use in hospitals, 
particularly “irrational” antibiotic use – defined as unnecessary or inappropriate use in 
respect of criteria such as clinical relevance, dosage and dosing schedule (World 
Health Organization, 1985, 2002) – has proved to be a significant driver of antibiotic 
resistance (Steinke & Davey, 2001; Goossens et al., 2005; Costelloe et al., 2010). This 
is an especially concerning problem, considering that the global consumption of 
antibiotics in human medicine increased by nearly 40% between 2000 and 2010 (Van 
Boeckel et al., 2014), and irrational antibiotic use is observed to be a severe problem in 
both the developed and the developing world: based on available data, recent studies 
found that around 50% of antibiotics in Southeast Asia (Holloway, 2011) and around 
30% of antibiotics in the United States (Fleming-Dutra et al., 2016) were unnecessarily 
prescribed.  
The significant extent of global antibiotic resistance and its negative impact on 
the health of the individuals and societies have been increasingly recognised. 
According to one of the most comprehensive reports to date, it was observed that 
bacteria that caused common healthcare-associated and community-acquired 
infections carried very high rates of resistance in all WHO regions: in particular, both 
the resistance to some of the “last-resort” antibiotics (including carbapenems and third 
generation cephalosporins) and to some of the most widely used antibiotics 
(exemplified by fluoroquinolones) was very widespread across the world (World Health 
Organization, 2014). Commensurately, antibiotic resistance leads to an increase in 
morbidity, mortality and costs of treatments worldwide, affecting both low- and middle-
income countries, and high-income countries (Friedman, Temkin & Carmeli, 2016; 
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Laxminarayan et al., 2016c). An estimated 23,000 people in the United States and 
25,000 in Europe die each year from resistant pathogens, whilst an estimated 214,000 
neonatal sepsis deaths are attributable to resistant pathogens each year 
(Laxminarayan, Matsoso, et al. 2016; Laxminarayan et al. 2013; in Laxminarayan, 
Sridhar, et al. 2016). The resulting economic impacts due to healthcare costs and 
productivity losses are estimated to be huge, with the overall crude economic burden 
estimated to be at least €1.5 billion euros in Europe in 2007, and $55 billion in the USA 
in 2000 (Gandra, Barter & Laxminarayan, 2014; Smith & Coast, 2013). Furthermore, as 
the effective lifespan of antibiotics is negatively affected by antibiotic resistance, rising 
resistance can lead to an “antibiotic apocalypse” where no more effective antibiotics 
are available against some of the most resistant bacteria; this is due to the fact that the 
current antibiotic pipeline is not producing new antibiotics to counteract the increase in 
resistant bacteria sufficiently quickly (Smith & Coast, 2013). 
Hence, rationalising antibiotic use in hospitals is a crucial aspect to controlling 
antibiotic resistance and avoiding its detrimental consequences. This is mainly 
achieved through the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies. At the hospital 
level, antibiotic stewardship policies are a set of coordinated interventions designed to 
improve rational antibiotic use with the goal of optimising antibiotic use to achieve the 
best clinical outcomes while minimising adverse events and limiting selective pressures 
that drive the emergence of resistance and reducing excessive costs attributable to 
suboptimal antibiotic use (Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America, Infectious 
Diseases Society of America & Society, 2012). Besides stipulating treatment guidelines 
for specific clinical conditions and a formulary of pharmaceuticals available for 
prescription, antibiotic stewardship policies also introduce interventions of two broad 
categories: restrictive interventions (such as formulary restriction based on levels of 
professional authority) seeks to control prescribing behaviours, and persuasive 
interventions (such as training and education) seeks to improve prescribing behaviours 
(Davey et al. 2015:191). The implementation of these policies involves a 
multidisciplinary team comprising prescribers, pharmacists, microbiologists, 
epidemiologists and infectious disease specialists (Lee et al., 2013), overseen by a 
management team that work closely with other administrative structures pertinent to 
pharmaceutical use and infection control, such as the drugs and therapeutics 
committee and infection control committee (Davey et al. 2015:192). To track the impact 
of the policies, a wide range of measures can be used to measure various aspects of 
antibiotic use in hospitals (Morris, 2014). For examples, antibiotic consumption can be 
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measured by the defined daily doses (DDDs) controlled for the population at risk of 
receiving antimicrobials over a specific period of time (Monnet, 2007), and frequency of 
antibiotic use can be measured by proportion of encounters with antibiotic prescriptions 
(World Health Organization, 2002). To further support these policies at the regional and 
national levels, it is crucial to develop and strengthen two broader policy domains 
pertinent to antibiotic stewardship. Surveillance of antibiotic use and resistance 
provides the basis for formulating, monitoring and evaluating interventions and 
strategies, and infection prevention and control helps reducing the spread of resistant 
bacteria and likelihood of infections within healthcare settings (Dar et al., 2015; Jinks et 
al., 2016; Farrar & Davies, 2016). 
Despite the fact that the effectiveness of antibiotic stewardship policies for 
improving antibiotic use in hospitals is strongly established and widely supported by 
extensive evidence base (Davey et al., 2013; Karanika et al., 2016; Schuts et al., 2016; 
Chandy et al., 2014), antibiotic stewardship policies are not a requirement in all 
hospitals; thus, ensuring implementation of these policies is crucial (Plachouras & 
Hopkins, 2017). Outcomes of high-level policy discussions and reviews both suggest 
that at the local level, policy implementation requires approaches tailored to the local 
context, such as resources available, organisational characteristics and cultural 
elements (Wellcome Trust, 2016; Plachouras & Hopkins, 2017). At the national level, 
enforceable targets, coordinated actions and the strengthening of health and public 
health systems are crucial (Laxminarayan et al., 2016a; Jinks et al., 2016).  
 
1.3 Antibiotic stewardship policies in China 
As a major driver of increasingly high levels of antibiotic resistance observed in 
recent years (Zhang et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 
2012; Li et al., 2014a), irrational antibiotic use has been an extensive and significant 
problem in China (Reynolds & McKee, 2009; Xiao et al., 2013a). Different types of 
irrational use of medicines in China have been widely documented and summarised, 
exemplified by polypharmacy, overprescribing of antibiotics, over use of injections and 
wrong usage of antibiotics (Mao et al., 2015). Behaviours related to irrational antibiotic 
use in China, as shown by extensive studies, are driven by a number of influential 
contextual factors at the system, hospital and individual levels, such as hospitals’ 
economic incentives to profit from prescribing, prescribers’ and patients’ lack of 
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knowledge (Mao et al., 2015; Reynolds & Mckee, 2011), and deteriorating prescriber-
patient relationship (Hesketh, Wu & Mao, 2012; He, 2014). 
Despite the lack of official or comprehensive data, multiple studies have 
corroborated that the levels of antibiotic use in hospitals in China is likely to be higher 
than that of developed countries both at the primary care level (Hui et al., 1997; Dong, 
Yan & Wang, 2008; Li et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014a) and at higher levels of hospitals 
(Li et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2015a). A very wide range of estimates for the proportion of 
encounters with antibiotic prescriptions have been reported in past studies, mostly 
ranging between 30% to 80%, with the aggregated average standing at around 50% 
across all three levels of healthcare in China (Yin et al., 2013). Whilst it is difficult to 
state a convincing number from these studies, a recent study conducted a direct 
benchmark comparison on antibiotic use between China and Sweden based on data 
from 2012 (Sun et al., 2015a). Drawing on data from 35 hospitals sampled from the 
official surveillance network for antibiotic use in China and 7 university hospitals in 
Sweden, the study found that the proportions of encounters with antibiotic prescriptions 
in Chinese hospitals (10% for outpatient and 50% for inpatient) remained much higher 
than in Swedish hospitals (1.1% for outpatient and 34% for inpatient). However, signs 
of significant progress towards reducing antibiotic use were observed in China, as 
inpatient antibiotic consumption in Chinese hospitals decreased dramatically from 910 
DDD/1000 inpatient days in 2008 to 473 DDD/1000 inpatient days in 2012, in 
comparison to 588 DDD/1000 inpatient days in Swedish hospitals (Sun et al., 2015a). 
This is supported by observations in other studies based on national data on 
pharmaceutical sales, which showed that antibiotic use had been steadily decreasing 
since around 2011 (Geng, 2014; Xu & Gan, 2012; Zhu & Cheng, 2012; Sun et al., 
2015a; Tao et al., 2013; Gan, 2012).  
Several studies speculated that the observed decrease in antibiotic use in 
hospitals starting around 2011 was strongly linked to the implementation of a new set 
of antibiotic stewardship policies in China in the form of the Nationwide Special 
Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic Use in Hospitals (The Campaign for short) 
between 2011 and 2013 (Sun et al., 2015a; Tao et al., 2013; Gan, 2012; Xu & Gan, 
2012). Preceded by a series of policies set out by the Ministry of Health of China (now 
National Health and Family Planning Commission) since the early 2000s, The 
Campaign represented the government’s first major intensive effort to strengthen the 
enforcement of existing policies (Ministry of Health, 2011, 2012b; National Health and 
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Family Planning Commission, 2013), which covered all policy domains of antibiotic 
stewardship at both the hospital and the national levels, including introducing treatment 
guidelines and interventions to change prescribing behaviours, (Ministry of Health, 
2004), setting up regional and national surveillance networks (Ministry of Health, 2005, 
2006, 2009b), and strengthening the control of hospital-associated infections (Ministry 
of Health, 2000, 2004). At the same time, The Campaign especially emphasised a 
target approach to monitoring and managing antibiotic use in hospitals (Ministry of 
Health, 2008b, 2009a). Existing research and documents have provided a broad 
overview of The Campaign: the national policy context of The Campaign has been 
described by the policy documents and useful reviews (Cui et al., 2017; Xiao & Li, 
2015), and the impact of The Campaign has been studied by a number of evaluations 
or alluded to by studies of trends and patterns of antibiotic use. Although a clear causal 
link between The Campaign and reductions in antibiotic use is not yet established 
(further evidence on this will be presented in Chapter 3, Literature Review), these 
studies collectively paint a picture of a nationally driven stewardship intervention being 
seemingly effective at delivering its desired impact. However, the mechanisms through 
which the purported impact could plausibly take place—especially, with respect to the 
process of implementation and the necessitating changes in prescribing behaviour—
remains very poorly understood. In particular, there have been only two published 
studies of the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China, and neither 
adequately analysed the entire healthcare structure and context in which actors at the 
country and the hospital levels operated (Wang et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2011). Thus, 
there was a strong need to conduct a full analysis of the implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in China, especially The Campaign, in order to understand the 
roles of central level and hospital level actors and factors.  
 
1.4 Research questions and methodology 
In light of the need to understand the implementation of antibiotic stewardship 
policies in general, and the research gap concerning China in particular, the overall aim 
of this research was to explore and analyse the implementation of The Campaign in 
China from 2011 to 2013 at the central and the hospital levels.  
Drawing on implementation theory, which lent critical concepts – through top-
down and bottom-up approaches to understanding policy implementation at different 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
20 
 
levels – for understanding the contextual factors influencing implementation, and the 
factors crucial to the process of implementation, the three overall research objectives 
and the specific research questions for each objective were generated as below: 
Objective 1: to understand the national policy context of antibiotic stewardship policies 
in China 
a. What reasons led to actions on antibiotic use in hospitals?  
b. Who were the key actors at the central level? 
c. What were the antibiotic stewardship policies to date? 
d. How did The Campaign relate to these policies?  
Objective 2: to understand the healthcare system context in which implementation of 
The Campaign took place 
a. What did the system level context comprise? 
b. What did the hospital level context comprise? 
c. What did the individual level context comprise? 
Objective 3: to explore and analyse the implementation process of The Campaign 
a. How was The Campaign implemented at the central level? 
b. How was The Campaign implemented at the hospital level? 
In order to address these questions and understand “fundamental and 
searching questions about the nature of social phenomena” (Pope & Mays, 2006), the 
research adopted a qualitative approach. This fieldwork of the research came in 2 
phases. In phase 1 it explored the perception and experience of policy implementation 
from the perspectives of policy actors including central officials, and managers, 
prescribers and patients from hospitals in urban Beijing. In phase 2 it analysed in detail 
the interaction between context and implementation process at the hospital level using 
a theory-driven case study (Yin, 2009), took place at a secondary hospital in Shanghai 
and included key actors including managers, manager-prescribers, prescribers and 
patients. In-depth interviews and semi-structured interviews were the main data 
collection methods. 
Thematic analysis of data was conducted for each subgroup within each phase 
of fieldwork, before all the themes from all the subgroups were reorganised and 
integrated based on a theoretical framework constructed using implementation theory, 
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which sought to describe and analyse policy implementation in respect of context and 
process, and their interactions at the two levels represented by the nested subgroups.  
 
1.5 Contents of the thesis 
This thesis will begin by a discussion of relevant theories on policy 
implementation in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), which contribute to the 
construction of a theoretical framework that lays the conceptual foundation for the 
study design and data analysis. This theoretical framework distinguishes context and 
process at different levels – macro and micro levels – of policy implementation and 
highlights their interactions.  
This will be followed by a review of empirical studies in Chapter 3 (Literature 
Review). Two structured literature reviews were conducted to examine the empirical 
studies relevant to the overall research topic: the first review examined the impact of 
The Campaign, and the second examined implementation of antibiotic stewardship 
policies in various country contexts and of health policies in China. This review of the 
literature will establish the evidence base for on the impact of The Campaign and 
situate further research to understand its implementation. It will also identify the 
common themes in policy implementation from the findings of the studies, discuss the 
extent to which implementation theories are applied in the existing literature, and 
explain how this research will strengthen existing research through the use of empirical 
qualitative data from a comprehensive range of policy actors and the application of the 
theoretical framework used in the analysis. 
The healthcare system background of China will be set out in Chapter 4 
(Healthcare System Background). Three key aspects of China’s healthcare system – 
governance and administration, organisation and delivery, and financing and provider 
incentives – will be described. How these arrangements could influence not only policy 
implementation, but also antibiotic use in hospitals will be explained. An overview of 
antibiotic use in hospitals in China will be provided, and how different levels of 
contextual factors pertinent to the healthcare system influence antibiotic use and 
prescribing will be explained.  
A detailed description and analysis of the national policy background will be set 
out in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), in which the rationale for antibiotic 
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stewardship policies in China, their development over a decade, and how the perceived 
lack of success in implementation led to The Campaign, will be explained. 
The study design and methods for collecting empirical data in this research will 
be discussed in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Methodology). This chapter will explain 
the rationale for the use of qualitative research to understand implementation of The 
Campaign and describe the overall study design that encompassed two phases of 
fieldwork: phase 1 explored the perspectives of multiple actors at central and hospital 
levels in Beijing; phase 2 examined policy implementation at a secondary hospital in 
Shanghai using a case study design. A conceptual map of the study, which explains 
how the theoretical framework informs the study design, will be presented. This is 
followed by detailed descriptions of the selection of study sites, data collection methods 
and process, and methods of data analysis in the two phases of fieldwork. In describing 
the data analysis, an extended conceptual map will be presented to demonstrate how 
the conceptual framework is used to structure the result chapters. Ethical issues and 
commentary on the methodology used in this research will be discussed at the end of 
this chapter.  
Results of the research will be reported in Chapters 7 (Policy Implementation at 
the Central Level), 8 (Policy Implementation at the Hospital Level, Part I: Analysis of 
the Perspectives of Multiple Actors from Hospitals in Beijing) and 9 (Policy 
Implementation at the Hospital Level, Part II: A Case Study of a Secondary Hospital in 
Shanghai). Chapters 7 and 8 reported results from phase 1 fieldwork in Beijing, and 
Chapter 9 from phase 2 fieldwork – a case study – in Shanghai. In analysing the 
interactions between context and process of the implementation of The Campaign at 
both central and hospital levels, these chapters will draw on the extended conceptual 
map presented in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Method).   
The thesis will conclude with Chapter 10. The research will be summarised in 
relation to the aims and objectives. A critique of the methodology will be provided, in 
which the limitations of the study design and methods, and the measures taken to 
mitigate these limitations in the 2 phases of fieldwork will be discussed. The 
contribution of the thesis to knowledge will then be presented. This will be followed by a 
detailed discussion of the findings of this thesis and their implications for policies and 
future research.  
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2.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1 (Introduction), this thesis concerns the implementation 
of antibiotic stewardship policies in China. This chapter establishes relevant theoretical 
frameworks to guide the analysis of policy implementation, and situates this research in 
relation to existing empirical studies which address similar or related issues.  
 Theories of policy implementation are examined: their development, 
perspectives and explanatory power are summarised and discussed.  The 
development of implementation research saw the formation of different views on policy 
implementation; three main streams of theoretical approaches to understanding the 
implementation process have emerged: top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches. 
In discussing the implementation process, these approaches also address the concept 
of implementation context, particularly its role in influencing policy implementation.   
 The application of these theoretical ideas in empirical studies, or the lack 
thereof, is examined in respect of three research topics highly relevant to this research, 
namely implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies around the world, 
implementation of other health policies in China, and implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in China. Common themes emerging from the findings of these 
studies are summarised.  
 The critical exposition of theoretical concepts and review of empirical studies 
highlight research gaps in the study of antibiotic stewardship policies both in empirical 
evidence on policy implementation and in application of implementation theory, and 
informs the generation of research questions and selection of theoretical perspectives 
for this research.  
 
2.2 Overview of the study of policy implementation 
This section discusses the study of policy implementation by describing its 
origin, subsequent development, and applications. A major theme of implementation 
studies concerns two seemingly opposing schools of thought: the top-down approach 
and the bottom-up approach. These approaches view policy implementation differently, 
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leading to different interpretations of the concept of implementation process. Both 
approaches recognise the importance of implementation context: discussion of 
implementation context is inherent to any kind of theoretical treatment of 
implementation process.  
 
Origin and development of the study of policy implementation 
The study of policy implementation as a distinct subject was formalised in the 
1970s. Following the emergence of early works on implementation exemplified by 
Selznick’s TVA and the Grass Roots (1949), formalisation of the field is represented by 
Pressman and Wildavsky’s seminal study Implementation: How Great Expectations in 
Washington are Dashed in Oakland (1973), which pioneers the explicit use of 
“implementation” as an analytical term in reviewing and analysing the “implementation 
deficits” of federally funded job-creation schemes (Goggin, 1990; O’Toole, 2000; 
Schofield, 2001).  
Central to driving the theoretical development of implementation research are 
the views and assumptions about the “processual” nature of policy implementation in 
relation to overall policy process that bridges “policy” and “action” (Schofield 2001).  
Early research views policy implementation as a step separated from policy 
formation, comprising a distinct hierarchy of rational and linear processes (Schofield, 
2001; Barrett, 2004). These intermediary administrative processes are considered to 
have a decisive role in translating formulated policies to policy goals and outcomes 
(Easton, 1965; Derthick, 1972; Ryan, 1995; Hill & Hupe, 2002). Although early 
research in the field aims to theorise these notions by examining the complexity of 
administration (Schofield, 2001) and develop causal relationship between policy 
implementation and outcome (Barrett, 2004), they tend to be explorative and inductive 
studies with “very few theoretical variables in focus” (Winter, 2006).  
The central assumptions of this early research are examined and scrutinised in 
later research, where scholars have different opinions on the “relationship between 
implementation and other elements of the policy process” (Ryan, 1995). Consequently, 
three different approaches to understanding policy implementation emerge as scholars 
developed theoretical frameworks that could guide empirical analysis (Winter, 2006). 
For scholars who see policy implementation as a “top-down” process, policy 
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formulation is clearly separated from policy implementation. For scholars who 
emphasise the active role of the recipients in policy implementation and their power in 
formulating de facto policies on the ground, policy implementation is a “bottom-up” 
process, so that no distinctions can be drawn between policy formulation and 
implementation (Ryan, 1995). The divisions between these two perspectives, and their 
relative merits and limitations are described and discussed in greater detail in the next 
sub-sections.   
The two contrasting perspectives of implementation are eventually reconciled 
using a “hybrid” approach, which views policy formulation and implementation as a 
continuum (Majone & Wildavsky, 1978). Marking a transition towards “more 
comparative and theoretical-deductive oriented” approaches (Saetren 2014, quoting 
Lester et al. 1987; Goggin et al. 1990; Hill & Hupe 2002), the hybrid approach seeks to 
validate the explanatory power of theoretical frameworks from previous works and 
develop more unified frameworks (Winter, 2006; Schofield, 2001).  
 
The “top-down” and “bottom-up” debate 
Heavily influenced by “the question of how to separate implementation from 
policy formation” (Hill & Hupe, 2002) as described in the previous sub-section, the top-
down versus bottom-up debate is one of the dominant themes in the development 
implementation research. The following subsections focus on the two opposing 
approaches to understanding implementation, highlighting their differences and 
tensions.  
a. Top-down approaches 
Top-down approaches to understanding policy implementation focus on official, 
formal policies that typically have legal mandate from the central government (O’Toole, 
1989), with a view to optimise the intended policy outcomes. Therefore, the perspective 
of analysis is largely pertinent to the government policy level, as policy is considered to 
be formulated “at the top” (Ryan, 1995). This view, as described in the previous sub-
section, assumes that implementation is a separate and linear translation process 
between the Centre and “those who will implement the policy” (Schofield, 2001; Ryan, 
1995). These assumptions are “a direct by-product of the rational, perfect public 
administration model” (Schofield, 2001). The concept of “control” – particularly “central 
control” – is emphasised in this perspective (Winter, 2006). 
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Despite “control” being a key concept, early implementation research rather 
focuses on the lack thereof, in the form of implementation problems, barriers, and 
failures (Schofield, 2001). For example, in addressing the extent of control required for 
successful implementation, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) spend much of their 
analysis of a federally mandated programme at local level arguing that implementation 
very often involves multiple actors and is therefore dependent on numerous 
organisational and administrative linkages; based on probabilistically-based arguments, 
it is claimed that the cumulative deficits in each of these steps could ultimately create a 
large “implementation deficit” (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Whilst the pessimistic tone 
(Rothstein, 1998) per se is not necessarily a problem, early implementation research 
suffers weaknesses that require addressing. In particular, the assumptions about the 
negative impact of multi-actor involvement on the presumably ideal scenario of linear 
implementation, and the subsequent effectiveness of policy implementation is overly 
simplistic, leading to problematic exaggeration of the probabilities of failure (Bowen, 
1982). In reality, policy implementation is likely to involve multiple actors, including 
state actors (actors in the government), and non-state actors (actors outside 
government) exemplified by civil society organisations (organisations which fall 
between the state and the individual or household) (Buse, Mays & Walt, 2012). 
However, multi-actor implementation could be a crucial factor of success rather than 
failure (O’Toole, 1986). Using the same probabilistically-based framework, it can be 
demonstrated convincingly that persistent and coordinated collaboration amongst 
different actors could improve the effectiveness of securing necessary clearances and 
reducing superfluous hurdles for policy implementation (Bowen, 1982).  
Rather than stall on the impossibility of perfect control, the ensuing research 
seeks to elaborate assumptions, capture more dimensions of complexities of policy 
implementation, and address weaknesses of previous research by proposing explicit 
theoretical frameworks.  
Influential top-down models of policy implementation with more iterated 
intermediary processes and multiple variables representing various influencing factors 
were developed, exemplified by the frameworks developed by Van meter and Van 
Horn (1975) and Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980). These frameworks still maintain a 
clear distinction between policy formulation and implementation. However, they 
recognise that policy formulation could affect policy implementation. Involvement of 
policy actors in the formulation phase may influence their compliance in implementation 
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(Van Meter & Van Horn 1975: p459), which could contribute to a “feedback process” 
that concerns the reformulation of policy based on experience of the implementation 
process (Sabatier, 1986). These frameworks also identify a range of variables linked to 
implementation processes, addressing influential factors such as content of policy, 
administrative mechanisms, policy actors and implementers involved, availability of 
resources, and the wider economic, social and political environment (Sabatier & 
Mazmanian 1980:544).  
Another approach to achieve in-depth analysis of imperfect control is first to 
come up with ideal conditions that enable “perfect implementation” before examining 
the extent to which each condition could be met in the real world. Similar to “the way in 
which economists employed the model of perfect competition”, this approach imagines 
the best possible combination of “external elements” such as resource availability and 
political acceptability and “internal elements” concerning administration that could 
produce “perfect implementation” (Hood 1976:6). The work of Hogwood and Gunn 
(1985) is a prime example of this approach. In their framework, “external” and “internal” 
elements to policy implementation are considered in the form of ten “preconditions” for 
“perfect implementation”. These preconditions (Hogwood & Gunn 1984: 199-206) are 
as follows:  
- The circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints; 
- That adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the 
programme; 
- That the required combination of resources is actually available; 
- That the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and 
effect; 
- That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there are few, 
if any, intervening links; 
- That dependency relationships are minimal; 
- That there is understanding of, and agreement on, objectives; 
- That tasks are fully specified in correct sequence; 
- That there is perfect communication and co-ordination; 
- That those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance. 
Intended for an audience at the government policy level, this model assumes a 
strong and democratically elected government dedicated to public objectives, and that 
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challenges to implementation arise because many of those “upon whom action 
depends” are not elected and they could be driven by private interests different from 
the government’s, “at least in the case of civil servants and the staff of health services, 
nationalised industries etc” (Hogwood & Gunn 1984:207).  
The assumed alignment between central authority and local implementers, 
therefore, requires further examination. A key concept that elaborates this relationship 
is “accountability”. Whilst the term has multiple extended meanings based on the basic 
concept of one being “called to account” by an authority for one’s actions (Mulgan, 
2000), a useful definition that captures core elements of the concept – “external 
scrutiny”, “justification”, “sanctions” and “control” (Mulgan 2000:557) – considers 
accountability to be “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2007). Two forms of 
accountability can be further identified. Whilst political accountability refers to the 
actions of elected officials being held to account by the electorate, and managerial 
accountability refers to delegated individuals being held to account by those in higher 
authorities against predetermined criteria pertinent to the responsibilities of interest 
(Day & Klein, 1987). Therefore, managerial accountability, as opposed to political 
accountability, provides more suitable dimensions to examine the technicalities of 
aligning central and local actors within lines of authority.  
In considering the mechanisms through which managerial accountability can be 
strengthened – particularly programme accountability concerning outcomes of actors’ 
activities (Leat, 1988)  – attention is drawn to the “targets approach”, exemplified by the 
example of the New Labour UK Government, which monitored the delivery and 
performance of public services in the UK using standards stipulated by the government 
(Hood, 2006, 2007). Three archetypes of this approach are summarised: target 
systems (aspirational standards expressed as numeric threshold), ranking systems 
(measurement of comparable units against one another) and intelligence systems 
(collection of background information and data that are not part of the previous 
systems) (Hood, 2007). Improved alignment and accountability in the “target approach” 
is achieved mainly through its punitive tendency. On the one hand, failure of 
implementers of public services to reach stipulated standards or attempts to abuse the 
system may lead to their sacking (Hood, 2006), a point that was made long ago by 
Voltaire in his observation of the management approach of the British naval 
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administration in Candide, ou l’Optimisme (1759): “Mais dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de 
tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres” (or “But in this country, it 
is sometimes good to kill an admiral to encourage others”). On the other hand, 
empirical research suggests that the ‘target approach’ creates greater tendency to 
punish failure than reward success in terms of generating electoral support for the 
government incumbents (Hood & Dixon, 2010). As a result, this approach has been 
shown to lead to better achievement of policy goals (Bevan & Hood, 2006a; Hood & 
Dixon, 2010) and deter gaming behaviours (Hood, 2006; Bevan & Hood, 2006b).  
In addition to the target approach, it is noted that the deployment of multiple 
approaches to enhance alignment and accountability, such as setting up multiple 
mechanisms of inspection, and using professional bodies to improve regulation, can be 
reasonable rather than excessive (Allen et al., 2016). Scott (2000:52-53) considers 
“redundancy”, in which “overlapping (and ostensibly superfluous) accountability 
mechanisms reduce the centrality of any one of them”, are the necessary results of 
both deliberate designs and contingency in response to changes in the system. In this 
sense, applying a combination of accountability mechanisms is a way to ensure 
alignment of central authority and local implementers in policy implementation. For 
instance, multiple regulatory measures for pharmaceuticals, such as through legal 
institution (Jayasuriya, 1985), official accreditation (Ensor & Weinzierl, 2007) and 
service monitoring by insurance payers (Maynard & Bloor, 2003) often exist in parallel 
with specific stewardship policies.  
In the aforementioned top-down frameworks, the theoretical treatment of the 
implementation context is integral to that of policy implementation. Whether capturing 
variables in policy implementation or considering “perfect” conditions for 
implementation, the implementation context has been consistently conceptualised as 
macro level factors external to the implementation process and beyond the control of 
relevant policy actors, which can influence the implementation process and the 
behaviours of the actors (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Commonly, these are economic, social 
and political factors (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) such 
as resource availability, public support, political support (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; 
Hood, 1976; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984),  technological advancements and media 
attention (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980).  
To summarise, the top-down approach to understanding policy implementation 
assumes a strong central government. It views the policy process as linear and 
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phased, in which policy implementers are separate from and subordinate to policy 
formulators. Therefore, its outcome-oriented and prescriptive policy advice is aimed at 
helping central government better to align formulated policy with actors and factors 
crucial to its implementation. Accordingly, it expects to address a more macro level 
implementation context of the wider economic, social and political environment. 
However, the applicability of three key assumptions of this model have been 
challenged and criticised: that there is a clear distinction between policy formulation; 
that policy implementation is linear and rational; and that policy implementation 
concerns a central perspective emphasising control (Schofield, 2001).  
Firstly, the top-down approach does not address politics at the stages of policy 
design and formulation, which can complicate and influence policy implementation in 
the long-term (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Winter, 1986, 2006). Moreover, as 
summarised by Ryan (1995), “the policy design and implementation often occur 
simultaneously through common actors” (Anon, 1981; Linder & Peters, 1987; Hjern & 
Hull, 1982) through an iterative process informed by experience gained during 
implementation (Majone & Wildavsky, 1978).  
Secondly, policy implementation is hardly a linear and rational process. Quoting 
the work of Berman (1978) and Baier et al. (1986), Schofield (2001) points out that the 
top-down model lacks “a great deal of macro and micro political reality”, including 
complexity of politics and behaviours, and ambiguity and contradiction in policy goals. 
An example given by Ryan (1995) is “implementation discretion” (Thompson, 1982; 
Burke, 1987; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992), where the implementation processes vary 
“according to programs, internal structures and external conditions”.  
Thirdly, immediately following the example of “implementation discretion” is the 
concern that the top-down approach over-emphasises the importance of the central 
government and at the same time, neglects the influence of the actual policy 
implementers (Sabatier 1986:30). Arguing against this the centre-focused top-down 
approach, scholars interested in the opposing bottom-up approach contend that front-
line workers at “the bottom” of the implementation system are in fact key decision 
makers in the implementation process (Winter, 2006). For example, Elmore’s work 
shows that actors who actually carry out activities for policy delivery can influence 
policy implementation significantly  (1979: 614). Schofield (2001) notes that these 
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“street-level bureaucrats” Lipsky (1980) are the actual “interpreters of central policy” 
(Thompson, 1982).  
b. Bottom-up approaches 
Bottom-up approaches to understanding policy implementation turn the policy 
process upside-down by emphasising the influential role of the frontline implementers – 
the “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980) – in policy implementation (Winter, 2006). 
However, the emergence of the bottom-up approach is not a reaction of the top-down 
approach: the two existed in parallel from the beginning. Moving attention away from 
the central government, the bottom-up approach emphasises the person who is 
employed to do a job for the government, and caught up in policies representing the 
grand ideals of those that are much higher up. Inevitably it challenges the procedural 
view of policy formulation and implementation. The implementation process is no 
longer seen as a rational and designed exercise that emphasises control and seeks to 
delivery policy goals; rather, the nature of implementation concerns the way individual 
implementers tackle the immediate problems in their policy-related jobs. Due to 
limitations in resources and capacities, street-level bureaucrats unavoidably experience 
a gap between the demand of the official policy and the actual workload involved in 
implementation (Winter 2006: 153). Thus, they have to develop routine and 
stereotyped coping strategies so as to get through a typical day’s work, whilst 
managing pressures and expectations associated with the demands of the policy (Hill & 
Hupe 2002: 52). In this way, the activities of the street-level bureaucrats effectively 
“become” the public policies that they are responsible for implementing (Lipsky 1980: 
xii). Therefore, the actual outcomes of policy implementation may deviate from the 
original policy objectives and intended goals (Nakamura 1987: 150). 
As with the top-down approach, theoretical frameworks have been developed 
around the key conceptual elements of the bottom-up approach. For instance, Elmore 
develops “backward mapping” (1979) as a strategy to map out factors and structures 
that are immediate to implementers at various levels that can only be “indirectly 
influenced by policymakers”. As opposed to “forward mapping”, which stresses the 
centralisation of control, backward mapping stresses the dispersal of control, and 
demonstrates that organisational structures, processes and environments revolving 
around the understanding, incentives and behaviours of street-level bureaucrats are 
integral to policy implementation in reality. The implications are twofold. On the one 
hand, it is necessary for policy objectives and designs to carefully consider the 
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behaviours and capabilities of the target implementers and the resources available to 
them in their organisational settings (Ryan, 1995). On the other hand, it is necessary to 
clarify that implementation research can address two closely related but fundamentally 
different research questions, namely “how to study implementation” and “how to control 
implementation” (Hill & Hupe 2002: 58). Bottom-up approaches are inclined to address 
the former question, while top-down approaches are inclined to address the latter.  
Further, bottom-up literature has been developed to address the 
aforementioned analytical implications and methodological implications. Organisation-
level analysis from Hjern and colleagues (Hjern & Porter, 1981; Hjern & Hull, 1982) 
aims to portray networks and relationships between organisational actors by first 
dissolving formal organisational structures and boundaries, and then reconstructing 
and mapping “the informal, empirical implementation structure around a given problem” 
(Winter 2006: 154). In their analysis, the methodological implications of bottom-up 
approaches, which highlight the importance of studying and understanding frontline 
implementers, are also reinforced (Hill & Hupe, 2002). By proposing snowballing of 
closely related actors as a method to inform the sampling and study of informal 
networks, bottom-up approaches are in effect advancing the use of inductive methods 
in the study of policy implementation (Schofield, 2001). The sampling procedures of 
this research, as described in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Methods), are inspired by 
this approach.  
As a result, in contrast to the “analytical simplicity” that top-down approaches 
attempt to establish (Schofield, 2001), bottom-up approaches have greatly enriched the 
theoretical treatment of the implementation context by focusing on the context faced by 
multiple actors at “the bottom”. Bottom-up scholars argue that policy implementation 
and the problems therein occur through the interaction of between central policy and 
local institutional settings (Berman, 1978), and because of that theorisation of policy 
implementation cannot be free of either central or local contexts (Maynard-Moody, 
Musheno & Palumbo, 1990). Whilst they acknowledge the importance of the 
exogenous macro level implementation context including economic, social and political 
factors (Anon, 1981; Berman, 1978), the influence of these factors are far less 
dominant than micro level context pertinent to local organisations and individuals that 
deliver the policy. Whereas central policy actors can only indirectly influence the micro 
level context, local implementers’ adaptation to local context could decide whether a 
policy is to succeed or fail (Palumbo, Maynard-Moody & Wright, 1984). In effect, 
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bottom-up perspectives offer methods to capture factors pertinent to the micro level 
implementation context. For instance, backward-mapping provides a way to capture 
and describe “contextual factors which are located away from the centre” by moving 
towards multiple-actor analysis that does not assume that central policy is the only or 
major influence on the understanding, incentives and behaviours of frontline 
implementers (Elmore, 1978; Schofield, 2001).  
To summarise, the bottom-up approach to understanding policy implementation 
sees local implementers to be critical to policy implementation, and assumes the 
influence of the local implementation context to be strong. Here, the policy process is a 
process of iterative adaptation initiated by local implementers. Therefore, it focuses 
more on the understanding, incentives and behaviours of local implementers and 
outputs resulting from these factors, as opposed to intended policy outcomes. Local 
policy implementation is then primarily situated in the micro level local implementation 
context, rather than the macro level context where policy formulation and 
implementation is initiated.  
However, the disregard of “the Centre” in bottom-up approaches is also 
considered its weakness. Whilst the top-down perspective could be accused of under-
estimation of the influence of the local implementers on the formal structures and 
processes, the bottom-up perspective could be – in exactly the same logic – accused 
of under-estimation of the influence of central actors and policies on local contexts 
(Schofield, 2001). Even decentralisation would have to occur “within a context of 
central control” (Matland, 1995). Also, the influence and discretion that can be exerted 
by local implementers can be overestimated (Ryan, 1995). In addition, a diversion from 
the Centre can represent a diversion from public interests and organisational 
authorities that are inherent to government policies (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Sabatier, 
1986; Lester et al., 1987). Therefore, despite the ability of bottom-up approaches to 
capture the importance of localness in policy implementation, scholars argue that from 
the perspective of theory development, attempting to generate overarching and 
generalizable theory based on descriptive phenomena at “the bottom” is to put the cart 
before the horse (Linder & Peters, 1987). 
Because of the strong methodological implications of bottom-up approaches, 
their emphasis of “the bottom” also draws criticisms in terms of research methodology. 
Street-level bureaucrats and local implementers are unlikely to be representative of all 
policy actors concerned in policy implementation (Ryan, 1995). Their perception and 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Background 
34 
 
understanding of the policy of interest, albeit being highly relevant to their local 
implementation context, could be parochial and divorced from the wider economic, 
social and political context that top-down approaches address (Sabatier 1986: 35).  
 
Moving on from the debate: synthesis and comparative approaches 
The reconciliation of the two approaches results in a hybrid perspective that 
seeks to synthesise the two opposing approaches (Lester et al. 1987; Linder & Peters 
1987b; Sabatier 1991; quoted in Schofield 2001). One of the key steps to synthesis is 
identifying and placing elements and variables that are responsible for the complexities 
that contribute to exacerbating the differences between the top-down and the bottom-
up perspectives within one common framework. For example, Elmore (1985) suggests 
the use of both “forward-mapping” and “backward-mapping” to account for the 
considerations of central actors and implementers respectively. Majone and Wildavsky 
(1978) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) both highlight that policy formulation 
and implementation is a continuum subjected to constant changes and evolutions, and 
that the perspectives and involvement of various groups of actors are essential to 
policy change. Ripley and Franklin (1982) build on the work of Lowi (1972) to make a 
crucial case for distinguishing different policy types. Matland (1995) highlights the vital 
need to specify the context and perspectives under which variables identified in various 
theoretical models are important.  
Despite attempts at synthesis, the differences between these two theoretical 
perspectives remain difficult to resolve, and efforts to reconcile the seemingly opposing 
theoretical arguments justly represented by either perspective are considered 
“protracted” and “not fruitful” (Saetren, 2005; Winter, 2006). In fact, some of the 
fundamental differences between the two perspectives represent those of 
“incommensurate paradigms” (Parsons 1995:487), so that each perspective “tended to 
ignore the portion of the implementation reality explained by the other” (Winter 
2006:154). By seeking the common denominators, the synthesis approach also 
inevitably loses some of the analytical edges possessed by each of the opposing 
perspectives.  
Therefore, it is important to recognise the relative merits of different 
conceptualisations of, and approaches to understanding policy implementation. 
Comparing different approaches as opposed to finding the “right” approaches can offer 
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valuable insights (Elmore, 1978), as approaches to study implementation depend on 
the specific circumstances and subjects of interest (Berman, 1980). Top-down 
approaches are best suited for more structured implementation that addresses specific 
problems, while bottom-up approaches are more problem-oriented than policy-focused, 
and suited to understanding the dynamics of local implementation contexts (Sabatier, 
1986).  
 
A theoretical framework for this research 
Based on the previous discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches, and 
how their different perspectives, strengths and weaknesses can be reconciled and 
suitably applied to explaining policy implementation at macro and micro levels, a 
theoretical framework for this research is proposed. This is described in Table 2-1, 
which illustrates the theoretical framework of this thesis. The macro level mainly 
concerns “the Centre”, and the examination of this level adopts the top-down 
perspective. In contrast, the micro level focus on the local settings, and the 
examination of this level adopts the bottom-up perspective. The influence of context on 
the implementation process at both levels is demonstrated by the line arrows: macro 
level contextual factors influence both levels of implementation process, whilst micro 
level contextual factors only influence local implementation process.  
 Theoretical 
perspective 
Factors pertinent to context Implementation process to 
be examined 
Macro 
level  
Top-down: 
focus on “the 
Centre” 
- National policy context: organisation of 
actors, political support and public 
perception 
- System level factors: financing, 
organisation, delivery and reforms 
- National implementation of 
policies formulated and 
dominated by central 
government  
Micro 
level  
Bottom-up: 
focus on the 
local settings 
- Hospital level factors: financing, 
organisation and delivery at 
organisational level; 
- Individual level factors: understanding, 
incentives, behaviours of, and 
interactions and relationships amongst 
multiple actors 
- Local implementation and 
adaptation of national 
policies carried out by local 
hospitals 
Table 2-1 Theoretical framework of the thesis 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a narrative review of theoretical literature, summarising 
different perspectives of implementation research. The review of theoretical literature 
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identified theoretical approaches that could help provide frameworks for cogent 
analysis of policy implementation, and comprehensive conceptualisation of factors 
crucial to the implementation context. Both the top-down and the bottom-up 
perspectives of policy implementation were useful, but it was necessary that they were 
applied to the right implementation scenario. Whilst the top-down perspective could 
structure analysis of implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies at the 
government policy level, the bottom-up perspective offered ways to better understand 
implementation at the hospital level. The theoretical framework therefore provides a 
structure to construct research question, examine existing evidence, determine study 
design and analytical methods.  
To identify gaps in knowledge and situate the research it is first necessary to 
examine existing empirical research related to the research topic of implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship policies in China.  
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the preceding analysis of the relevant theories, which explores 
approaches to understanding implementation process and different levels of 
implementation context, two structured literature reviews were conducted of the 
empirical studies relevant to the overall research topic: the first review examined the 
impact of The Campaign, and the second review examined implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in various country contexts and of health policies in China.   
The literature was identified through structured searches in academic 
databases based on key terms and tracking citations in relevant references. Structured 
searching was conducted in following databases:  
• Embase 
• Global Health 
• HMIC Health Management Information Consortium 
• Ovid MEDLINE(R) 
• Econlit 
• Social Policy and Practice 
Additional searching was conducted on Google Scholar and the China-based 
China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). Furthermore, a recent government 
report on antibiotic use was obtained and included in the analysis. The search terms, 
inclusion and exclusion criteria and the results of the review are described below.  
 
3.2 Review on the impact of The Campaign 
 To establish an overview of whether The Campaign impacted on antibiotic use 
in China, this literature review looked at both the studies that described overall trends 
in antibiotic use in China or parts of its regions before, during and after the periods of 
The Campaign, and those that explicitly evaluated the impact The Campaign as a 
whole. Search terms for both types of studies include core conceptual terms such as 
“China”, “antibiotics”, “prescribing” and “consumption”. For the studies of trends, 
relevant terms including “trends” and “patterns” were included. After initial pilot 
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searches, additional key terms that specified data sources, such as “sales”, 
“procurement”, “survey” or “surveillance” were also added. For the studies of impact, 
extra key terms related to evaluation such as “evaluate”, “impact” or “effect”, and 
concepts directly related to The Campaign such as “action plan”, “nationwide 
campaign” and “special campaign” were used. For CNKI, Chinese translations of these 
terms were used.  
 Initial inclusion criteria for the studies were kept broad. For trends in antibiotic 
use, studies based on data from public or commercial databases or surveillance 
networks at either national or regional levels were included as long as they covered 
multiple time-points over at least two years. For the evaluation of the impact of The 
Campaign, studies at national, regional and hospital levels from 2011 – the year The 
Campaign was implemented – were included, regardless of whether the subject of 
evaluation was claimed to be The Campaign as a whole or its constituting 
interventions. Exclusion criteria were formulated upon closer inspection of the studies. 
Studies that primarily focused on sales volume and revenue of antibiotics were 
excluded, as they were much less reflective on antibiotic consumption than 
standardised indicators that directly measured consumption, such as Defined Daily 
Dose (DDD) per 1000 inhabitants per day and DDD per 100 bed-days. Evaluative 
studies that did not provide important prescribing indicators such as prescribing rates 
and adjusted consumption measured in DDD per 100 bed-days (and to a lesser extent 
in this review, indicators pertinent to perioperative antibiotic use) were excluded, as 
these indicators were central to understanding antibiotic use and were assessed in The 
Campaign. Cross-sectional studies that only included one time-point were excluded, 
unless they were part of a bigger survey and could be joined up with related studies 
with multiple time-points. Finally, where clearly corresponding versions of Chinese and 
English articles were available, the version with the more detailed and clear described 
analysis – the English version most of the time – was included and the less informative 
version was excluded. These inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied in the 
screening process, and the outcomes of each stage of screening are summarised in 
Figure 3-1.  
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Figure 3-1. Selection process of articles for the review of the impact of The Campaign 
 
 One hundred and twenty studies were included in this review. All the studies 
were retrospective observational studies based on longitudinal datasets or surveys 
collected over specified periods of time. They could be categorised into four main 
groups based on their subject and regional focus: 
• National trends in antibiotic use in China (5 studies) 
• National evaluation of The Campaign (4 studies) 
• Regional trends in antibiotic use in China (4 studies) 
• Regional evaluation of The Campaign (12 studies) 
• Single-hospital studies (95 studies) 
These studies will be discussed in the following subsections. For consistency, 
the unit of DDD per 1000-patient-days will be converted to DDD per 100-patient-days 
by dividing a factor of 10 where applicable. As the purpose of the review is to examine 
antibiotic use in China in general, and use of specific classes of antibiotics are not 
discussed.  
A brief description of the included studies for this part of the literature review is 
available in Appendix 1, where Table A1-1 listed national and regional level studies of 
trends in antibiotic and impact evaluation of The Campaign, and Table A1-2 listed 
single-hospital evaluations of The Campaign.  
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National trends in antibiotic use in China (5 studies) 
Five studies (Van Boeckel et al., 2014; Wushouer et al., 2017a; National Health 
and Family Planning Commission, 2016; Li et al., 2013; Ren et al., 2015) drew on 
national-level databases to examine the trends in antibiotic use in China. These studies 
showed that despite an increase in the overall volume of antibiotic consumption over 
nearly two decades, consumption adjusted for patient volume and duration of treatment 
had been decreasing; as had prescribing rates in various clinical settings. On the 
whole, these studies provide recent evidence on national trends and a tangible starting 
point to understanding antibiotic use in China, but their descriptive analyses are 
insufficient to connect the broadly decreasing antibiotic use with The Campaign itself. 
Van Boeckel et al. (2014) found that China as a whole was one the biggest 
consumers of antibiotics in the world between 2000 and 2010, but per capita 
consumption was quite low. The study analysed global sales data for both hospital and 
retail sectors obtained from the commercial database IMS Health MIDAS, and reported 
consumption using a “standard unit” as defined by the database (where one pill equals 
to one dose or one unit). It found that there had been a significant increase in total 
antibiotic consumption between 2000 and 2010 in China, and that China had become 
the second largest consumer of antibiotics in the world at 1010 units just before the 
commencement of The Campaign. But due to its large population, China’s per capita 
consumption at 7.5 units per person was considerably lower than most developing and 
developed countries, such as India (10.7 units per person) and the United States (22 
units per person). The study did not provide a detailed analysis of China per se.  
Wushouer et al. (2017a) covered the period right after Van Boeckel et al. (2014) 
left off, and described the rising trends in antibiotic consumption from 2011 to 2015. It 
extracted quarterly sales data from 468 out of 1000 city-level tertiary hospitals that 
voluntarily participated in China Medical Economic Information, a database of sales 
records run by the China Pharmacy Association. It reported consumption using defined 
daily dose per 1000 inhabitants per day or DID (where number of pills or drug units 
were divided by WHO’s recommended dosage and further divided by the total number 
of population of interest in a given year, before this result was multiplied by 1000 for 
standardisation). It found that the consumption of antibiotics in China had been rising 
throughout and after The Campaign between 2011 and 2015, from around 8 DID in 
2011 to around 10 DID in 2015. But the study did not stop there: it offered a plausible 
explanation for this rising trend of consumption against The Campaign. Citing the 
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falling proportion of pharmaceutical expenditure on antibiotics (from 21% of total 
pharmaceutical expenditure in 2011 to 15% in 2015), rising total pharmaceutical 
expenditure (an average of 5.5% each year), and growing inpatient volume at tertiary 
hospitals across the country (almost doubled between 2011 and 2015), the study 
reasonably observed that the ever growing antibiotic consumption was not necessarily 
evidence against the effectiveness of The Campaign, but more of a result of ever rising 
healthcare demand and utilisation. However, as DID was calculated using the stable 
total population in China as the denominator rather than the rapidly increasing actual 
volume of patients served by the hospitals included in the analysis, consumption could 
skew unfavourably towards provinces with fewer patients. In partly addressing this 
problem, the study used inpatient volume as the denominator to explore regional 
differences and found that consumption in the affluent and resourceful eastern China – 
where population-adjusted consumption was highest – was much lower when 
consumption was adjusted for inpatient volume in comparison to western and central 
regions. From this, the study deduced that concentration of healthcare resources in the 
eastern regions attracted significant patient flows from the rest of the country, and it 
could be an indication of better antibiotic stewardship at tertiary hospitals in the more 
resourceful eastern China than the other parts. However, as better performing hospitals 
were more likely to join the network, the results from this study could be prone to 
positive selection bias.  
Li et al. (2013) and Ren et al. (2015) offered some insight into prescribing 
practices instead of consumption of antibiotics in the years leading up to and during 
The Campaign by analysing changes in prescribing rates. Together, both of these 
studies surveyed members of the National Healthcare-Associated Infection 
Surveillance System, which included tertiary hospitals with established healthcare-
associated infection practices in the country. The number of hospitals surveyed 
increased dramatically after The Campaign began, from around 200 in 2010 to over 
1300 in 2012. Li et al. (2013) covered 5 data points at 2001, 2003, 2005, 2008 and 
2010, and Ren et al. (2015) covered 1 data point at 2012. Together, these studies 
showed that overall prescribing rates in the hospitals studied had been decreasing 
before The Campaign began, from about 55% in 2001 to about 47% in 2010; this 
number fell further to just below 39% in 2012. The fact that these studies credited the 
decrease in prescribing rate to the effective implementation of antibiotic stewardship 
and surveillance that were in place even before The Campaign, but they were unlikely 
to represent the full picture, as hospitals included in these surveillance networks were 
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themselves highly aware of hospital-associated infections and antibiotic resistance, and 
already equipped with the resources to address the problems in antibiotic prescribing to 
start with. Importantly though, the two studies also provided breakdowns of antibiotic in 
different clinical departments, which demonstrated huge variances. Departments 
including respiratory medicine and paediatrics were amongst the heaviest users of 
antibiotics in the hospitals surveyed, and their antibiotic prescribing rates stayed above 
70% between 2001 and 2012, and in some years, they were close to 80%. Surgical 
urology also had a high rate of antibiotic use between 60% and 70%. These rates were 
a stark contrast to those in departments such as obstetrics (below 50%), nephrology 
(below 30%) and cardiovascular medicine (about 20%). Antibiotic stewardship at 
department level is likely to be highly adapted and specific to their needs. Although 
these credible studies showed possible progress in antibiotic stewardship over a 
decade that overlapped with The Campaign, the fact these studies came from an early 
specialist network for the control of healthcare-associated infections implied that the 
positive progress could be the result of selection bias in member institutions, which 
were likely to be better-than-average performers in the control of antibiotic use.  
The most authoritative data on antibiotic consumption and prescribing rates in 
China was provided by a recent report from the Chinese government, “The 
Administration on the Clinical Use of Antimicrobial Agents and the Status Quo of 
Antimicrobial Resistance in China” (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 
2016). The report drew on the data collected annually by the national surveillance 
system, Center for Antibacterial Surveillance (CAS), which expanded from including 
only several hundred secondary and mainly tertiary hospitals in the early 2000s to 
around 2000 hospitals from 31 provinces by 2016. This first ever official report on 
antibiotic use and resistance shed light on various indicators on consumption and 
prescribing that were specified by The Campaign. Most prominently, it reported that 
antibiotic prescribing rates had significantly decreased in inpatient (from 67.3% in 2010 
to 39.1% in 2015, including both surgical and non-surgical patients) and outpatient 
settings (from 17.2 % in 2011 to 11.2% in 2015). Inpatient consumption of antibiotics 
measured by defined daily dose per 100 patient-days, which accounted for both the 
volume of patients and the duration of their hospital stay, had also fallen (from 85 in 
2005 to 50 DDD per 100-patient-days in 2015). It was worth noting that this adjusted 
consumption stayed above 78 DDDs per 100 patient-days until 2010, and did not start 
to fall until 2011, when The Campaign began. The report also described progress in 
antibiotic stewardship in surgeries, such as antibiotic use for various surgical incisions 
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and timing and duration of perioperative antibiotic use, where all results showed 
improvement from 2011 and 2012. Finally, similar to Wushouer et al. (2017a), the 
report described the downward trends in the proportion of revenue from antibiotic sales 
in total pharmaceutical revenue (from 19.7% in 2010 to 11.3% in 2015) and in per 
capita expenditure on antibiotics. The report largely reported positive improvements 
from the government’s perspective and sought to attribute them to the implementation 
of The Campaign, but it did not have any analytical methods to support the claims.   
 
National evaluation of The Campaign (4 studies) 
Four studies (Zou et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2016; Bao et al., 2015b; Sun et al., 
2015a) attempted to examine trends in antibiotic use independently and investigate 
whether The Campaign was truly responsible for any substantial change. Although all 
these studies claimed to show significant reductions in antibiotic use since The 
Campaign began, none of these studies was equipped with a sufficiently robust design 
to attribute causality. Even so, two studies (Bao et al., 2015b; Sun et al., 2015a) 
employed rigorous analytical methods to provide compelling insight into changes in the 
trends in antibiotic prescribing before and after The Campaign. These evaluative 
studies confirmed the downward trends in antibiotic use observed by the non-
evaluative studies and implied a possible role of The Campaign in generating the 
trends. However, the causal role of The Campaign in reducing antibiotic use could not 
be ascertained; also, questions about variation across regions, clinical settings and 
types of hospitals raised by some of the studies of trends as well as evaluative studies 
reviewed in this section need to be explored carefully. 
Both Sun et al. (2015a) and Bao et al. (2015b) conducted time series analysis 
using the method of segmented regression and investigated changes in antibiotic use 
over several time periods defined by the authors, including one that overlapped with 
The Campaign. Both studies attempted to achieve representativeness at the national 
level, with respective shortcomings. Sun et al. (2015a) randomly sampled prescriptions 
and medical records from the 2000-strong national network, the Center for Antibacterial 
Surveillance, and surveyed 35 tertiary hospitals from its six constituent regions to 
achieve better representation, but it failed to acknowledge secondary hospitals. Bao et 
al. (2015b) had better representation of secondary hospitals, as they reached out to an 
informal hospital network based on common interest in research and eventually 
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extracted data from 65 public hospitals that responded (35 secondary and 30 tertiary 
hospitals). However, the peer nature of the network could have compromised the 
neutrality of the study as interested hospitals were likely to be more dedicated in 
antibiotic stewardship from the start. With Sun et al. (2015a) reporting 32 quarterly data 
points between 2005 to 2012 and Bao et al. (2015b) 48 monthly data points between 
2010 and 2014, these studies jointly presented an account of contemporality between 
notable reduction in antibiotic use and commencement of The Campaign. Both studies 
reported a marked decrease in antibiotic use over their study periods, observing large 
reductions in outpatient (from about 15% to 10% in Sun et al.; from about 40% to 30% 
in Bao et al.) and inpatient antibiotic prescribing rates (from about 75% to 50% in Sun 
et al.; from about 60% to 35% in Bao et al.) and inpatient antibiotic consumption (from 
about 75 to 45 DDDs per 100 patient-days in Sun et al; from about 80 to 30 DDDs per 
100 patient days in Bao et al.). Further findings include reduction in medical 
expenditure and improvements in perioperative antibiotic use. Although the exact range 
of figures varies to some degree due to sampling differences, the trends in these 
indicators are largely in line with those observed in the national report (National Health 
and Family Planning Commission, 2016). Most crucially, these two studies used 
segmented regression to analyse and compare these trends in separate phases in 
relation to The Campaign and demonstrated an observable decrease in antibiotic use 
in the periods after the commencement of The Campaign. Sun et al. (2015a) separated 
their data into two phases: before (2005 – 2011) and after (2011 – 2012). Bao et al. 
(2015b) broke down their data into three phases: preparation (2010 – 2011), 
intervention (2011 – 2012) and assessment (2012 – 2014). With the intervention phase 
in both studies alluding to the possible effectiveness of The Campaign in driving down 
antibiotic use, Bao et al. (2015b) went further to illustrate that the effect had in fact 
significantly intensified across most of the indicators for antibiotic use when comparing 
the assessment phase to the intervention phase. Even though these two studies were 
unable to attribute direct causality between The Campaign and the observed 
reductions in antibiotic use due to the lack of a control group or counterfactual, they 
supplied convincing empirical evidence to further this theoretically plausible hypothesis 
by showing synchronicity between the timing of the two events. Together with the 
national trends depicted in the studies described earlier, these studies provided further 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the implementation of The Campaign may be 
related to the reduction in antibiotic use at a national level in large public hospitals, the 
target hospitals of the policies. 
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In comparison, two other national evaluations from Zou et al. (2014) and Zhou 
et al. (2016) were much weaker in terms of their analysis. Without using segmented 
regression, they were unable to measure changes in antibiotic use through phases of 
time in relation to The Campaign, even though their observations about decreasing 
antibiotic prescribing and patient-day-adjusted consumption were consistent the 
findings of the more rigorous evaluations above. As these studies had only two cross-
sectional data points in 2011 and 2012, they were only able to show whether there 
were any significant differences in the observed indicators between the two years. As 
both studies focused on specialised hospitals only, they were highly unrepresentative 
of the broader healthcare context, where most hospitals were general hospitals. Their 
overall sampling frame was unclear, despite both having included over 200 hospitals 
from 30 provinces. To further undermine the validity of their analysis, Zou et al. (2014) 
sampled two different groups of hospitals at the two data points. Despite these 
limitations, these two studies performed subgroup analysis to provide some insight into 
variations across regions, types and sizes of hospitals. In particular, Zhou et al. (2016) 
performed a multivariate analysis to show that specialised hospitals in the central 
region were associated with better adherence to guidelines in antibiotic use for type I 
incisions. However, the confusing display of multiple data tables coupled with a lack of 
cogent descriptions of findings in reporting made drawing clear and useful lessons from 
these studies even more difficult.  
 
Regional trends in antibiotic use in China (4 studies) 
Four studies of the regional trends (Yin, Li & Sun, 2018; Wushouer et al., 
2017b; Lin et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017b) provided a limited but useful window to 
explore regional variations in antibiotic use, which were sometimes substantial. Time 
trends in antibiotic use were described in these studies, but not studied with statistical 
tools. Importantly, some of these studies provided a new angle of analysis by 
comparing antibiotic use at the primary care level with secondary and tertiary hospitals. 
In sum, the studies of regional trends in antibiotic use revealed heterogeneity and 
complexity in antibiotic use in different parts of China. The level of urbanisation could 
have huge bearing on the pattern of healthcare utilization and consequently antibiotic 
consumption. Therefore, even though there were indications that The Campaign could 
be associated with reducing antibiotic use, it was unlikely that all regions were equally 
affected by its implementation. The policy approach of The Campaign to focus on 
Chapter 3. Literature Review 
46 
 
secondary and tertiary hospitals could impact more significantly where they were 
responsible for most of the antibiotic consumption, such as Changsha and Shanghai. 
Zhang et al. (2017b) described a falling inpatient prescribing rate across all 
three levels of hospitals between 2003 and 2014 in Changsha City, the capital of 
Hunan Province in southern China. It sourced annually reported inpatient prescribing 
data from the Urban Employees Basic Medical Insurance database, which covered 
nearly 60% of the population of Changsha. The study reported that the inpatient 
prescribing rate in hospitals steadily declined from close to 80% in 2003 to below 50% 
in 2014, a trend that was consistent with national studies. Notably, 2011—the year The 
Campaign commenced—marked the turning point for the increasing use of one single 
antibiotic and the beginning of a sharp decline in the use of multiple antibiotics for a 
given course of treatment, so that by 2014 the prescribing rate of single-antibiotic 
treatments far exceeded that of combination therapies by nearly 20%. The study 
provided a breakdown of prescribing rates by hospital level for only one data point at 
2014, and it offered useful insight into the pattern of antibiotic use in hospitals across 
all levels of healthcare. For that year, 50 primary care hospitals, 26 secondary hospitals 
and 30 tertiary hospitals were included in the analysis. It showed that primary care 
hospitals had higher inpatient prescribing rate (53.5% at primary level versus 45.2% 
and 40.2% at secondary and tertiary hospitals respectively) and were seemingly more 
reliant on antibiotics for their revenue than higher-level hospitals (antibiotics accounted 
for 24.7% of the total health expenditure at primary level, versus 14.5% and 10.8% at 
secondary and tertiary hospitals respectively). Nevertheless, much lower per capita 
expenditure on antibiotics at primary level compared with higher-level hospitals (132.5 
USD at primary level versus 160.6 USD and 314.8 USD at secondary and tertiary 
levels respectively) pointed to the fact that the more advanced (and consequently 
expensive) antibiotics were used mostly at tertiary hospitals.  It is therefore necessary 
for further research to be undertaken to understand the appropriateness and the 
implications of the policy approach of The Campaign to prioritise tertiary hospitals and 
to a lesser extent, secondary hospitals in enforcing antibiotic stewardship.  
 Lin et al. (2016) and Yin et al. (2018) both reported antibiotic use – mainly in the 
form of population-adjusted consumption, DID – in all three levels of hospitals in two 
cities in eastern China, a region with high levels of antibiotic use identified in Wushouer 
et al. (2017a). Both studies analysed sales data from official procurement platforms for 
pharmaceuticals at the municipal or provincial level, which were used extensively by all 
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levels of public hospitals. Lin et al. (2016) measured 24 quarterly data points between 
2009 and 2014, whilst Yin et al. (2018) measured 5 annual data points between 2012 
and 2016. Despite the similarities, the regional settings of the two studies, and the 
subsequent pattern of antibiotic use across the three levels of healthcare were 
drastically different. Lin et al. (2016) investigated the highly urbanised and metropolitan 
Shanghai City, where healthcare was provided in about 180 hospitals (30 tertiary and 
150 secondary hospitals) and close to 300 community healthcare centres at the 
primary level. Yin et al. (2018) studied one of the most agricultural regions in Shandong 
Province, where over 500 higher-level hospitals were significantly outnumbered by 
more than 2000 primary care providers in the urban (about 500) and rural areas (more 
than 1500). Over the studied period,  Lin et al. (2016) saw a huge reduction in antibiotic 
use in Shanghai from over 20 to just below 16 DID, whilst Yin et al. (2018) observed a 
small increase from 13 to 14 DID.  
These differing trends could be open to more detailed investigation and 
interpretation beyond these studies, because, as pointed out in the review by 
Wushouer et al. (2017a), the overall increase in the population-adjusted antibiotic 
consumption could well be a reflection of the rising demand for healthcare and 
increasing patient volumes. However, insightful interpretation could be made through 
comparing the contrasting study settings. Firstly, regional characteristics could give rise 
to very different patterns of antibiotic consumption across levels of healthcare: 
secondary and tertiary hospitals were responsible for most of the antibiotic 
consumption in mainly urban regions rather than regions with vast rural areas. For 
Shanghai, Lin et al. (2016) found that primary care accounted for 36% of antibiotic 
consumption, whereas hospitals accounted for 64%. For Shandong, Yin et al. (2018) 
found that primary care – the vast majority (nearly 90%) of which were rural primary 
care facilities – accounted for 80% of antibiotic consumption, and higher-level hospitals 
accounted for merely 20%. Secondly, given the first point, dramatic reduction in 
population-adjusted antibiotic consumption starting from 2011 in Shanghai, where 
higher-level hospitals consumed most antibiotics, was consistent with the designed 
impact of The Campaign. Antibiotic consumption in Shanghai had been on the rise until 
the first quarter of 2011, at which point it reached the highest recorded level of 29 DID. 
This level was even higher than those reported in Wushouer et al. (2017a), which did 
not have data from Shanghai but estimated that tertiary hospitals in the two bordering 
provinces of Shanghai in eastern China had the highest antibiotic consumption (>19 
DID) across the country. Dramatically, consumption sharply reduced to around 17 DID 
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by the fourth quarter of 2011 and had since been fluctuating steadily around that level 
until the last period of the study in 2014. Considering that the DID estimates did not 
consider duration of treatment (DDD per 100 patient-days) and hence were not 
necessarily reflective of rational antibiotic use per se, and the fact that the study had 
not yet been adjusted for patient flows from other provinces, which would account for 
over 20% of the patients in hospitals in Shanghai, the drastic decrease in DID was a 
remarkable trend that could be indicative of the impact of The Campaign. Thirdly, the 
moderately upward fluctuations seen in population-adjusted antibiotic consumption 
during the years of The Campaign in Shandong, where primary care overwhelmingly 
dominated antibiotic consumption, could be better understood in the context of the 
study of Shanghai. Yin et al. (2018) estimated that population-adjusted antibiotic 
consumption in Shandong was around 14 DID between 2012 and 2016. This was 
higher than the estimate for Shandong at a range of 5 – 8 DID given in Wushouer et al. 
(2017a), which only estimated consumption in tertiary hospitals, and thus further 
showed that primary care was a key driver for antibiotic consumption in Shandong. 
Although it was fair for Yin et al. (2018) to note that The Campaign only addressed 
higher-level hospitals and further actions were needed to rationalise antibiotic 
prescribing at the primary care level for provinces like Shandong, the role of primary 
care in driving overall antibiotic consumption in China remained unclear. What was 
clear was that the more hospital-dominant Shanghai (16 DID) and the more primary-
care-dominant Shandong (14 DID) were both reaching very similar levels of 
consumption after The Campaign started from 2012 onwards.  
 Wushouer et al. (2017b) outlined antibiotic consumption in the western Xinjiang 
Province between 2014 and 2016. It collected quarterly data on inpatient antibiotic use 
from 36 hospitals in the province, and showed that in this post-Campaign period, 
patient-day adjusted consumption of antibiotics remained relatively stable around 40 
DDD per 100-patient-days. It was within the range of consumption reported in national-
level studies and evaluations. As the purpose of the study was to articulate the 
relationship between consumption and resistance, it did not investigate in depth the 
trend in consumption per se.   
Regional evaluation of The Campaign (12 studies) 
Twelve studies (Tang et al., 2018; Wang & Jin, 2013; Shi et al., 2014; Zhang et 
al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2017a; 
Duanmu et al., 2015; Ma, 2013; Shu et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2013a) evaluated impact 
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of The Campaign on antibiotic use in various cities and regions. However, only 1 study 
conducted rigorous analysis using segmented regression. Tertiary and secondary 
hospitals were the main interest, and in a few studies primary care was also studied. 
Most of these studies reported largely positive outcomes that need to be cautiously 
interpreted, but some of them conducted useful sub-group analyses and provided 
critical comments on deficiencies in the implementation of The Campaign. Even though 
the findings of the regional evaluations were consistent with national evaluations in 
saying that The Campaign had reduced antibiotic use, they did not sufficiently unravel 
and interpret variations of the impact in different regional and clinical settings. 
Tang et al. (2018) employed segmented regression to examine the impact of 
The Campaign on antibiotic use at primary care level in Hubei Province in central 
China. They extracted monthly records for 31 months between 2011 and 2013 from the 
procurement database for urban and rural primary care centres in the province. Whilst 
the study observed some decrease in the total volume of unadjusted antibiotic 
consumption at primary care level, it did not find the decrease to be substantial. 
Therefore, The Campaign’s impact on primary care remained inconclusive. As the 
study did not report population-adjusted consumption, its findings were difficult to 
compare with those from the studies of trends discussed above.  
Eleven remaining regional evaluation studies were similar to the national 
evaluations from Zou et al. (2014) and Zhou et al. (2016) in the sense that their 
analytical strategies were too weak to support their purpose, and their presentation of 
findings was not effective at times. These studies did not adequately report their 
sampling frame and process and were likely to be subjected to selection bias of better-
performing hospitals. The majority of the studies only conducted descriptive 
comparisons in antibiotic use and prescribing rates across different years and did not 
seem to have employed statistical methods in their analyses (Wang & Jin, 2013; Shi et 
al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2016; Duanmu et al., 2015; Ma, 2013; Shu et al., 2015; Yang et 
al., 2013a). The studies focused on urban settings in various parts of China, especially 
large cities exemplified by Beijing, Tianjin (both in northern China), Shanghai (eastern 
China), Guangzhou (southern China) and Chengdu (western China). Apart from a few 
studies that included a small number of primary care clinics, most studies focused on 
tertiary hospitals, and occasionally secondary hospitals and primary care clinics. 
Findings of the studies were generally positive about The Campaign, highlighting 
decreasing antibiotic use and prescribing rates even at primary care level. However, 
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there was insufficient interpretation of these positive findings and few studies critiqued 
The Campaign where findings were less optimal. A few studies did provide insightful 
analysis that echoed observations about variation in antibiotic use in different clinical 
and resource settings. For example,  Yang et al. (2013a) noted antibiotic use in given 
clinical departments depended heavily on their patient mix (for instance, paediatrics 
and respiratory medicine sustained high levels of antibiotic use), so that uniform 
policies that were not adapted to clinical needs in those departments could hinder 
implementation. Shu et al. (2015) identified several problems in implementation 
associated with the suboptimal impact of The Campaign in some hospitals, including 
insufficient adherence to accountability and performance assessment mechanisms, 
lack of resources in some hospitals to devote to training clinical pharmacists and 
building adequate microbiology facilities, and slow introduction of information 
technology platforms in some hospitals to digitalise the prescribing system and its 
management.  
 
Single-hospital studies (95 studies) 
Ninety-five studies examined antibiotic use within single hospitals. More than 
three quarters of the 95 single-hospital studies were from tertiary hospitals (64 general, 
6 specialist and 2 traditional Chinese medicine hospitals), and 21 out of the 23 
remaining studies were from secondary hospitals (18 general and 3 specialist 
hospitals); only 2 studies were from primary hospitals. The majority of the single-
hospital studies (67 studies) examined overall antibiotic prescribing in hospitals, whilst 
the rest (28 studies) focused on specific clinical departments or procedures, especially 
surgery (13 studies) and orthopaedics (5 studies). But the findings of these studies did 
not substantially add to those from the evaluative studies or studies of trends at 
regional and national levels.  
Although these studies claimed to evaluate the impact of The Campaign, they 
provided nothing more than descriptions of cross-sectional trends for prescribing 
indicators from various timepoints before, during and after The Campaign. In doing so, 
they did not employ segmented regression to analyse the trends.  
Furthermore, these methodological limitations in study design and analysis 
were further subjected to greater publication bias than studies at regional and national 
levels. These studies were overwhelmingly positive about and confirmed the impact of 
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The Campaign in their findings, consistently reporting reductions in prescribing rates 
and inpatient antibiotic consumption as well as improvements in perioperative 
prescribing practices without offering robust analysis of how The Campaign was related 
to improvement in antibiotic stewardship or critical insight into areas where 
implementation to The Campaign were less ideal. This potentially amplified publication 
bias was understandable: rather than being conducted by independent researchers, 
the lead authors of the studies were internal to the hospitals concerned, and they were 
unlikely to publicly critique their employers’ performance in implementing The 
Campaign due to their professional interests. 
 
3.3 Review of the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies 
To examine existing empirical studies pertinent to understanding the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China, literature from two related 
subject areas was examined: implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies around 
the world (including China), and implementation of other health policies specifically in 
China. Therefore, two separate sets of search terms were used to reflect the two 
subject areas of interest. One set of terms were concepts related to “policy 
implementation” and “antibiotic stewardship”. The other set of terms were concepts 
related to “policy implementation”, “health” and “China”. To focus on implementation, 
both sets of terms actively excluded concepts related to “impact evaluation” by using 
the operator “NOT”. For CNKI, Chinese translations of the relevant terms were used.  
There were three main inclusion criteria for the articles identified. Firstly, they 
had to be studies with clear study designs aimed at collecting primary data. Secondly, 
studies had to include explicit analysis of some aspects of policy implementation as 
part of their main aims and results. Thirdly, studies of antibiotic stewardship policies 
had to address hospital settings rather than other settings. Based on these criteria, 
titles and abstracts of the articles identified were screened, before the full-text articles 
were retrieved for further assessment for inclusion for the review. The outcomes of 
each stage of the selection process are described in Figure 3-2.  
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Figure 3-2 Selection process of articles for the review of empirical studies of policy implementation related to 
the research topic 
 
In the end, 23 studies were included for review. As explained above, they were 
categorised into three main groups based on topic areas and methodologies:  
• Implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies outside China (14 studies) 
• Implementation of other health policies specifically in China (5 studies) 
• Implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China (4 studies) 
These studies are discussed in turn in the following subsections, which are 
followed by a summary of themes from the findings of all the studies.  
 
Implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies outside China (14 
studies) 
Fourteen cross-sectional studies analysed the implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in countries outside China. Although no explicit differentiations 
were made between the concepts of context and process, these studies commented on 
some aspects relevant to these concepts in reporting findings pertinent to policy 
implementation.  
Nine cross-sectional studies (Hersh et al., 2009; Pope et al., 2009; Johannsson 
et al., 2011; Doron et al., 2013; James et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2015; Bryant, 2015; 
Enani, 2016; Wolf et al., 2016) used internet-, email- or fax-based surveys as a data 
collection method to examine the characteristics of various antibiotic stewardship 
policies and their implementation across various hospital settings including acute care, 
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paediatrics, oncology, tertiary hospitals, and public and private hospitals. With sample 
sizes varying from just over 10 to over 500, these studies addressed several 
geographic regions around the world, particularly North America, Australia and the 
Arabian Gulf.  In addressing implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies, these 
studies focused on identifying factors pertinent to policy implementation at the hospital 
level in the form of “barriers to implementation” perceived by various actors at the 
hospital level including prescribers, clinical pharmacists and directors sampled from 
professional or hospital networks from around the world. Prominent barriers to 
implementation identified included lack of funding, lack of the necessary personnel and 
capacity for antibiotic stewardship, lack of support from prescribing prescribers 
(especially senior prescribers), lack of support from the hospital administration and 
management team, lack of prioritisation compared with other programmes, lack of time, 
and lack of IT and data support.  
However, these nine studies provided limited descriptive insights into some but 
not all aspects of implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies. Although the cross-
sectional methodology enabled gross generalisation of hospital level contextual factors, 
the limitations of the survey method made it impossible for these studies to collect 
sufficient qualitative data to explore further how and why these contextual factors 
significantly hindered implementation. In addition, as the options in the survey 
instruments were predetermined based on expert opinions and literature reviews, they 
were too generalised to reflect the full range of opinions held by the respondents or the 
complexity of behaviours or interactions amongst various groups of medical 
professionals and specialists.  
Five case studies (Charani et al., 2013; James et al., 2015; Jeffs et al., 2015; 
Cotta et al., 2015; Bailey, Tully & Cooke, 2015) adopted qualitative methods such as 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups to collect more in-depth information about 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in various medical settings in 
Australia, the UK, and the United States. These studies encompassed the perspectives 
of a range of key actors of antibiotic stewardship at the hospital level including 
prescribers, infectious disease specialists, clinical pharmacists, microbiologists and 
hospital executives. Besides commenting on additional factors at the hospital level, 
these studies also addressed factors at the national and the individual levels. At the 
national level, the main barriers to implementation were lack of uniform international 
and regional guidelines, and the enabling factors were introduction of formal mandates. 
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At the hospital level, the barriers to implementation summarised previously were 
reaffirmed by these studies. Additionally, several enabling factors were identified, 
including reinforcement of other supportive policies; establishment of an effective 
administrative structure; establishment of an antibiotic stewardship committee; 
introduction of leadership by bringing senior and respected members into the 
committee; and creation of collaborative relationships across departments. At the 
individual level, barriers to implementation were exemplified by lack of knowledge and 
understanding of antibiotic use or policies; lack of consideration of patient behaviours 
and preferences; lack of considerations for prescriber-patient relationships; and 
interference with physician autonomy.  
Two mixed-method case studies – Charani et al. (2013) and James et al. (2015) 
– combined quantitative and qualitative methods to understand implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship programmes, and their interviewees and focus group participants 
were representative of the actors involved in hospital level implementation, including 
medical professionals and administration personnel. The qualitative components of 
both studies essentially offered more detailed and grounded explanations for the 
“barriers” to implementation that they identified. These studies identified hospital-level 
factors that were broadly consistent with some of those which emerged from the cross-
sectional studies described previously, but their thematic analysis was more detailed 
and grounded to the narrative within the data. In evaluating a smartphone application 
for the delivery of antibiotic stewardship policies, Charani et al. (2013) identified 
hospital level factors, such as support for timely updates of the programme, 
commitment of hospitals to different mobile platforms and their policies on use of 
mobile devices at work, were important to the implementation of the intervention. 
James et al. (2015) described specific issues in their many study sites, including 
variation of antibiotic stewardship practices, lack of arrangements to access relevant 
experts, difficulty in maintaining workforce capacity, and differing governance 
structures. Additionally, these studies also outlined how individual level factors such as 
perception and understanding of the policies of interest, social preferences of 
behaviours and prescriber-patient interactions could influence implementation.  
However, these mixed-method case studies were only attempting to enrich 
quantitative findings using some qualitative data; neither of the studies above was fully 
devoted to providing in-depth analysis of implementation based on detailed description 
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of the actors’ perceptions and behaviours. Neither study presented sufficiently detailed 
qualitative analysis.  
Three case studies – Cotta et al. (2015), Bailey et al. (2015) and Jeffs et al. 
(2015) – relied solely on qualitative methods, and gave much more detail about the 
perceptions and reported behaviours of the actors involved in antibiotic stewardship. 
These case studies showed that by employing in-depth qualitative methods, more 
substantiated and systematic thematic analysis could be produced. Studying private 
hospitals, Cotta et al. (2015) interviewed comprehensive focus groups of actors 
including prescribers, specialists, microbiologists and executives to articulate how 
hospital level factors (such as enforcement, scope for introducing guidelines and 
resources) and individual level factors (such as knowledge of antibiotic use, and 
behaviours and interactions within and between different specialties) could contribute 
to “barriers” to implementation in the private hospital context. Jeffs et al. (2015) 
interviewed a small set of prescribers and pharmacists in academic hospitals and 
provided detailed analysis of how antibiotic stewardship policies were implemented at 
the hospital level under the themes of leadership, collaborative relationships and 
progress tracking. Furthermore, Bailey et al. (2015) highlighted factors crucial to policy 
implementation at the national level, including availability of uniform guidelines and 
introduction of formal mandates.  
Despite providing more detailed qualitative data and analyses, these three 
qualitative case studies shared a common weakness: findings from these studies were 
often presented as descriptive themes, in which no clear conceptual distinctions were 
made concerning different levels of implementation, or factors pertinent to context and 
process respectively. Consequently, these studies were unable to take full advantage 
of the qualitative data they collected to provide cogent interpretations for the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies.   
 
Implementation of other health policies in China (5 studies) 
Five qualitative case studies (Duckett, 2001; Tolhurst et al., 2004; Schwartz & 
Evans, 2007; Dong, Christensen & Painter, 2014; Xiao et al., 2013b) examined health 
policy areas other than antibiotic stewardship in China. Apart from Dong et al. (2014), 
who used secondary data only, all other studies employed qualitative methods, such as 
interviews and focus groups, to gather primary data. All five studies revealed factors 
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crucial to policy implementation specific to the Chinese context. At the national level, 
barriers to implementation were posed by lack of state capacity to enforce policy; lack 
of financial support at the central level; lack of coordinated reforms to address 
fundamental problems in the healthcare system; lack of alignment between the 
responsibilities of government ministries and their roles in policy implementation; lack 
of coordination across government ministries; lack of regulatory power of laws and 
regulations; and extensive decentralisation. Corresponding to some of these barriers 
were several enabling factors, such as strengthening of the capacity and effectiveness 
of administrative accountability and bureaucracy; provision of financial support; 
mobilisation of high level of political support and prioritisation; enactment of laws, 
policies and regulations; and mobilisation of support from non-state actors. At the local 
level, barriers to policy implementation comprised lack of financial support at the local 
level; lack of the necessary personnel and capacity; lack of alignment of interests of 
different actors; lack of local political prioritisation; lack of effective supervision and 
reporting, which could enable gaming behaviours; lack of realistic target management 
approach; lack of accountability at the local level; and lack of attention to service users’ 
demands.  
Three case studies (Duckett, 2001; Tolhurst et al., 2004; Schwartz & Evans, 
2007) described implementation of various health policies in China without using 
theory. All three studies were case studies of policy implementation at the local level in 
China with strong qualitative components: Duckett (2001) studied pilot reforms of social 
health insurance in several cities in China by drawing on interviews with both central 
and local officials; Tolhurst et al. (2004) investigated the implementation of Maternal 
and Infant Health Care Law in two poor counties in China at county, township and 
village levels using both quantitative and qualitative methods, which included key 
informant interviews with local officials, and in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions with villagers; Schwartz and Evans (2007) analysed the implementation of 
public health responses of a township in Western China to the SARS epidemic based 
on mainly secondary accounts and few interviews. Situated in the background of local 
healthcare context, Duckett (2001) and Tolhurst et al. (2004) appropriately highlighted 
the complexity of local implementation due to the interaction between macro- and micro 
level factors. Although interpretation of the data was not aided by either top-down or 
bottom-up approaches to understanding policy implementation in both studies, these 
studies managed effectively to highlight the dynamics between the two approaches to 
understanding policy implementation in an implicit way. Duckett (2001) noted that 
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centrally formulated schemes encountered problems with implementation in local cities 
for several reasons. Firstly, micro level factors – the tensions and dynamics in the 
alignment of economic and political interests amongst local actors including 
government departments, enterprises, hospitals and medicine producers – were 
influential. Secondly, interaction between macro- and micro level factors further 
complicated local implementation in China’s political context. Thirdly, macro level 
factors such as weak state capacity, lack of necessary health reforms, misalignment 
between government ministries with their roles in policy implementation and extensive 
fiscal decentralisation coupled with micro level factors including lack of local 
government accountability, to strengthen the abilities and interests of local 
governments to resist reforms proposed by the central government. Tolhurst et al. 
(2004) identified several “barriers” to implementation at macro and micro levels, 
including the lack of local financial support from central government and decentralised 
local governments, personnel capacity, and alignment of political remits and interests 
of the various government departments involved. The discussions of these factors were 
situated in the background of local healthcare delivery and financing, including access, 
utilisation and demand for maternal and childcare services. There were also elements 
pertinent to implementation processes: the authors noted that there were reported 
gaming behaviours in the form of selective or false reporting when targets of the policy 
of interest were not met. Much of the analysis by Schwartz and Evans (2007) was 
based on secondary data rather than the highly limited primary qualitative data, and as 
a result, their empirical analysis of local implementation was not strongly supported. 
However, they shed useful light on a few macro level factors that could influence policy 
implementation at the national level, noting macro level factors such as capacity of the 
state, central budgetary support, political support, enactment of laws and regulations, 
local adaptation of the central policies, and the role of non-state actors such as civil 
associations and village committees.  
Whilst the above studies managed to address elements pertinent to policy 
implementation at macro and micro levels in China, the absence of theoretical 
frameworks restricted the interpretation of their rich and interesting data. Although 
these studies showed that insightful qualitative case studies could be conducted 
without the use of theory, they also demonstrated the difficulty to clearly explain all the 
conceptual elements pertinent to different levels of policy implementation without 
implementation theory.  
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Two studies (Dong, Christensen & Painter, 2014; Xiao et al., 2013b) made 
explicit use of theories in analysing policy implementation.   
An analysis of policy documents and existing studies conducted by Dong et al. 
(2014) aimed to understand the lack of implementation in healthcare reform in China 
relying purely on secondary qualitative data sources such as policy documents and 
published studies. Despite all three approaches to understanding policy implementation 
– top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches – being described, application of these 
theories in analysis was absent. Even though policy implementation was not the main 
subject of the paper, it provided some useful analysis of the interactions and 
coordination amongst actors at the central level.  
Xiao, Zhao, et al. (2013) presented a case study of the New Essential 
Medicines Policy at the local level. “Complex adaptive systems”, which “originated from 
running agent-based models on computers which attempted to model complex natural 
or artificial behaviours, or more recently complex social phenomena such as health 
interventions and reforms”, was used as the theoretical framework for the study to 
study the “non-linearity” of policy process generated by the dynamics of actor 
behaviours (Xiao et al., 2013b). Based on the description provided by the authors, it 
was clear that this stream of theory was not entirely appropriate to understanding policy 
implementation. Firstly, despite the elements of complex adaptive systems perhaps 
sharing commonality with those pertinent to implementation theories, such as 
interactions amongst actors, adaptive behaviours and deviation from intended policy 
mechanisms and/or outputs, implementation theories would be much better placed to 
conceptualise and align these elements with the purpose of exploring and 
understanding policy implementation, which was what the authors explicitly tried to 
achieve. Secondly, heavily focused on actors and relationships but without 
incorporating elements that could allow for any conceptualisation of process or context 
at different levels, the theory of complex adaptive systems was likely to generate 
muddled interpretations that were indeed complex if not complicated, at best when it 
came to explaining policy implementation. Xiao, Zhao, et al. (2013) demonstrated these 
problems. Although their study highlighted the complexity of policy process introduced 
by local actors by drawing on qualitative data from local officials, prescribers and 
patients from three remote counties, the themes of the main findings, which concerned 
the unexpected outcomes, adaptive behaviours and non-linear implementation, merely 
presented rather than unpacked the complexity associated with policy implementation.  
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As a result of inappropriate use of theory, neither study above engendered 
insight into implementation of health policies in China compared with the three studies 
(Duckett, 2001; Tolhurst et al., 2004; Schwartz & Evans, 2007) that were conducted 
without using theory.  
 
Implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China (4 studies) 
Four qualitative case studies (Liu et al., 2011a; Li et al., 2014b; Wang et al., 
2016; Jin et al., 2011) specifically analysed Antibiotic stewardship policies in China. 
Apart from Wang et al. (2016), who used secondary data only, all other studies 
gathered primary data mainly through interviews. All the studies identified factors 
crucial to policy implementation at the national, hospital and individual levels. At the 
national level, barriers to implementation included lack of coordinated reforms to 
address fundamental problems in the healthcare system; lack of enforcement of 
existing laws and policies; and lack of coordination across government ministries. At 
the hospital level, barriers to implementation consisted of lack of necessary personnel 
and capacity for antibiotic stewardship; and lack of time. At the individual level, barriers 
to implementation were represented by lack of knowledge and understanding of 
antibiotic use or policies; and lack of trust in prescriber-patient relationships.  
Two studies (Liu et al., 2011a; Li et al., 2014b) analysed some aspects relevant 
to the implementation of Antibiotic stewardship policies in China without applying 
implementation theory.  
In their discussion about antibiotic stewardship in China, two case studies 
based on structured interviews, G. Liu et al. (2011) and M. Li et al. (2014), had some 
findings regarding the influence of macro level factors such as China’s pharmaceutical 
distribution system, pharmaceutical regulatory system and health financing system on 
antibiotic prescribing and use, as well as micro level factors concerning prescribers’ 
and patients’ understanding and behaviours. In addition, they very briefly outlined 
hospital level factors that could influence implementation of guidelines, including 
deteriorating prescriber relationships, lack of laboratory resources and human 
resources.  
However, the reporting in both studies was unsatisfactory. Both studies 
reported sample sizes in the range of several hundred people, which is highly unusual 
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for qualitative studies. It was unclear how these structured interviews were conducted, 
and at the same time the reporting of findings was insufficient. G. Liu et al. (2011) 
reported very limited empirical results, and in presenting their results they did not make 
clear which sections were authors’ own prescriptive discussions and which sections 
came from data from interviews. M. Li et al. (2014) reported a series of descriptive 
statistics to summarise responses to their questions without presenting any themes. It 
was unclear if either study had the appropriate qualitative data to support more 
meaningful analysis. 
Two other studies (Wang et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2011) explicitly applied 
theoretical approaches in their analysis of policy implementation.  
In an ambitious study, Wang et al. (2016) attempted to apply the complex 
system theory first described in the discussion of Xiao, Zhao, et al. (2013) in an 
analysis of secondary data, with the aim of analysing how “adaptive activities and 
interactive relationships” amongst different parts and agents in the healthcare system 
“influence the implementation of policy interventions”. Their study sought to address 
issues related to both antibiotic stewardship and distribution of pharmaceuticals at all 
levels, including actors at the government policy level down to individual patients, from 
hospitals to the pharmaceutical distribution industry. There were two major problems 
with this study. Firstly, the study completely relied on secondary data sources of 
published studies and policy documents. The evidence base of the study was 
insufficient to support the ambitious scale of its investigation or its conclusions to start 
with. Secondly, as with Xiao, Zhao, et al. (2013), using complex system theory to 
explain policy implementation represented a case of misapplication of theory. The 
complex system theory was not suitable to understanding policy implementation. 
Similar to Xiao, Zhao, et al. (2013) the findings of Wang et al. (2016) rightly presented 
the complexity of policy implementation by highlighting the fact that there were many 
actors and complicated incentive mechanisms in a system where actors interact with 
antibiotic use at various levels. Again, however, the inappropriate use of theory greatly 
limited the extent to which the stated complexity could be unpacked and analysed.  
In a qualitative case study, Jin et al. (2011) investigated perceptions and 
practices of antibiotic use amongst nearly 30 villagers from 4 villages in 2 provinces to 
understand “technology regulation”. Although this framing represented much broader 
policy issues, the scope of this paper was compatible with the concept of antibiotic 
stewardship, as the authors specifically referred to an antibiotic stewardship policy 
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when explaining their rationale. From the title, the authors make it very clear that it is 
their intention to apply the bottom-up perspective to understand individual level factors 
that could shape local implementation context of antibiotic stewardship policies, and 
explained the rationale by introducing the idea of “backward-mapping” (Elmore, 1979). 
Jin et al. (2011) study took on the bottom-up perspective in two significant ways. Firstly, 
the focus of the study eschewed “the Centre”, and instead emphasised the role of local 
actors pertinent to the policy issues. Secondly, instead of examining the intended 
outcomes of the policies of interest, this study explored the perspectives and 
behaviours local actors on the demand side: the villagers. Hence, this study revealed 
that local awareness and perception of antibiotics, patient preferences for 
pharmaceuticals, patterns of antibiotic use and perception of provider prescribing were 
varied amongst the villagers. Most of the villagers did not have a scientific 
understanding of antibiotics, and stronger preferences for antibiotics were associated 
with higher cost (which was seen to implied better quality) and intravenous 
administration (which was seen to imply greater effectiveness). It was not uncommon 
for patients to request specific antibiotics for both therapeutic and prophylactic 
purposes. Finally, the villagers voiced their views about the prescribing behaviours of 
village prescribers, and their mixed feelings about the prescriber-patient relationship, in 
which trust was eroded by the perceived financial incentives. Despite the lack of data 
from actors from the supply-side, this study effectively applied the bottom-up 
perspective to understanding policy implementation to inform its study design and data 
analysis, and provided insight into how individual level context could introduce 
complexities in the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies.  
These two studies showed that only the appropriate use of theoretical ideas on 
policy implementation could inform collection of the necessary data for a study on the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China, and contribute to a more 
cogent and in-depth interpretation of the observed phenomena in respect of policy 
implementation.  
The themes which emerged from the findings of all the studies discussed are 
summarised in Table 3-1.  Despite differences in the subjects of interest, macro- and 
micro level factors that influenced policy implementation in different studies were 
similar. Although, in essence, barriers and enabling factors often overlapped, it is worth 
noting that most of the studies concentrated on barriers to implementation from 
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unsuccessful experience, rather than enabling factors for implementation from 
successful experience. 
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 Implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies outside China Implementation of other health policies specifically in China 
Implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship 
policies in China 
Macro 
level 
factors 
Barriers to policy implementation at the national level: 
- Lack of uniform international guidelines; 
- Lack of uniform regional guidelines. 
 
Enabling factors for policy implementation at the national level: 
- Introduction of formal mandates. 
 
Barriers to policy implementation at the national 
level: 
- Lack of state capacity to enforce policy; 
- Lack of financial support at the central level; 
- Lack of coordinated reforms to address 
fundamental problems in the healthcare system; 
- Lack of alignment between the responsibilities 
of government ministries and their roles in policy 
implementation; 
- Lack of coordination across government 
ministries; 
- Lack of regulatory power of laws and 
regulations; 
- Extensive decentralisation. 
 
Enabling factors for policy implementation at the 
national level: 
- Strengthening of the capacity and effectiveness 
administrative accountability and bureaucracy;  
- Provision of financial support; 
- Mobilisation of high levels of political support 
and prioritisation; 
- Enactment of laws, policies and regulations; 
- Mobilisation of support from non-state actors. 
Barriers to policy 
implementation at the 
national level: 
- Lack of coordinated 
reforms to address 
fundamental problems in 
the healthcare system; 
- Lack of enforcement of 
existing laws and 
policies; 
- Lack of coordination 
across government 
ministries. 
Micro 
level 
factors 
Barriers to policy implementation at the hospital level: 
- Lack of funding; 
- Lack of the necessary personnel and capacity for antibiotic 
stewardship; 
- Lack of support from prescribing prescribers, especially senior 
prescribers; 
- Lack of support from the hospital administration and management 
team; 
- Lack of other aspects including: prioritisation compared with other 
programmes; time; IT and data support; and others. 
 
Enabling factors for policy implementation at the hospital level: 
- Reinforcement of other supportive policies for antibiotic stewardship; 
- Establishment of an effective administrative structure; 
Barriers to policy implementation at the local 
level: 
- Lack of financial support at local level; 
- Lack of the necessary personnel and capacity;  
- Lack of alignment of interests of different actors; 
- Lack of local political prioritisation;  
- Lack of effective supervision and reporting 
(which enables gaming behaviours); 
- Lack of realistic target management approach; 
- Lack of accountability at the local level; 
- Lack of attention to service users’ demands. 
 
Barriers to policy 
implementation at the 
hospital level: 
- Lack of the necessary 
personnel and capacity 
for antibiotic stewardship; 
- Lack of time. 
 
Barriers to policy 
implementation at the 
individual level: 
- Lack of knowledge and 
understanding of 
antibiotic use or policies; 
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- Establishment of an antibiotic stewardship committee; 
- Introduction of leadership by bringing senior and respected members 
into the committee; 
- Creation of collaborative relationships across departments; 
- Conducting clinical audit programmes to rapidly demonstrate outcomes 
of policy implementation. 
 
Barriers to policy implementation at the individual level: 
- Lack of knowledge and understanding of antibiotic use or policies; 
- Lack of consideration of patient behaviours and preferences; 
- Lack of consideration of prescriber-patient relationships; 
- Interference with physician autonomy. 
- Lack of trust in 
prescriber-patient 
relationships. 
Table 3-1 Summary of themes emerged from the literature review 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed both the theoretical literature and empirical studies 
that are relevant to the topic of this research.  
The literature review highlighted several research gaps. Firstly, there was a lack 
of in-depth research on the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China in 
general. Existing quantitative evidence could not conclusively attribute the observed 
decrease in the trends of antibiotic use in China – which varied widely across regional, 
healthcare and clinical setting – to the impact of The Campaign. Secondly, even if there 
were to be sufficiently strong quantitative evidence from the studies reviewed, none of 
them provided cogent explanation as to how The Campaign could produce the 
observed impact. Where existing studies attempted to analyse implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship overall, they tended to focus more on the context rather than the 
process of policy implementation. Particularly, none of the studies identified and 
reviewed provided information about the process of implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in China. Thirdly, there was a lack of application of implementation 
theory in these studies. Despite several studies being well-conducted and well-reported 
qualitative case studies capable of generating detailed descriptive analysis, most of the 
studies reviewed did not take advantage of relevant theories of policy implementation 
to inform better study designs and inspire more cogent and in-depth interpretation of 
phenomena relevant to policy implementation.  
Thus, the aim of this research is to bridge these research gaps by exploring and 
analysing the implementation of The Nationwide Special Rectification Campaign on 
Antibiotic Use in Hospitals (The Campaign for short) – a collection of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in China implemented between 2011 through 2013 – at both the 
macro (central) and micro (hospital) levels. To achieve this aim, specific research 
questions were framed under three research objectives that sought to identify and 
interpret factors pertinent to context and process of implementation at either level using 
appropriate theoretical approaches including the top-down and the bottom up 
approaches. The objectives and research questions were as follows: 
Objective 1: to understand the national policy context of antibiotic stewardship policies 
in China 
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a. What reasons led to actions on antibiotic use in hospitals?  
b. Who were the key actors at the central level? 
c. What were the antibiotic stewardship policies to date? 
d. How did The Campaign relate to these policies?  
Objective 2: to understand the healthcare system context in which implementation of 
The Campaign took place 
a. What did the system level context comprise? 
b. What did the hospital level context comprise? 
c. What did the individual level context comprise? 
Objective 3: to explore and analyse the implementation process of The Campaign 
a. How was The Campaign implemented at the central level? 
b. How was The Campaign implemented at the hospital level? 
The considerations for the use of theory were also duly reflected by the study 
design of this research, which is introduced in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Methods). 
However, in order to understand policy implementation in China, it is crucial first to 
understand China’s healthcare system background in Chapter 4, the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4. Healthcare System Background 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It follows from the discussion of theoretical ideas in the previous chapter that 
understanding the context of a given policy is pre-requisite to understanding its 
implementation. Therefore, this chapter introduces China’s healthcare system, and 
comprises contextual factors that could influence policy processes and behaviours 
relevant to policy implementation. 
By describing how China’s healthcare system works, this chapter provides the 
necessary briefing on the healthcare system context in which policy implementation 
takes place. The description of China’s healthcare system is focused on three aspects: 
governance and administration, organisation and delivery, and financing and provider 
incentives. It draws on a number of recent and comprehensive reviews, particularly one 
of the most prominent reviews to date (Meng et al., 2015). 
In the case of antibiotic stewardship policies, antibiotic prescribing is one of the 
most influential behavioural aspect for policy implementation, and therefore requires 
detailed discussion. Relating to the three aspects of China’s healthcare system, this 
chapter also discusses how factors at the levels of healthcare system, hospital and 
individual could influence antibiotic prescribing by prescribers, and hence affect policy 
implementation.  
 
4.2 Governance and administration 
The main administrative bodies of health at the central level in China are the 
National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) – former the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) until 2013 – and its affiliated agency, the State Administration of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (Meng et al. 2015:19). As a ministry of the State Council, 
or the Central Government, they enforce laws that are pertinent to health and 
healthcare, which are mainly formulated by the State Legislature in the form of the 
National People’s Congress, or sometimes by the ministries.  
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Figure 4-1 Collaboration of multiple ministries in health 
 
Issues in healthcare often require multi-ministerial collaboration. Other 
ministries of, or closely related to, the State Council, for example the China Food and 
Drug Administration, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, work closely with the NHFPC on different policy areas in healthcare. This is 
described in Figure 4-1. 
The interplay between decentralisation and centralisation in the governance 
and administration of health in China has been a constant theme since the country 
underwent a market reform in the late 1970s (Wagstaff et al., 2009). Both the 
governance and legal systems of China comprise a four-tier hierarchy of administrative 
or legislative bodies at the state level, provincial level, city level, and in the case of 
health administration, township level. The organizational structure of local health 
administrations is similar to that at the central level and their governing functions mirror 
those at the central level (Meng et al. 2015:20).  
Provincial and city level governments have varying degrees of power and 
flexibility to formulate and implement variations of policies based on the guidelines and 
instructions provided by the Central Government due to extensive decentralisation, 
both in terms of function (Meng et al. 2015:34; Hipgrave et al. 2012), and in terms of 
geography (Ho, 2010). On the one hand, much of the administrative authority over the 
function of health is transferred to from the central government to the local 
governments (Ma, Lu, and Quan 2008; Meng et al. 2015:38), which is also a 
consequence of decentralisation of fiscal expenditure and revenue (Ramesh, Wu & He, 
2014). On the other hand, local autonomy of different degrees also exists within 
geographically defined administrative subdivisions in China (Ho, 2010). Despite both 
forms of decentralisation, the Central Government “still plays a dominant role in both 
legislation and decision making”; in this sense, decentralisation allows all levels of local 
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governments “to develop their plans and policies in light of local realities” (Meng et al. 
2015:35, 37) such as availability of local funding, so that all of them are effectively 
“both policy-makers and policy-implementers” (Meng et al. 2004:13).  
Besides these state actors, non-state actors in the form of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) also play important roles in health administration in China. There 
are three forms of CSOs. “Civil organisations” are mass organisations and associations 
that are closely affiliated with government systems and have an established national 
network; “civil non-enterprise units” fill gaps in welfare functions by providing certain 
public and social services; “grass-roots CSOs” are community-based organisations that 
are involved with the disadvantaged populations that they work with (Li et al., 2010; 
Schwartz & Evans, 2007). This thesis focuses on the first group of CSOs, which are 
legally recognised by the Chinese government and registered with the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (Li et al., 2010), and form a crucial part of the policy context of antibiotic 
stewardship. Some of the most notable and influential associations in this group are 
professional associations that represent interests of their respective professional 
groups, such as the Chinese Medical Association, the Chinese Pharmacists 
Association and the Chinese Preventative Medication Association, which frequently 
work alongside the government in public health issues by organising training and 
helping formulating professional guidelines (Ma, 2002). 
 
4.3 Organisation and delivery 
Government-owned public hospitals are the main providers of healthcare, as 
they account for 60% of all hospitals in China and make up almost 90% of the total 
number of existing ward beds (Meng et al. 2015:112). Due to their dominance in 
healthcare provision in China and relevance to the research topic of interest, this 
research focus on public hospitals. Unless otherwise stated, both “hospitals” and 
“healthcare providers” refer to public hospitals in this research.  
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Figure 4-2 Organisation of healthcare providers in China (Xu et al. 2014, adapted) 
 
From an administrative perspective, China’s healthcare providers are organised 
into three tiers based on size of catchment area, represented in Figure 4-2. Primary 
care comprises clinics and health centres at the level of urban community or rural 
village and township. Secondary hospitals are designed to function at the level of 
district or county. Tertiary hospitals cover the level of city or above. In reality, the tiered 
system is also associated with the level of healthcare services a hospital provides. 
Primary care providers mostly provide limited healthcare services, whilst secondary 
and tertiary hospitals provide comprehensive services and conduct academic research. 
Within the three-tiered healthcare system, traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) coexists 
with modern medicine (Hesketh & Zhu, 1997). TCM services are provided in the TCM 
departments of many hospitals at all three levels that mainly provide modern medical 
services. In addition, 12.5% of all hospitals are TCM hospitals that mainly provide TCM 
services. Increasingly, TCM hospitals also provide modern medical services (Shen et 
al., 2011).  
Healthcare resources are maldistributed across primary care and higher-level 
hospitals, and across urban and rural areas. Although the number of primary care 
providers is high in comparison with higher level hospitals, most of the healthcare 
resources (measured by, for example, possession of advanced technology and ward 
beds) are concentrated in the hospitals, especially those in urban areas (Meng et al. 
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2015:111-115; Hougaard, Østerdal, and Yu 2011). Advanced care in China’s cities, 
especially metropolitan cities, is available at levels comparable with advanced 
economies (Brixi, Mu & Targa, 2013). Beijing, and Shanghai, for instance, report 
prevalence of advanced medical equipment that exceed levels common in European 
cities (Chen et al., 2007), and they are two of the few cities that accommodate 
extremely large hospitals with 4000 beds or more (Barber et al., 2014). Human 
resources are scarce and unevenly distributed in general (Yip et al., 2012). Only about 
6% of hospital personnel are prescribers with post-graduate degrees, while the vast 
majority act as prescribers but only bachelor-level education (Hougaard, Østerdal & Yu, 
2011). Compared with rural areas, urban areas have more than twice the healthcare 
professionals per 1000 population, and more healthcare professionals with more 
advanced educational background (Meng et al. 2015:121-122; Hougaard, Østerdal, 
and Yu 2011). In rural areas, however, many prescribers are underqualified (Hougaard, 
Østerdal & Yu, 2011; Yip et al., 2012). Most importantly, until recently, the development 
of workforces at the primary level in China’s healthcare system has been a neglected 
area (Barber et al., 2014; Yip et al., 2010). Coupled with the lack of a gatekeeping 
system that allows patients to disregard the recommended ascending referral pathways 
within the system and self-refer to any level of hospital as they wish, the perceivable 
differences in resources and available services between primary care providers and 
higher level hospitals lead to a concentration of healthcare utilisation in higher level 
hospitals, and a general lack of confidence in primary care providers (Pan et al., 2006; 
McCollum et al., 2014). About 85% of all outpatient visits and inpatient admissions 
respectively take place in secondary and tertiary hospitals (Meng et al. 2015:139). In 
many instances, higher-level hospitals, rather than primary care providers, become the 
first contact point for patients (Wu et al., 2017). To address overcrowding in higher 
level hospitals and increase the supply of services at primary level, ongoing pilot 
reforms are being implemented to strengthen the capacity of primary care providers 
and establish a functional gate keeping system and formal patient referral pathways 
(Wang et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2011b). 
The performance and quality of services provided by all levels of hospitals – for 
example, rationality of prescribing, service provision and healthcare costs – are 
monitored and regulated by central and local governments, as well as non-state actors 
such as government-related research organisations and professional associations. On 
the government’s side, the departments of NHFPC and its associated organisations, 
including the Centre of Inspection and Supervision and the National Clinical 
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Improvement System, are in charge of managing quality of healthcare at the country 
level by developing quality standards, implementing quality assurance policies, and 
monitoring and auditing quality of healthcare of all three levels of hospitals (Ma et al., 
2015). At the local level, these matters are administered by the arms of the NHFPC. 
Each tier of hospital contains another grading system based on provider performance 
and quality of healthcare (Hougaard, Østerdal & Yu, 2011). High-performing hospitals 
can be accredited to move up within the tiered system, or even be considered for an 
upgrade along the tiered system, whilst under-performing hospitals may be subjected 
to punitive measures. In addition, payers responsible for administrating the social 
health insurance schemes also impose separate sets of regulatory controls on service 
provision and prescribing, primarily with the purpose of controlling healthcare costs. 
Hospitals failing to pass the standards would not receive payments through social 
health insurance, and in severe cases, could face de-listing by the social health 
insurance schemes. On non-state actors’ side, professional associations contribute to 
promoting self-regulation amongst healthcare professionals by promoting ethical 
medical practices through enforcing internal disciplinary actions. The adequacy and the 
effectiveness of carrying out hospital accreditations and performance audits on the 
quality of healthcare and performance of hospitals is unclear, as the data and reports 
associated with these exercises remain internal to the government. However, it has 
been recognised that the grading system of healthcare significantly shapes the public’s 
perception of quality of healthcare, drawing even greater demand for services at higher 
and better graded hospitals (Ma et al., 2015).   
 
4.4 Financing and provider incentives 
Out-of-pocket payments, social health insurance schemes and subsidies from 
local (provincial and county) governments comprise the three main methods of 
healthcare financing in China. The three major social health insurance schemes in 
China, which covered more than 92% of China’s total population (Yip et al., 2012), are 
the New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS), the Urban Resident Basic Medical 
Insurance (URBMI) and the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI); which 
cover the rural population, urban unemployed population and urban employees 
respectively. In addition, the minority of civil servants, army personnel and other public 
sector workers are entitled to a special form of full-coverage insurance called 
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“Government Funded Healthcare” (Gongfei Yiliao), although it is now being gradually 
phased out and replaced by other social health insurance schemes.  
Social health insurance is on course to replace out-of-pocket payments to 
become the largest contributor to healthcare financing in China. Since the first decade 
of the 21st century, the Chinese government has been dedicating efforts to reduce out-
of-pocket payments by dramatically improving the coverage of social health insurance 
schemes and increasing government spending. In 2000, out-of-pocket payments, 
social health insurance schemes and government subsidies accounted for 59%, 26% 
and 15% of total health expenditure respectively; in 2012, they became a more 
balanced set of figures of 34%, 36% and 30% (Meng et al. 2015:76). This is despite the 
fact that the service packages of the social health insurance schemes for the more 
financially challenged populations – the NCMS and the URBMI – offer limited financial 
protection, so that their beneficiaries still have to bear over 50% of their medical 
expenditure (Yip et al., 2012). 
The current financing and pricing arrangements create dominant fee-for-service 
incentives for healthcare providers. As government subsidies are unable to cover all 
the costs, which include operational costs and capital investments in infrastructure and 
equipment, hospitals are required to generate revenue to cover the shortfall from fee-
paying patients and payment from social health insurance based on a stringent fee 
schedule regulated by the government (Eggleston et al., 2008). Although other provider 
payment mechanisms such as global budget and capitation exist, social health 
insurance payment is also predominantly fee-for-service (Meng et al. 2015:102). This 
incentive, coupled with the very low prices for medical services set by the official fee 
schedule in order to ensure affordability of healthcare, drives healthcare providers to 
provide profitable high-tech diagnostics and pharmaceuticals while stinting on 
unprofitable basic services (Eggleston et al., 2008). The fee-for-service incentive at the 
level of hospital is then translated to the level of prescribers through their salary 
structure. As labour costs are mainly recovered from revenue generated by service 
delivery, prescribers’ income and benefits are primarily determined by their ability to 
create revenue; workload is one of the major assessment criteria for assigning bonuses 
(Meng et al. 2015:103-104). Bonuses make up a substantial part of prescribers’ pay. In 
big cities, bonuses are thought to have often equalled or exceeded basic salary 
(Munro, 2013).  
Chapter 4. Healthcare System Background 
74 
 
One effect of this system is overprescribing, as pharmaceutical sales are in 
effect a major source of revenue for hospitals, especially secondary and tertiary 
hospitals. According to recent data, prescription pharmaceuticals take up nearly 50% of 
China’s total healthcare expenditure, with the rest evenly split between inpatient and 
outpatient services (Daemmrich & Mohanty, 2014). Higher level hospitals and primary 
care providers account for 60% and 18% of total pharmaceutical consumption in China 
in 2012 (Cheng & Wang, 2014). The mechanism that allows hospitals to profit from 
pharmaceutical sales is a government-sanctioned 15% mark-up over wholesale 
pharmaceutical prices (Herd, Hu & Koen, 2010). The actual mark-ups could be much 
higher ratios, because pharmaceutical distributors that act as agents between hospitals 
and manufacturers often introduce extra costs through their lobbying activities to gain 
market access for their products (Yu et al., 2010). For example, pharmaceutical 
distributors could offer informal payments to prescribers to increase sales of their 
products (Munro, 2013). At the same time, the healthcare financing arrangements do 
little to stimulate healthcare providers to deliver immunizations and other public health 
services, or to engage in the broader determinants of health in the community 
(Eggleston et al., 2008).  
In order to realign mechanisms of healthcare financing with the aims of 
reducing overprescribing and encouraging provision of public health services, China 
introduced a series of interrelated health reform measures that revolved around the 
introduction of the New Essential Medicine System in 2009, including policies to 
strengthen the capacity of primary care providers and improve their provision of public 
health services. The primary purpose of these policies is to remove revenue associated 
with pharmaceutical sales and replace it with government subsidy and fees for 
providing services related to maintaining community health. As a starting point, the 
government stipulated that the vast majority of pharmaceuticals available at primary 
care providers must be limited to Essential Medicines, typically consisting of about 200 
types of conventional pharmaceuticals and 100 types pharmaceuticals with Traditional 
Chinese Medicine formularies called “TCM patented pharmaceuticals”. Most of the 
included pharmaceuticals are low-priced generics achieving the required Good 
Manufacturing Standards, and virtually all of them are eligible for reimbursement from 
all the social health insurance schemes (Yang et al., 2013c). An integral policy element 
associated with the Essential Medicine Policy is the “zero-mark-up” policy, meaning 
that Essential Medicines must be sold to patients at procurement cost. To support this 
policy, the government created a regional procurement platform for collective 
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tendering, removing facility-level tendering that involves more steps and room for mark-
ups related to pharmaceutical distribution (Barber et al., 2013). In addition, to fill the 
deficit in revenue created by the zero-mark-up policy, the government increased 
financial subsidies available to primary care providers, which cover the basic salaries of 
all healthcare workers, including prescribers (Zhang, Wang & Zhang, 2014). Whilst the 
specific arrangements and percentages regarding the subsidy are likely to differ in 
different regions and districts, a general increase in government subsidy for primary 
care providers has been observed since the set of policies was first rolled out in 2009 
(Cheng et al., 2012). Several years into the implementation in 2013, public subsidies 
already accounted for 40% of primary care providers’ revenue, significantly up from 
14% in the early stages of implementation in 2011 (Meng et al. 2015:31, 82). To further 
encourage the provision and quality of public healthcare and basic healthcare services 
including setting up patient profiles for all the residents enrolled in the primary care 
provider to document their history, providing regular health check-ups and 
immunization services for the residents, and managing chronic diseases for the elderly 
patients, the governmental subsidies are delivered as a budget decided by capitation, 
and are tied to an annual performance assessment (Yip et al., 2012). Under this 
system, basic salary funded by governmental subsidy, rather than performance-linked 
bonus based on service provision, constitutes the bulk of a prescriber’s pay (Zhou, Li & 
Hesketh, 2014). The need for prescribers to fulfil requirements in provision of public 
health services has more to do with helping securing better governmental subsidies for 
their employers, the primary care providers. The sufficiency of government subsidy is 
therefore vital in maintaining the dissociation between service provision and revenue 
generation (Tang et al., 2013). However, as of now, the full suite of policies comprising 
Essential Medicines Policy and the commensurate reforms in provider financing are 
only applicable to primary care providers (Guan et al., 2011). Although essential 
medicines with zero mark-ups are also available in the more influential and sizeable 
secondary and tertiary hospitals, they are not restricted to using only essential 
medicines in the way that primary care providers are. In part, this is out of clinical 
considerations: the limited range of essential medicines is not sufficient to treat more 
complicated and severe diseases that higher level hospitals regularly deal with. 
Fundamentally, budgetary support from the government remain nominal for higher level 
hospitals – accounting for only around 8% of their total revenue (Meng et al. 2015:31) – 
so that they still primarily rely on the fee-for-service revenue generating model that 
emphasizes provision of high-margin services and pharmaceuticals. A negative effect 
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of the difference in availability of pharmaceuticals due to this policy arrangement is the 
increase in referrals from primary care providers to higher-level hospitals, as patients 
fail to obtain the appropriate treatments from the restricted range of pharmaceuticals 
available at the primary care level (Hu, 2013).  
 
4.5 Factors influencing antibiotic use in hospitals 
Most of the antibiotics in China reach patients through hospitals, particularly 
secondary and tertiary hospitals. As pointed out above, 60% of total pharmaceutical 
consumption in China takes place through higher level hospitals, compared with 18% 
through primary care providers and 19% through retail pharmacies in 2012 (Cheng & 
Wang, 2014). Consumption of antibiotics for systemic use (namely those that are 
applied to the whole human body as opposed to local areas) in secondary and tertiary 
hospitals made up over 20% of total pharmaceutical consumption between 2008 and 
2011, the largest share of consumption amongst all types of pharmaceutical (Zhu and 
Cheng 2012:21). In comparison, antibiotics only account for less than 7% of all 
pharmaceutical sales in retail pharmacies (China Association of Pharmaceutical 
Commerce, 2015). Antibiotics are a particularly crucial class of pharmaceuticals for 
inpatient services, which take up 60% of total pharmaceutical consumption in China 
(Geng, 2014). Antibiotics for systemic use account for 20% of the total inpatient 
expenditure in public hospitals incurred through the social health insurance scheme 
UEBMI in 2013, and it is the largest share of all types of pharmaceuticals (China 
Association of Pharmaceutical Commerce, 2015). 
As with other countries, antibiotic use in hospitals in China can be influenced by 
contextual factors pertinent to the healthcare system at system, hospital and individual 
levels (Teixeira Rodrigues et al., 2013; Lopez-Vazquez, Vazquez-Lago & Figueiras, 
2012; Hulscher, Grol & van der Meer, 2010); the nature of these factors is described in 
Table 4-1.  
Level of 
determinants 
Factors 
System Role and size of the pharmaceutical market; organisation, financing and other healthcare 
policies 
Hospital Hospital policies for healthcare delivery 
Individual Knowledge, attitude and behaviours of prescribers and patients; interactions between 
prescribers and patients 
Table 4-1 Influencing factors of antibiotic use in hospitals 
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At the system and hospital levels, existing empirical research shows that factors 
pertinent to the organisation of hospitals, healthcare financing and provider incentives 
at these levels can influence antibiotic use in hospitals (Wang et al., 2016).  
As described previously, the current healthcare financing and pricing 
arrangements and provider payment mechanisms create strong fee-for-service 
incentives for healthcare providers to provide more services and prescribe more 
pharmaceuticals, including antibiotics. It has been observed that there was a tendency 
for prescribers to prescribe more expensive pharmaceuticals (Chen et al., 2014). This 
fee-for-service incentive was transferred to prescribers through their fee-for-service 
salary system, which encouraged revenue generation (Liu & Mills, 2005).  
With these arrangements in the system unchanged, health reform interventions 
aimed at making healthcare more affordable and accessible could lead to unintended 
and undesirable consequences. For example, pricing reforms that aimed to reduce 
prices for certain pharmaceuticals could lead to unintended effects such as increased 
utilisation of pharmaceuticals, especially expensive ones, and increased 
pharmaceutical expenditure (Meng et al., 2005). Similar unintended effects in 
prescribing can be seen with insurance coverage, which lowers barriers to accessing 
healthcare for patients without necessarily changing the fee-for-service provider 
payment mechanism. On the one hand, insured patients, who had better ability to pay 
than the uninsured, were more likely to be prescribed more pharmaceuticals, antibiotics 
and injections than the uninsured (Sun et al., 2009). On the other hand, although 
insured patients received more pharmaceuticals and more expensive pharmaceuticals, 
they may not be receiving better health treatment (Lu, 2014). Even though such 
prescribing patterns may be related to consideration of quality of pharmaceuticals – 
due to differences in production standards, cheaper pharmaceuticals in China can be 
associated with poorer quality and greater risk of adverse effects (Yao, Zhou & Wang, 
2012) – there is still clear evidence that fee-for-service incentives are leading to 
overprovision of healthcare (Chen et al., 2014).  
Introduction of alternative provider payment mechanisms is one crucial step to 
removing fee-for-service incentives and reducing unnecessary prescribing. Even 
though fee-for-service remains largely the status quo, multiple pilots have been carried 
out to introduce other provider payment mechanisms through social health insurance. 
Recent studies on pilot reforms at primary care level (Yip et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2014, 
2016) consistently showed that the use of capitation combined with pay-for-
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performance can effectively reduce irrational prescribing. For secondary and tertiary 
hospitals, pilot reforms of case-based payments such as diagnostic-related groups 
were less well studied and required further research; existing results showed that these 
pilots could reduce pharmaceutical expenditure, but it was unclear whether or not 
quality of healthcare was affected (Yip et al., 2010). In the meantime, moving the salary 
system of prescribers away from the reliance of fee-for-service bonus could also 
reduce overprovision of healthcare and overprescribing (Liu & Mills, 2005; Wang et al., 
2011).  
However, there is a direct relationship between how providers are paid and how 
providers are financed: overprescribing is likely to persist if pharmaceutical sales and 
service provision are the main means of raising revenue for hospitals. Coupled with the 
financing reform, the Essential Medicines Policy reform, introduced along with the zero-
mark-up policy, is a significant measure to correct the health financing drivers of 
overprescribing at the primary care level. The impact of this set of reforms has been 
widely assessed (Yang et al., 2013c; Chen et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2013; Yin, Song & 
Bian, 2014; Song et al., 2014b, 2014a; Yao et al., 2015; Xiao et al., 2016; Gong et al., 
2016). It has been found that by regulating the procurement and limiting the range of 
pharmaceuticals available for selection, removing the mark-up on price, and increasing 
government subsidy to replenish the gap in healthcare financing, the Essential 
Medicines Policy could effectively lower the average pharmaceutical expenditure per 
prescription. However, there is no clear evidence on whether the policy can effectively 
reduce antibiotic prescribing, or whether it can improve the medical rationality and 
quality of prescribing where reduction was observed. In addition, as described 
previously, these reforms are limited to primary care level only as of now, and the 
situations in secondary and tertiary hospitals largely remain unchanged. But existing 
evidence suggests that the Essential Medicine Policy per se does not lead to rational 
antibiotic prescribing. The direction of the impact of the policy on antibiotic use is 
heterogeneous among the existing studies. Even when reduction of antibiotic use is 
observed, the level of antibiotic use remains high and irrational or inappropriate use 
prevalent (Wei et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2016; Gong et al., 2016; Song et al., 2014b; Yin, 
Song & Bian, 2014; Chen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013b). In explaining why this may 
be the case, the more recent studies explicitly point out that the essential medicines 
policy package is concerned with cost control rather than antibiotic stewardship, and 
effects associated with rational antibiotic use is better explained by the implementation 
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of the Essential Medicine Policy with antibiotic stewardship programmes (Wei et al., 
2017; Xiao et al., 2016). 
At the individual level, factors pertinent to the individuals involved antibiotic 
prescribing – prescribers and patients – can influence antibiotic prescribing (Mao et al., 
2015). Using common cold as a tracer condition, studies have shown that antibiotics, 
which are not needed for the common cold, are often prescribed for the common cold 
in China, particularly in rural areas (Reynolds & McKee, 2009; Sun et al., 2015b; Zhao 
et al., 2013a). Level of training and experience was influential in prescribers’ 
prescribing practices, with better-trained prescribers working in higher-level hospitals 
more likely to have better understanding of rational antibiotic use (Bai et al., 2016; 
Zhao et al., 2013b). Another influential factor for antibiotic prescribing was patients’ 
demand for antibiotics, including in the form of injections (Reynolds & McKee, 2009; Jin 
et al., 2011). This was in part due to lack of medical understanding, especially amongst 
rural residents (Gu et al., 2015). Patients’ attitudes could also be informed by their 
belief in the efficacy of medicines, for example injections (Reynolds & Mckee, 2011). 
Finally, growing medical disputes and deteriorating prescriber-patient relationships in 
China, which result from patients’ negative perceptions of the misalignment between 
financial incentives and provision of healthcare, can lead to defensive prescribing 
behaviours in the form of over-prescribing, as patients’ hostility towards prescribers 
becomes so significant that prescribers are afraid of the ramifications of not meeting 
patients’ expectations or demands, which sometimes even escalate to physical 
violence (He, 2014; Hesketh, Wu & Mao, 2012).  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The way that China’s healthcare system is governed, organised and financed 
sets the scene for understanding the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies 
in two ways. On the one hand, the structures of the healthcare system – the way that 
its resources are created, distributed and regulated – determine some of the vital 
parameters for the implementation process of health policies in China. On the other 
hand, healthcare system factors at the system, hospital and individual levels can 
influence prescribing behaviours and antibiotic use in hospitals, the prime target of 
antibiotic stewardship policies, in various ways. In light of these influential factors, the 
next chapter provides a summary of the antibiotic stewardship policies to date. 
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Chapter 5. National Policy Context 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The last chapter described China’s healthcare system context and how it could 
influence antibiotic use and prescribing; this chapter outlines another crucial part of the 
context for policy implementation: the national policy background. By examining the 
policy context of antibiotic stewardship, actors in antibiotic stewardship and the 
purpose and content of The Campaign, this chapter seeks to address the first research 
objective proposed at the end of Chapter 3 (Literature Review), namely to understand 
the national policy context of antibiotic stewardship policies in China. In doing so, it lays 
the foundation for researching the characteristics of policy implementation and 
assessing the degree to which top-down and bottom-up approaches to understanding 
policy implementation described in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background) are applicable 
to the implementation of The Campaign. This account in this chapter is based on 
existing official policy documents and academic literature. 
 
5.2 Policy background of antibiotic stewardship 
China has long recognised the importance of antibiotic stewardship in hospitals. 
Although defining antibiotic use and production as a multisectoral and multi-ministerial 
issue between the NHFPC, the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is a 
relatively recent development (Ministry of Health, 2010), policies relevant to 
rationalising antibiotic use in hospitals were conceived by the former Ministry of Health 
in the early 2000s (Sun & Hawkey, 2016; Cui et al., 2017). These policy actions on 
antibiotic use in hospitals are motivated by domestic and international factors. 
Domestically, the government began to take notice of antibiotic stewardship for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the problems of rising antibiotic resistance and extensive 
irrational antibiotic use had reached a level critical enough to alarm the government to 
issue initial clinical guidelines and stewardship measures as a first step to rationalise 
prescribing (Ministry of Health, 2004) and establishing surveillance networks better to 
gauge the extent of the problems (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006). On the other hand, 
antibiotic prescribing was quickly becoming a heated issue in public discourse. 
Increasing documentation of overprescribing of antibiotics associated with prescribers’ 
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financial incentives (Li et al., 2012) clearly highlighted some of the most fundamental 
problems with financing and delivery in China’s healthcare system described in 
Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background). On top of this, sensationalist reporting 
only served to fan the fame of patients’ frustration with the system and 
misunderstanding of prescribers (Tucker et al., 2015). Tackling antibiotic 
overprescribing, therefore, became an indispensable part of the health reforms to 
address those perceived healthcare system deficiencies (Yip et al., 2010). International 
collaborations between the former MoH and the World Health Organization (WHO) also 
helped catalyse stronger policy actions on antibiotic use in hospitals. Through working 
with the WHO in the early 2000s, the former MoH became increasingly aware of the 
importance of rational antibiotic use and subsequently adapted measures proposed by 
the WHO to rationalise antibiotic use in hospitals, such as developing and monitoring 
indicators of antibiotic use and setting up expert committees on rational use of 
medicines (Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011; Hu, 2010).  
Subsequently, a series of interconnected antibiotic stewardship policies were 
gradually introduced by the central NHFPC over a period close to 10 years, culminating 
in The Campaign. Prime examples of policy actions by the NHFPC to tackle 
overprescribing of antibiotics and improve antibiotic stewardship – summarised in 
Table 5-1 – can be divided into four strategic areas (NCCPAA Committee, 2015):  
• Establishing and strengthening surveillance networks to quantify the levels of 
antibiotic use and resistance and inform policy making, monitoring and 
evaluation;  
• Strengthening the technical capacity of medical professionals to improve the 
knowledge and capacity of prescribers, clinical pharmacists and microbiologists; 
• Improving the rationality of antibiotic use in hospitals and the prescribing; 
• Establishing laws on antibiotic stewardship to safeguard antibiotic stewardship 
activities in the long term.  
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Strategic area Year Key documents Summary of the policies 
1. Establishing and strengthening surveillance 
networks (Ministry of Health 2005, 2006, 2009b, 
2012d) 
2005 
Notice on Establishing Surveillance Networks for 
Antibiotic Use in Hospitals and Antibiotic 
Resistance 
- Establishing surveillance networks for 
antibiotic use in hospitals (Centre for 
Antibacterial Surveillance, CAS) and 
antibiotic resistance (China Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System, CARSS) 
and expand their nationwide coverage 
2006 
Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of 
Health on Further Enhancing the Surveillance of 
Antibiotic Use in Hospitals and Antibiotic 
Resistance 
2009 Notice on Strengthening the Surveillance of Rational Use of Medicines 
2012 
Notice on Strengthening the Surveillance of 
Antibiotic Use in Hospitals and Antibiotic 
Resistance 
2. Strengthening the technical 
capacity of medical 
professionals (Ministry of Health & 
Committee of Experts on Rational 
Drug Use, 2012; Ministry of Health, 
2008a, 2007, 2012c, 2012a) 
Technical 
guidelines for 
antibiotic use  
2012 National Guidelines for Antimicrobial Treatments 
- Providing guidelines for treatments of 
infectious diseases, including in the case of 
paediatrics 
- Summarising the pharmacological 
properties of various anti-invectives 
Expert 
committee on 
rational use of 
medicine 
2008 
Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of 
Health on Establishing the Ministry of Health 
Committee of Experts on Rational Drug Use 
- Establishing the CERDU to formulate and 
agenda on rational use of medicines, one of 
the six working groups being antibiotics 
Capacity 
building for 
medical 
professionals 
2007 
Notice of the Department of Medical 
Administration of the Ministry of Health on 
Conducting Pilot Programme of Clinical 
Pharmacist System 
- Defining the role of clinical pharmacists and 
the departments of pharmaceutical affairs in 
advising and monitoring antibiotic use in 
hospitals 
2009 
Large scale, nationwide training programmes 
exemplified by the Xinghuo Programme (2009-
2011) and the Mengya Programme (2009-2012) 
- Improving the capacity of medical 
professionals across all levels of healthcare 
in ensuring rational antibiotic use and 
conducting surveillance of antibiotic 
resistance 2012 
Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of 
Health on Organising Nationwide Training 
Programmes on the Stewardship of Antibiotic Use 
in Hospitals 
Prescription 
reviews in 
hospitals 
2010 
Notice of the Ministry of Health on Issuing the Pilot 
Standards for the Review and Management of 
Prescriptions in Hospitals 
- Specifying the standards and methods of 
reporting of prescription reviews in hospitals 
3. Improving the rationality of 
antibiotic use and prescribing 
(Ministry of Health, 2004, 2010, 
2011, 2012b; National Health and 
Family Planning Commission, 
Early attempts 
to regulate 
prescribing 
2004 Notice on Implementing the Guiding Principles for Antibiotic Use in Hospitals 
- Outlining guidelines on antibiotic use and 
principles for treating different types of 
bacterial infections 
- Outlining early antibiotic stewardship 
strategies such as formulary restriction 
Chapter 5. National Policy Context 
83 
 
2013; Ministry of Health, 2008b, 
2009a) 2008 
Notice of the Ministry of Health on Further 
Improving the Stewardship of Antibiotic Use in 
Hospitals 
- Improving rational antibiotic use in several 
key areas including perioperative antibiotic 
prophylaxis, prophylaxis treatment for Class 
I incision and the use of fluoroquinolones 
- Putting in place antibiotic stewardship 
policies including formulary restriction and a 
resistance alert system 
2009 
Notice of the General Office of Ministry of Health 
on Issues Concerning the Stewardship of 
Antibiotic Use in Hospitals 
Cross-ministry 
rectification 
campaign 
2010 Notice on Issuing the Plan for the Nationwide Joint Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotics 
- Initiating a coordinated campaign across 
four government ministries (MoH, CFDA, 
MIIT and MoA) to improve manufacturing, 
supply and use of antibiotics in different 
sectors 
Nationwide 
campaign (The 
Campaign) 
2011 
Notice of the General Office of Ministry of Health 
on Effectively Conducting the Nationwide Special 
Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic Use in 
Hospitals - Initiating a three-year nationwide campaign characterised by the requirement for 
hospitals to meet stringent numerical 
targets across several key indicators and to 
comply with other antibiotic stewardship 
policies 
2012 
Notice of the General Office of Ministry of Health 
on Continuing to Further Carry Out the Nationwide 
Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic Use 
in Hospitals 
2013 
Notice on Further Conducting the Nationwide 
Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic Use 
in Hospitals 
4. Establishing legal institutions for 
antibiotic stewardship (Ministry of 
Health, 2012a) 
Enforcing laws 
on general 
medical and 
pharmaceutical 
affairs 
Before 
2012 
Examples include: Pharmaceutical Administration 
Law of the People's Republic of China; Law on 
Practicing Prescribers of the People's Republic of 
China; The Administrative Regulations on Medical 
Institution; Measures for the Administration of 
Prescriptions; Measures for the Administration of 
the Control of Hospital-Acquired Infections; The 
Provisions on the Administration of 
Pharmaceuticals in Medical Institutions 
 
Enforcing the 
law on antibiotic 
use 
2012 Measures for the Stewardship of Antibiotic Use in Hospitals 
- Enforcing antibiotic stewardship policies 
concerning all aspects of antibiotic use in 
hospitals, from the procurement process 
through to resistance monitoring; 
- Specifying accountabilities and 
responsibilities of the actors at government 
and hospital levels in antibiotic stewardship.  
Table 5-1 Key antibiotic stewardship policies in China 
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Early efforts in respect of antibiotic stewardship were characterised by lack of 
implementation. Issued in 2004 as the first set of antibiotic stewardship policies, the 
“Guiding Principles for Antibiotic Use in Hospitals” were not backed by surveillance 
data or supporting policies to build the necessary human and administrative resources 
for policy implementation. Later policies – including the “Notice of the Ministry of Health 
on Further Improving the Stewardship of Antibiotic Use in Hospitals” in 2008 and the 
“Notice of the General Office of Ministry of Health on Issues Concerning the 
Stewardship of Antibiotic Use in Hospitals” in 2009 – were more likely to be better 
implemented as they were better supported by complementary policies. Since 2005, 
surveillance systems on antibiotic use and resistance have been established (“Notice 
on Establishing Surveillance Networks for Antibiotic Use in Hospitals and Antibiotic 
Resistance” in 2005, and “Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Health on 
Further Enhancing the Surveillance of Antibiotic Use in Hospitals and Antibiotic 
Resistance” in 2006) and expanded (“Notice on Strengthening the Surveillance of 
Rational Use of Medicines” in 2009), which better enabled evidence-based policy 
making and progress monitoring. Other complementary policies also continued to build 
and strengthen human resources, such as the establishing of a new expert committee 
to administer rational use of medicines (“Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of 
Health on Establishing the Ministry of Health Committee of Experts on Rational Drug 
Use” in 2008), and initiating of training programmes to increase the professional 
capacities of prescribers, pharmacists and microbiologists (“Notice of the Department 
of Medical Administration of the Ministry of Health on Conducting Pilot Programme of 
Clinical Pharmacist System” in 2007; Xinghuo and Mengya Programmes in 2009). 
 
5.3 Actors in antibiotic stewardship 
As a distinct policy issue, antibiotic stewardship is related to existing policy 
areas in healthcare delivery with designated actors at central and hospital levels 
responsible for implementation. At the central level, actors are organised around two 
broader policy areas. The first area is “rational use of medicines”, a technical concept 
that concerns whether antibiotics should be applied given the medical indications, and 
how antibiotics should be applied, such as the choice of pharmaceuticals, route of 
administration, and dosing schedules (National Institute of Hospital Administration & 
China Hospital Association, 2011). The goal of this policy area is to achieve the best 
intended clinical outcomes with minimal toxicity and impact on resistance. The second 
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area is “healthcare quality and safety” (National Institute of Hospital Administration & 
China Hospital Association, 2011). In addition to ensuring quality and safety of 
prescribing, which overlaps with the “rational use of medicines” aspect, this policy area 
also examines the process of prescribing and the cost-effectiveness of treatment as 
part of the overall healthcare provision by the hospital as well as the measures to 
control healthcare-associated infection. Aligned with these two areas, policy actors at 
the central level – summarised in Table 5-2 below – include: 
• Central and regional arms of the government, specifically those of the Bureau of 
Medical Administration (formerly the Department of Medical Administration) of 
the NHFPC; 
• Government-affiliated research and expert groups including the National 
Institute of Hospital Administration (NIHA), and the Committee of Experts on 
Rational Drug Use (CERDU); 
• Academic and professional associations including the Chinese Pharmacists 
Association (CPA), the Chinese Hospital Association (CHA), the Chinese 
Medical Association (CMA) and the Chinese Pharmaceutical Association 
(CPhA).  
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Type of 
actors 
Prominent 
example(s)  
Summary of official roles and responsibilities Alignment 
with policy 
areas 
The 
government 
Bureau of 
Medical 
Administration, 
NHFPC 
The Bureau is a Department-level organisation in 
the NHFPC, responsible for: 
• Making and implementing policies for 
healthcare providers on administration, 
medical technology, quality, safety, service 
delivery and blood bank management;  
• Setting and implementing professional 
standards for healthcare professionals and 
healthcare service management, including 
pharmaceutical affairs, laboratory 
management and clinical trials; 
• Setting and implementing rules and criteria of 
audits of healthcare providers on 
administration and performance. 
“Healthcare 
quality and 
safety” 
Government- 
affiliated 
research and 
expert 
groups 
National Institute 
of Hospital 
Administration 
(NIHA) 
The NIHA is a research institute directly under the 
NHFPC, responsible for: 
• Conducting audits and accreditations of 
hospitals; 
• Conducting research on the administration of 
hospital; 
• Training hospital directors and managers; 
• Collecting data pertaining to the administration 
of hospitals; 
• Providing scientific evidence for the making of 
policies, laws and standards. 
“Healthcare 
quality and 
safety” 
Committee of 
Experts on 
Rational Drug 
Use (CERDU) 
The CERDU is a committee set up by the NHFPC, 
responsible for: 
• Organising expert meetings to discuss 
agendas and work plans on the management 
of rational use of medicines; 
• Advising on the implementation work plans; 
• Conducting research to inform the design of 
measures and standards for rational use of 
medicines; 
• Organising education and training activities to 
improve rational use of medicines.  
“Rational use 
of medicines” 
Academic 
and 
professional 
associations 
Academic and 
professional 
associations of 
pharmacists, 
prescribers, 
hospitals and so 
on 
Academic and professional associations are non-
profit non-government organisations set up by 
health professionals that the associations 
represent, generally responsible for: 
• Reinforcing professional standards; 
• Organising training and continuous education; 
• Setting up and participating in collaborations 
across public and private platforms; 
• Participating in making and implementing 
policies and laws pertaining to their respective 
professional areas. 
“Healthcare 
quality and 
safety” (e.g. 
CHA) and 
“Rational use 
of medicines” 
(e.g. CPA) 
Table 5-2 Key actors in antibiotic stewardship at the national level 
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Their role in supporting the four strategic areas for antibiotic stewardship 
introduced earlier is illustrated in Table 5-3.  
Strategic area in antibiotic 
stewardship 
Alignment with the roles of the actors 
1. Establishing and strengthening 
surveillance networks 
- The surveillance networks for antibiotic use (CAS) and for 
resistance (CARSS) were managed by the NIHA and the 
CERDU respectively, collected and analysed data on use and 
resistance; 
- Officials and experts reviewed and formulated policies 
accordingly. 
2. Strengthening the technical 
capacity of medical 
professionals 
- Government-affiliated groups and academic and professional 
associations organised training programmes for medical 
professionals; 
- Prescribers, pharmacists and microbiologists were crucial to 
the inter-professional collaboration in antibiotic stewardship. 
3. Improving implementation of 
the policies 
- The government was the main enforcer of policies and laws. 
- Government-affiliated groups and academic and professional 
associations provide support in formulating, interpreting and 
promoting these measures and lawful requirements.  
4. Establishing laws on antibiotic 
stewardship 
Table 5-3 Alignment between the strategic areas in antibiotic stewardship and the roles of the actors 
 
At the hospital level, policy actors are also aligned with both policy areas that 
concern antibiotic use in hospitals. Managerial level actors are medical professionals 
who oversee a range of administrative activities and processes in the hospital in order 
to ensure safe and effective delivery of healthcare services. At this level, antibiotic 
stewardship involves the coordination of inter-professional collaborations of several 
types of expertise, most prominently infectious disease specialists, clinical pharmacists 
and microbiologists. Prescribing level actors are prescribers and patients, the dyad that 
comprises the smallest unit of antibiotic prescribing and use. Prescribers’ 
responsibilities are to comply with antibiotic stewardship policies and improve their 
knowledge and understanding of rational use of antibiotics and other pharmaceuticals.  
 
5.4 Purpose and content of The Campaign 
The Campaign was widely seen as the most comprehensive policy intervention 
to improve antibiotic stewardship across China (Xiao et al., 2013a; Xiao & Li, 2015). 
Whilst little is known about the impact or the state of implementation of the antibiotic 
stewardship policies prior to The Campaign – there are few descriptive accounts, let 
alone definitive evidence on the impact or implementation of the previous policies from 
official sources or academic research – there is no evidence to suggest that they were 
binding requirements for hospitals that could generate concerted implementation 
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(Zhang et al., 2008b, 2008a). Given this context, The Campaign, which lasted for 3 
years between 2011 and 2013, was set up by the NHFPC to introduce an intense 
phase of top-down policy implementation across the whole country (Sun et al., 2015a; 
Bao et al., 2015a; NCCPAA Committee, 2015). Contents of The Campaign are detailed 
by the following three policy documents: 
• The 2011 Plan for the Nationwide Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic 
Use in Hospitals (released as part of the Notice of the General Office of Ministry 
of Health on Effectively Conducting the Nationwide Special Rectification 
Campaign on Antibiotic Use in Hospitals) 
 
• The 2012 Plan for the Nationwide Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic 
Use in Hospitals (released as part of the Notice of the General Office of Ministry 
of Health on Continuing to Further Carry out the Nationwide Special 
Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic Use in Hospitals) 
• The 2013 Plan for the Nationwide Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic 
Use in Hospitals (released as part of the Notice on Further Conducting the 
Nationwide Special Rectification Campaign on Antibiotic Use in Hospitals) 
Collectively, these documents set out a range of key policies to be implemented 
in The Campaign, which are summarised in Table 5-4 below. 
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Key Policy of The 
Campaign 
Summary of the policy Past policies referenced Level of main actors 
concerned 
Set up an accountability 
mechanism 
Set up a clear chain of command of the key actors at the central level and the 
managerial actors at the hospital level; in particular, the chief director of a hospital is 
appointed as the First Responsible Person. Introduce indicators related to rational 
antibiotic use in the official performance audit of hospitals and managerial actors at 
the hospital level conducted by the government.  
N/A Central and hospital 
levels 
Introduce stringent penalties 
for irrational antibiotic use in 
hospitals 
In accordance with laws that govern the medical practice and the official 
performance audit of hospitals conducted by the government, the government 
introduces a stringent penalty system for irrational antibiotic use, which concerns the 
punishment of prescribers, managerial actors and FRPs according to the severity of 
irrational antibiotic use and the violation of relevant laws.  
Pharmaceutical Administration Law of 
the People's Republic of China; Law on 
Practicing Prescribers of the People's 
Republic of China; The Administrative 
Regulations on Medical Institution; 
Measures for the Administration of 
Prescriptions; Measures for the 
Administration of the Control of 
Hospital-Acquired Infections; The 
Provisions on the Administration of 
Pharmaceuticals in Medical Institutions 
(before 2012) 
Maintain a formal report 
system between hospitals 
and the government 
Hospitals provide regular annual and biannual reports on various aspects of 
antibiotic use to the government. On examination of the reports, central and 
provincial governments identify the problems and publicise the findings accordingly, 
and convene meetings with FRPs to issue cautions.  
N/A 
Set up regional surveillance 
networks on antibiotic use 
and resistance 
Set up subsidiary networks of the national surveillance networks on antibiotic use 
and resistance at provincial level, and connect them to the national networks.  
Notice on Establishing Surveillance 
Networks for Antibiotic Use in Hospitals 
and Antibiotic Resistance (2005) 
 
Notice of the General Office of the 
Ministry of Health on Further Enhancing 
the Surveillance of Antibiotic Use in 
Hospitals and Antibiotic Resistance 
(2006) 
 
Notice on Strengthening the 
Surveillance of Rational Use of 
Medicines (2009) 
Central and hospital 
levels 
Conduct internal 
surveillance of antibiotic 
resistance to inform 
antibiotic use 
Improve the rate of microbiological culture-based diagnosis in inpatients in 
secondary and tertiary hospitals, and conduct internal surveillance of antibiotic 
resistance to inform antibiotic use in the hospital and set up resistance alerts. Submit 
relevant information in accordance with the requirements of the national surveillance 
mechanism.  
Conduct baseline survey of 
antibiotic use in hospitals 
Gather baseline data for a range of indicators related to antibiotic use in hospitals 
that are directly related to the audit and other surveillance programmes. 
Hospital level 
Conduct internal 
surveillance and 
assessment of antibiotic use 
in hospitals 
Conduct surveillance, with the help of information technology if possible, of antibiotic 
use in all departments of a hospital, and identify alarming trends in use, adverse 
reactions and potential breaches in sales by pharmaceutical companies. Analyse 
and assess the clinical rationality of antibiotic use in various departments.  
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Strengthen the inter-
professional support for 
antibiotic use in hospitals 
Set up the required facilities and build technical support around the teams of 
infectious disease prescribers, clinical pharmacists and microbiologists. 
Notice of the Department of Medical 
Administration of the Ministry of Health 
on Conducting Pilot Programme of 
Clinical Pharmacist System (2007) 
 
Xinghuo Programme (2009-2011) and 
the Mengya Programme (2009-2012) 
Central and hospital 
levels 
Introduce stringent checks 
for qualifications of relevant 
medical professional 
Introduce training and examination on rational antibiotic use towards the attainment 
of relevant prescribing authorisations and qualifications for prescribers and clinical 
pharmacists respectively. 
Strictly implement formulary 
restriction 
Strictly define and implement the authorisation levels for prescribing non-restricted, 
restricted and reserved classes of antibiotics according to the professional grades of 
prescribers. 
Notice on Implementing the Guiding 
Principles for Antibiotic Use in Hospitals 
(2004) 
 
Notice of the Ministry of Health on 
Further Improving the Stewardship of 
Antibiotic Use in Hospitals (2008) 
 
Notice of the General Office of Ministry 
of Health on Issues Concerning the 
Stewardship of Antibiotic Use in 
Hospitals (2009) 
Hospital level 
Strengthen the regulation of 
procurement and 
management of the 
antibiotic formulary 
Refine, through the decision-making of the internal drug and therapeutic committee 
(DTC), the selection of the regular antibiotic formulary in a number of specific areas. 
In particular, tertiary hospitals are permitted to have no more than 50 types of 
antibiotics by active ingredient, and secondary hospitals no more than 35 types in 
the regular formulary; for each type of antibiotic of a particular route of 
administration, hospitals are permitted to select products from no more than 2 
commercial brands.  
Control the frequency and 
strength of antibiotic use in 
hospitals 
Control antibiotic use in outpatient, inpatient and surgery departments by meeting 
key targets for several indictors including outpatient and inpatient prescribing rates 
measured in percentages of total prescriptions, patient-day adjusted inpatient 
antibiotic consumption as measured by defined daily dose (DDD) per 100 bed-days, 
and rates of antibiotic use under specific pre-operative and post-operative 
circumstances, such as prophylactic antibiotic use for type I incisions.  
Conduct internal prescription 
review 
Conduct, through the help of information technology, internal prescription review of a 
sample of prescriptions by authorised prescribers. Publish the outcome of the review, 
which is aligned with their performance appraisal, within the hospital. Impose 
punishments that restrict or remove certain levels of prescribing authorisation for 
prescribers who failed to comply to relevant prescribing regulations.  
Notice of the Ministry of Health on 
Issuing the Standards for the Review 
and Management of Prescriptions in 
Hospitals (Pilot) (2010) 
Apply information 
technology in antibiotic 
stewardship in hospitals 
Strengthen the capacity and increase the application of information technology in 
antibiotic stewardship policies, such as formulary restriction, surveillance of antibiotic 
use and resistance and prescription review.  
N/A 
Improve health promotion for 
rational antibiotic use    
Promote the activities of the hospital during The Campaign, educate patients about 
the importance of rational antibiotic use 
N/A 
Table 5-4 Key Policies of The Campaign 
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The key policies outlined by The Campaign were clearly based on previous 
antibiotic stewardship policies and supporting policies: a lot of them inherited policy 
contents that had first appeared in previous policies, which were pertinent to three out 
of the four strategic areas for antibiotic stewardship described in Table 5-1 
(establishing and strengthening surveillance, strengthening technical capacity of 
medical professionals, and improving rationality of antibiotic use and prescribing). For 
example, before appearing as one of the key policies of The Campaign in 2011, 
formulary restriction was first proposed in the 2004 “Guiding Principles for Antibiotic 
Use in Hospitals”, and it was reiterated in the 2008 “Notice of the Ministry of Health on 
Further Improving the Stewardship of Antibiotic Use in Hospitals”.  
Five aspects mark the departure of the compulsory Campaign policies from 
previous non-binding policies. First, Campaign policies incorporated clearly stated 
targets into the policies. A target refers to a restrictive threshold denoting the highest 
numeric level at which the indicator of interest is permitted. Many of the targets 
concerned prescribing; these are summarised in Table 5-5 below. There were also 
prescribing indicators for antibiotic use in surgery, including timing and duration of 
prophylactic antibiotic use in surgeries, and rate of prophylactic antibiotic use in clean 
surgeries. In addition, there were indicators that measured stewardship activities other 
than prescribing, such as the percentage of prescriptions reviewed by pharmacists, and 
the rate of culture-based diagnosis in inpatients. Second, the Campaign policies 
explicitly addressed a defined range of actors at the hospital level, as the Campaign 
documents indicated that secondary and tertiary hospitals were the intended targets; 
however, this policy approach was not further explained in the documents. Third, the 
Campaign policies clearly delineated a chain of command in implementation that runs 
through the administrative system of the government, connecting central level actors 
with that of the hospital level actors. As described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System 
Background), public hospitals were considered public organisations that were 
administered by branches of the Bureau of Medical Administration at corresponding 
levels of government. This chain of command was translated into a line of 
accountability in The Campaign, as the director of a public hospital was appointed as 
“First Responsible Person” for policy implementation, held accountable by government 
officials from the local branch of the Bureau of Medical Administration. At the same 
time, heads of clinical departments were held accountable by the director. All these 
actors were required to sign an assurance that they would implement the necessary 
activities. Fourth, the documents clearly stated that prescribing targets would be used 
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to evaluate the performance of a hospital and all the actors it encompassed, including 
its directors, managerial actors and prescribers, which could have implications for 
financial and administrative penalties, which were not described in detail in the 
documents. Fifth, The Campaign described specific monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms, which involved internal inspections at secondary and tertiary hospitals, 
external inspections by various levels of regional and national governments.  
 
Indicator Calculation Target levels 
Outpatient prescribing rate (Encounters or cases with an 
antibiotic prescribed / total 
encounters over the same period 
e.g. a month) x 100% 
20% 
Inpatient prescribing rate 60% 
A&E prescribing rate 40% 
Inpatient antibiotic consumption (Inpatient antibiotic consumption 
measured in DDDs/total number of 
inpatient patient-days over the 
same period e.g. a month) x 100 
40DDD/100 patient-days 
Table 5-5 Key prescribing targets of The Campaign 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the national policy background of The Campaign 
including the reasons for policy actions on antibiotic stewardship, its designated policy 
areas and actors, the role of The Campaign and its contents. In doing so, it has 
addressed the first research question 
According to the theoretical framework of this study described in Chapter 2 
(Theoretical Background), the national policy context discussed in this chapter is part of 
the macro level context that influenced policy implementation at both the central and 
the hospital levels. Under this framework, this chapter informed the study design in two 
crucial ways. First, more understanding of the policy approach of The Campaign to 
target only secondary and tertiary hospitals, and the implication of that for policy 
implementation in China’s healthcare system was necessary better to inform the macro 
level context. Second, both the top-down and bottom-up perspectives of policy 
implementation are relevant depending on actors’ perspectives, and a thorough 
understanding of The Campaign should encompass as many perspectives from “the 
top” and “the bottom” as possible. For the actors at the central level, the 
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implementation of The Campaign marked a very special top-down phase of policy 
implementation. Features of top-down implementation such as target management and 
accountability mechanisms suggested in the policies required close examination: were 
all those policies implemented as directed, and if so, how did they work in practice to 
enable top-down implementation? For the actors at the hospital level, The Campaign 
also represented another set of policies that affected their daily work. The fact that The 
Campaign was part of the continuum of antibiotic stewardship policies in China, and 
that it was preceded by numerous policies that had been implemented previously 
meant that all kinds front-line implementers – directors, manager-prescribers and 
prescribers – were likely to be acquainted with elements of The Campaign to various 
degrees. More fundamentally, some policies of The Campaign are directly addressing 
some of the drivers of antibiotic prescribing described in in Chapter 4 (Healthcare 
System Background). For example, at the organisational level, financial penalties 
associated with lack implementation could play an important part in shifting the 
ingrained financial incentives to prescribe within the healthcare system, especially 
given the context of health financing reforms that sought to dissociate revenue 
generation from sales of pharmaceuticals with profit margins; at the individual level, 
training of healthcare professionals could enhance their understanding of antibiotic use 
and improve prescribing behaviours.  
Having established the theoretical framework (chapter 2), examined existing 
evidence, situated and formulated the research (chapter 3), and thoroughly reviewed 
the healthcare system (chapter 4) and national policy background pertinent to the 
implementation of The Campaign (chapter 5), the next chapter describes how the 
research itself was conducted by detailing its methodology.  
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Chapter 6. Study Design and Methods 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the study design and the methods used to collect and 
analyse data. It also explains the alignment between the study design and the research 
questions, the potential limitations of the methodology, and the steps taken to mitigate 
these limitations.   
As described in Chapter 1 (Introduction) and Chapter 3 (Literature Review), the 
aim of this research was to explore and analyse the implementation of The Campaign 
in China from 2011 and 2013 at the central and the hospital levels.  
In accordance with the theories discussed, and theoretical framework 
established in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), specific research questions were 
framed under three research objectives as follows: 
Objective 1: to understand the national policy context of antibiotic stewardship policies 
in China 
a. What factors led to actions on antibiotic use in hospitals?  
b. Who were the key actors at the central level? 
c. What are the antibiotic stewardship policies to date? 
d. How did The Campaign relate to these policies?  
Objective 2: to understand the healthcare system context in which implementation of 
The Campaign took place 
a. What did the system-level context comprise? 
b. What did the hospital-level context comprise? 
c. What did the individual-level context comprise? 
Objective 3: to explore and analyse the implementation process of The Campaign 
a. How was The Campaign implemented at the central level? 
b. How was The Campaign implemented at the hospital level? 
Objective 1 has been addressed by the review of policy documents and 
literature reported in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), which necessitated and 
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informed the empirical research for addressing objectives 2 and 3 described in this 
chapter.  
 
6.2 Study approach and design 
Overall, the research adopted a qualitative research approach. Due to the lack 
of information on antibiotic stewardship policies in China in general, this research 
focused on addressing exploratory “how” and “why” questions rather than explanatory 
questions. A qualitative approach is appropriate to address “fundamental and 
searching questions about the nature of social phenomena” (Pope & Mays, 2006). 
Whereas the aim of quantitative approach is to achieve statistical generalisation by 
making inferences about a population or universe on the basis of empirical data 
collected about a sample from that universe, the aim of qualitative approach is to 
achieve analytic generalisation by demonstrating the relevance of findings to a 
sequence of events described by existing theories, so that the refined and theoretically-
informed description could be used to implicate other, similar situations where 
analogous events might also occur (Yin, 2009, 2010). Therefore, this research sought 
not to measure predetermined variables or test existing hypotheses based on a priori 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest, but to build that understanding from a 
fundamental level in reference to existing theoretical ideas on policy implementation 
and bridge knowledge gaps as identified and described in Chapter 2 (Theoretical 
Background). 
To study the implementation process of The Campaign, this research first 
explored the perception and experience of policy implementation from the perspectives 
of actors, and then analysed in detail the interaction between context and 
implementation process at the hospital level using a case study. The overall study 
design is demonstrated in Figure 6-1 below. Phase 1 fieldwork, which took place 
between June and September 2015, sought to understand the perspectives on policy 
implementation by a variety of actors at macro and micro levels. Phase 2 fieldwork, 
which took place in October 2017, focused on analysing policy implementation in a 
hospital setting through conducting a case study.  
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Figure 6-1 Overall study design 
 
Phase 1 fieldwork explored and analysed the perspectives of policy actors at 
macro (crucial to central implementation) and micro levels (crucial to hospital 
implementation). Rather than analysing the implementation of specific activities of The 
Campaign, phase 1 fieldwork took a general approach to building initial understanding 
of both the context and process of policy implementation.  
Three groups of actors were interviewed. Actors at the central level (subgroup 
1) were those who had first-hand experience of the implementation process and the 
policy context of antibiotic stewardship policies in China. This group predominantly 
comprised actors that worked inside, or closely with, the central government. In 
addition, the composition of the group was supplemented by experts from academia 
and the pharmaceutical industry who had relevant insight and knowledge.  
 Actors at the hospital level consisted of two subgroups. Managerial actors 
(subgroup 2) were senior managers and administrators who, despite being leading 
medical professionals in their field, also dedicated much of their time to managing the 
day-to-day running of a hospital. They were the people who oversaw the 
implementation and delivery of antibiotic stewardship policies at the hospital level. Due 
to their managerial roles, they not only had first-hand experience of the implementation 
process of antibiotic stewardship policies in China at the hospital level, but also plentiful 
insight on system-level health policies and reforms initiated by “the Centre” that 
influenced various aspects of health service provision, such as financing and delivery.  
The other subgroup of the hospital-level actors were the prescribing-level actors 
(subgroup 3), namely prescribing prescribers and their patients. From a bottom-up 
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perspective, they were considered part of the frontline implementers of antibiotic 
stewardship policies. Although it was difficult to know the extent to which these actors 
were aware of the actual antibiotic stewardship policies being implemented mainly by 
managerial actors at the hospital level or actors at the central level, they provided 
useful insight into the healthcare system context and what actually happened in terms 
of antibiotic use in hospitals. 
 Building on the understanding of actor perspectives from phase 1 fieldwork, a 
case study of policy implementation at the hospital level was conducted in phase 2 
fieldwork so as to understand how “a planned change” such as policy implementation 
occurs “in a messy real world setting” (J & Keen, 2010), and to unravel granular details 
of a contemporary event exemplified by The Campaign (Yin, 2009). To achieve a 
detailed and in-depth analysis of policy implementation within one single hospital, the 
case study analysed implementation activities that were most pertinent to the hospital 
level. These included activities that embedded the top-down approach from the 
government (setting up an accountability mechanism, introducing stringent penalties for 
irrational antibiotic use in hospitals and maintaining a reporting line between hospitals 
and the government) and hospital-based antibiotic stewardship policies (including 
conducting internal surveillance of antibiotic resistance and use, strengthening inter-
professional support, introducing stringent qualification requirements, implementing 
formulary restriction, regulating antibiotic formulary, controlling antibiotic use through 
targets, conducting internal prescription review, applying information technology 
platform and improving health promotion with patients). 
The central conceptual element to the case study is the definition of “the case”, 
or the “unit of analysis” (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The case in phase 2 fieldwork of 
this research specifically refers to policy implementation at a secondary hospital in 
Shanghai. In one sense, the case does not have to be a tangible object: it can be an 
event, an entity, a decision, a programme, or even a conceptual idea such as the 
implementation process or organisational change (Yin, 2009). In this specific instance, 
the case is the hospital in which the implementation of The Campaign took place, 
which encompassed the actors, administrative arrangements and mechanisms that 
contributed to the implementation process representative of those in a typical urban 
healthcare setting in China. The case study research opted for a single case design. 
From a theoretical perspective (Yin, 2009), there are three reasons why a single case 
design is sufficient for this study. The single case here represented a “revelatory case” 
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in which a phenomenon of interest – the implementation of antibiotic stewardship 
policies in China – was very under-studied empirically. As illustrated by Chapter 3 
(Literature Review), there are few empirical studies on this subject to date. This 
researcher was in a position to participate in a number of high-level meetings, and 
subsequently build a network of high-level informants who were at the heart of the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China.  
The case study is a flexible methodology that allows the researcher to explore 
in depth “a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals” 
(Creswell, 2003). In a case study, a researcher can collect detailed information using a 
variety of methods (Stake, 1995). Despite that direct observation was not permitted by 
hospital collaborators when the fieldwork first took place in 2015 and then in late 2017, 
and that the possibility of quantitative analysis of antibiotic prescribing was precluded 
by the lack of access to data, major actors at various levels pertaining to The 
Campaign were all accessible for qualitative interviews, and their memory of the events 
during The Campaign was likely to remain sufficiently strong due to the high-profile 
nature of the policy. Therefore, qualitative data were collected from policy actors at the 
hospital level, including managerial (non-clinical managers) and prescribing-level 
actors (prescribers and patients). Additionally, a new group of actors—manager-
prescribers—was identified. These actors were senior prescribers or heads of clinical 
departments who were responsible for policy and prescribing at the same time.  
The two phases of fieldwork were designed in line with the theoretical 
framework set out in Table 2-1 in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background). A conceptual 
map of the study linking the theoretical framework with the study design and the 
outputs of empirical analysis is illustrated below in Table 6-1. This conceptual map will 
be revisited later in this chapter, where an expanded version of this map will explain 
how the theoretical ideas pertinent to top-down and bottom-up implementation 
respectively reviewed in Chapter 2 will be used in data analysis, and how results will be 
presented in the result chapters. 
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 Theoretical 
perspective 
Factors 
pertinent 
to context 
Implementation process to be examined Fieldwork 
phase 
Policy 
actors 
concerned 
Level of 
implementation 
Focus of 
analysis 
Aspects of policy implementation with 
respect to the activities of The 
Campaign (introduced in chapter 5) to 
be examined 
Macro 
level  
Top-down: 
focus on “the 
Centre” 
- Policy 
factors 
- Health 
system 
factors 
- National 
implementation 
of The 
Campaign 
- Context and 
process of 
central 
implementation 
- The overall role and activities of the 
central government in top-down 
implementation 
- Phase 1 - Subgroup 
1 
Micro 
level  
Bottom-up: 
focus on the 
local settings 
- Hospital-
level 
factors 
- Individual-
level 
factors 
- Local 
implementation 
and adaptation 
of The 
Campaign 
carried out by 
local hospitals 
- Context and 
process of 
hospital 
implementation 
- The overall role and activities of the 
nationally leading hospital in 
implementing top-down policies at the 
hospital level 
- Subgroup 
2 
- Context of 
hospital 
implementation 
- Not applicable (contextual factors only) 
- Subgroup 
3 
- Context and 
process of 
hospital 
implementation 
- A detailed analysis of the role of the 
secondary hospital in Shanghai in setting 
up an accountability mechanism, 
introducing stringent penalties for 
irrational antibiotic use in hospitals and 
maintaining a reporting line between 
hospitals and the government 
- A detailed analysis of the implementation 
of hospital-based policies including 
conducting internal surveillance of 
antibiotic resistance and use, 
strengthening inter-professional support, 
introducing stringent qualification 
requirements, implementing formulary 
restriction, regulating antibiotic formulary, 
controlling antibiotic use through targets, 
conducting internal prescription review, 
applying information technology platform 
and improving health promotion with 
patients 
- Phase 2 - Hospital 
case study 
Table 6-1 Conceptual map of the study 
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6.3 Phase 1 fieldwork in Beijing: analysis of perspectives of policy 
actors at the central and hospital levels 
Phase 1 fieldwork took place in Beijing between June and September 2015. 
During this phase of research, the researcher conducted research that would support 
the design and execution of the case study in phase 2 fieldwork.  
 
Selection of phase 1 fieldwork sites 
Based on the focus of the research on the urban Chinese setting and the 
researcher’s existing contacts with gatekeepers and key informants, Beijing was 
selected to be the city where fieldwork would take place. Table 6-2 provides a 
summary of the fieldwork sites, including central government, a nationally leading 
hospital and 5 local hospitals in urban areas.  
These study sites were chosen to capture a range of policy actors that reflected 
the composition of actor subgroups in the study design. However, constraints in 
research access led to several limitations that would influence the balance of the 
analysis. Firstly, access to the central government in subgroup 1 provided a crucial 
window to understand the perspectives of policy makers and implementers at the top of 
the chain of command, but the lack of access to regional government meant that the 
link between central and local implementation could not be examined. Secondly, 
access to managers at a nationally leading tertiary hospital in subgroup 2 offered an 
opportunity to tease out some of the interactions between context and process of policy 
implementation at the hospital level, but the hospital itself was far too advanced and 
atypical for the analysis to be generalised to other urban settings in China. Thirdly, the 
lack of access to prescribers and patients due to negotiation issues precluded the 
possibility of conducting a thorough case study at these hospitals. Fourthly, access to a 
limited number of prescribers and patients at five different hospitals in Beijing enabled 
a rich analysis of some of the crucial contextual factors influencing prescribing 
behaviours in the urban Chinese context, but restricted access to myriad policy actors 
across hospital departments and levels made in-depth analysis of policy 
implementation in each hospital impossible. 
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Level of policy 
implementation 
Component of 
the study 
design 
Focus of analysis Corresponding study site(s) Access 
Strengths of study 
site(s) 
Limitations of study 
site(s) 
Central level 
Subgroup 1, 
(central 
government 
officials and 
experts) 
Context and 
process of central 
implementation 
Mainly NHFPC and 
two key 
government-
affiliated research 
and expert groups 
(Beijing) 
The researcher had 
existing contacts who 
were gatekeepers to 
other study sites, and 
was acquainted with 
some of the key 
informants previously 
through participation of 
high-level meetings and 
previous collaborations 
These highly central 
organisations were 
responsible for all the 
major policy 
processes, and they 
were the implementers 
of The Campaign. 
• Access to regional-
level government of 
Beijing could not be 
gained. 
Hospital level 
Subgroup 2, 
(hospital 
managers) 
Context and 
process of hospital 
implementation 
A nationally-leading 
hospital in China 
(Beijing) 
The hospital worked 
very closely with the 
government and its 
related organisations, 
resulting in a strong 
link between the 
implementation 
process at the central 
level and the hospital 
level.  
• Only the managerial 
actors at this hospital 
could be accessed 
for interviews; 
• A nationally-leading 
hospital was far too 
atypical a setting. 
Subgroup 3, 
(prescribers 
and patients) 
Context of hospital 
implementation 
Five local hospitals 
with various 
characteristics 
(Beijing) 
Five local hospitals 
were selected to 
capture a range of 
different healthcare 
settings in urban 
Beijing, including: a 
small community 
health centre; a large 
community health 
centre; a tertiary 
hospital, and a TCM 
tertiary hospital.  
• Access to hospital 
actors was restricted 
to few prescribers 
per hospital, severely 
limiting in-depth 
study of policy 
implementation. 
Table 6-2 Rationale for the selection of study sites 
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The process of gaining access during this research was made more difficult by 
the fact that the research was not part of any formal collaborations; nor it was funded 
by any international research body or government. On one level, the researcher was 
not able to harness the machinery of these structures to enhance possibility of gaining 
access. On a more fundamental level, without any possible formal assistance that 
could take place at an organisational level, the researcher had to rely on building 
strong collaborative relationships with gatekeepers. To a large extent, the introduction 
by the gatekeepers helped the researcher to establish an initial relationship and trust 
with the interviewees and made phase 1 fieldwork possible, which would have been 
otherwise difficult for the researcher to achieve on his own in China’s social context. 
One key gatekeeper was Gatekeeper 1, who helped secure access to the sites 
for subgroup 1 and subgroup 2: the central NHFPC and two key government-affiliated 
research and expert groups (by late August, 2015) and the national tertiary hospital (by 
mid-August, 2015). Gatekeeper 1 was a high-level expert who worked very closely with 
both officials and medical experts. The researcher met this gatekeeper during official 
meetings and conferences in China in March 2015. After building a strong connection 
through working together on multiple projects, negotiations for access to the study site 
began in early July, 2015. Due to the position of this expert and his strong connections 
with both the study sites in Beijing, access to the study sites for subgroups 1 and 2, 
and some of the most senior personnel that the researcher had planned to interview – 
including high-level officials, senior officers, and departmental heads of the national 
tertiary hospital in Beijing – was successfully granted. However, as explained in Table 
6-2, the researcher did not gain access to prescribers and patients at the national 
tertiary hospital. This was because gatekeeper 1 had other commitments and was not 
able to help negotiating that level of access.  
Another key gatekeeper was Gatekeeper 2, who helped secured access to four 
of the five local hospitals in urban Beijing for subgroup 3 by late July to early August, 
2015. Gatekeeper 2 was a high-level officer whose work involved working very closely 
with local hospitals in Beijing. The researcher met this gatekeeper through previous 
collaborations. This gatekeeper negotiated access to four hospitals on the researcher’s 
behalf. Negotiations began in early July, 2015. Although the relationship between the 
researcher and the gatekeeper was strong and the gatekeeper was in a position of 
power, negotiations for access to the local hospitals proved more difficult than 
imagined. As the research was not part of a formal partnership, some hospitals did not 
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feel obliged to participate. Other hospitals felt uncomfortable with the idea of having a 
researcher talk to both members of their staff and  patients in the hospital. Still others 
were sensitive about the relevance of the research topic to antibiotic use as a result of 
The Campaign, and refused to participate despite that steps taken to mitigate that 
sensitivity. These factors meant that the researcher could not afford the luxury to reject 
offers that were negotiated by the gatekeeper. The gatekeeper was very understanding 
of the dilemma, and managed to negotiate, to the best possible extent that met the 
researcher’s criteria, initial access to four local hospitals (apart from the university 
hospital in the final five) and a point of contact in each of the hospitals. The researcher 
then negotiated further access to prescribers and patients in those hospitals with those 
contacts directly. The researcher did not have full control over the access to 
prescribers, and the point contacts at each hospital only agreed to give access to no 
more than 3 or 4 prescribers. However, the research did have full control over the 
access to patients in the waiting areas in the hospitals. 
Before gaining access to those four hospitals, the researcher managed to gain 
access to a university hospital with the help of Gatekeeper 3 by mid-July. The access 
was limited to just one prescriber, and the one interview conducted there was regarded 
as the pilot interview for later ones conducted in those four hospitals.  
The only occasions where no gatekeepers were needed in research access 
was when the researcher interviewed several respected academics and a former 
specialist at a pharmaceutical company. These people were accessed on a one-to-one 
basis at the initiative of the researcher, and no organisational access was required.  
 
Data collection in phase 1 fieldwork 
The methods of data collection employed in phase 1 fieldwork were as follows: 
1. In-depth interviews with actors at the government and policy level (subgroup 1) 
including: 
• Academics and experts on antibiotic use and health policies in China; 
• Senior officers at the government-affiliated research organisations and 
expert groups; 
• High-level government officials; 
And with managerial actors at the hospital level (subgroup 2) including: 
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• Heads of microbiology, pharmaceutical affairs, infection control, outpatient 
affairs and medical affairs of the nationally leading hospital, and a senior 
emergency prescriber from the hospital; 
2. Semi-structured interviews with prescribers and users at the hospital level 
(subgroup 3) including: 
• Prescribers from the five selected hospitals; 
• Patients from` the four selected hospitals. 
Table 6-3 describes how the methods of data collection addresses the research 
objectives and questions through the nested subgroups of the case study. It also gives 
a summary of the sources of data for each method.  
Subgroups 
concerned 
Methods of data 
collection Sources of data 
Subgroup 1: the 
central level In-depth interview 
Key informants including: government officials, 
senior officers and experts at government-related 
organisations, academics, and other experts 
Subgroup 2: the 
hospital level (i): the 
managerial level 
 
 
In-depth interview 
Key informants including: heads of various 
departments that managed antibiotic use in 
hospitals (for examples, medical affairs, 
outpatient affairs, and pharmaceutical affairs) 
Subgroup 3: the 
hospital level (ii): the 
prescribing level 
Semi-structured interview 
Prescribers 
Patients visiting the hospitals 
Table 6-3 Data sources to address the research questions 
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The interviews took place from June through September 2015 after access was 
secured in the relevant sites (as described in Section 4.3). Table 6-4 provides an 
overview of the timeframe of the research activities.  
Time of year 
in 2015 
List of informants interviewed (NOT arranged 
chronologically) 
Case study 
component 
addressed 
June to early 
July 
Academics studying antibiotic use and health policies in China 
(n=4), former antibiotic specialist at a pharmaceutical 
company (n=1) 
Subgroup 1: the 
central level 
 
Mid-July 
to mid-August 
Pilot: prescriber at a university hospital (n=1) Subgroup 3: the 
hospital level (ii): 
the prescribing level 
 
Pilot: patients at a small community health centre (n=1) and a 
tertiary hospital (n=4) 
Prescribers (n=3) and patients (n=7) at a small community 
health centre 
Prescribers (n=3) and patients (n=4) at a large community 
health centre 
Prescribers (n=3) and patients (n=9) at a tertiary hospital 
Prescribers (n=3) and patients (n=8) at a TCM tertiary hospital 
Mid-August to 
mid-September 
Heads of microbiology, pharmaceutical affairs, infection 
control, outpatient affairs and medical affairs of the nationally 
leading hospital, and a senior emergency prescriber at the 
hospital (n=6) 
Subgroup 2: the 
hospital level (i): the 
managerial level 
Senior officers at government-affiliated research organisations 
(n=3) and expert groups (n=1) 
Subgroup 1: the 
central level 
 High-level government officials (n=2) 
Table 6-4 Summary of fieldwork schedule 
 
The details about the methods of data collection, including the review of key 
policy documents, are explained in turn.  
 
In-depth interviews with key informants 
The in-depth interview was an ideal method for the researcher to learn from 
knowledgeable individuals who possessed knowledge and/or personal experience of 
the subject of interest. They were, in this case, the high-level key informants at the 
central level, and the key managerial informants in the nationally leading hospital. The 
in-depth interview presents a less structured and highly flexible way to focus on 
exploring one or two issues that is tailored towards the interviewee’s own expertise and 
interests (Green & Thorogood, 2009; Britten, 2006). Due to the less structured nature 
of the in-depth interview, the topic guides used in these interviews comprise some 
general questions and probes that were broadly aligned with the research questions 
and theoretical framework. In fact, most of the probes of the interview were largely 
based on the subjects decided by the interviewee and their responses. This iterative 
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probing process involves informed and rational improvisation (Legard, Keegan & Ward, 
2003). After each interview, the researcher would reflect on the experience, and 
generate new items for inquiring and probing specific to the next informant. The 
information sheets, consent forms and topic guides for the key informants in phase 1 
fieldwork are available in Appendices 2b, 2c and 2d respectively.  
The types and numbers of key informants interviewed were listed 
chronologically in Tables 6-5a and 6-5b.  
 
Dates Informants interviewed Purpose 
25th June 
to 15th July 
Academics studying antibiotic use and 
health policies in China (n=4), former 
antibiotic specialist from an international 
pharmaceutical company (n=1) 
To reaffirm and reinforce existing 
knowledge, explore potential areas of 
inquiry to be used in later in-depth 
interviews, and gather data from the actors 
at the central level 
13th 
August 
Senior officer at a government-affiliated 
research organisation (n=1) 
To gather data from the actors at the 
central level 
25th 
August 
Senior officers at government-affiliated 
research organisations (n=2) and expert 
groups (n=2) 
To gather data from the actors at the 
central level 
15th 
September 
High-level government officials (n=2) To gather data from the actors at the 
central level 
Total key actors at the central level (n=12) 
• Experts outside the government (n=5): academics 
D1, D2, D3, D4; former antibiotic specialist from a 
pharmaceutical company P; 
• Officials (n=2): government officials A1, A2; 
• Officers/experts working closely with the government 
(n=5): senior officers B1, B2, B3, C; medical expert 
M. 
 
Table 6-5a In-depth interviews with key informants at the central level 
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Dates Informants interviewed Purpose 
19th – 23rd 
August 
Heads of microbiology, pharmaceutical 
affairs and infection control of the nationally 
leading hospital (n=3) 
To gather data from the managerial actors 
at the hospital level 
26th 
August – 
9th 
September 
Heads of outpatient affairs and medical 
affairs of the nationally leading hospital and 
a senior emergency prescriber at the 
hospital (n=3) 
To gather data from the managerial actors 
at the hospital level 
Total managerial actors at the hospital level (n=6) 
• Head of medical affairs MA; 
• Head of outpatient affairs OA; 
• Head of pharmaceutical affairs PA; 
• Head of infection control IC; 
• Head of clinical microbiology CM; 
• Senior emergency prescriber E. 
 
Table 6-5b In-depth interview with key informants in the nationally leading hospital 
 
Overall, 18 in-depth interviews were conducted. 17 interviews were conducted 
face-to-face in private locations of the interviewees’ choices, so that they could talk in 
confidence in a comfortable environment. One interview was conducted over the 
telephone. As the researcher was introduced by a powerful gatekeeper with personal 
connections to the key informants, and that the researcher had already been 
acquainted with some of them through previous meetings, most of them gave consent 
for the recording of the interview. 16 interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
in Chinese by the researcher. However, two interviews were not recorded because the 
interviewees were still uncomfortable with the idea of recording. Notes were taken by 
the researcher instead, and the interviews were written up within 24 hours. Each 
interview lasted between 30 minutes and 90 minutes. All the interviews – including the 
semi-structured interviews to be described later – were conducted in Chinese, the 
native language of the researcher and the interviewees. They were all included in the 
analysis.  
The rationale for the sampling of key informants was based on the principle of 
purposive sampling. The aim of purposive sampling is to select “information rich cases, 
from which the researcher can learn a great deal about matters of central importance to 
the purpose of the research” (Patton 1990, in Emmel 2013). It was much more 
important to ensure that the key informants selected were “worthy of in-depth study, 
because they provided detailed insight” than to consider statistical representativeness, 
which is a different concern of probability sampling (Emmel, 2013). In addition, taking 
inspiration from the methodological implications of bottom-up approaches, the 
researcher also relied on the advice of gatekeepers to identify closely related actors 
and networks not obvious to outsiders (Schofield, 2001), as described in Chapter 2 
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(Theoretical Background). The researcher had identified a list of key informants before 
going into the field; during the fieldwork, the researcher constantly refined this list at the 
advice of Gatekeeper 1, who had a deep understanding of the machinery of the central 
level and the hospital level. Several managerial actors at the hospital level were added, 
as were a senior officer and a high-level official, and the researcher was then able to 
learn about how they worked together through the introduction of the gatekeeper. Even 
so, the final list of interviewees was broadly consistent with what the researcher had 
anticipated before the fieldwork. 
The process of gaining access to these interviewees was generally successful. 
The researcher independently gained access to the academics and the pharmaceutical 
specialist without problems, and interviews with these actors took place very early on. 
Access to all the key informants at the central level and the hospital level was 
negotiated gradually and successfully through Gatekeeper 1, and interviews with these 
actors were conducted in the later stages of the fieldwork starting from mid-August. 
To ensure that the researcher could gain knowledge from different perspectives 
and refine the interviewee agenda as the fieldwork progressed, the researcher planned 
and arranged the interviews strategically to allow for accumulation of information. As 
demonstrated in Tables 6-6a and 6-6b, the researcher first conducted interviews with 
the academics and the former pharmaceutical specialist early on during the fieldwork, 
which helped the researcher to reaffirm the findings and research gaps established 
from literature review, explore issues that were not covered by the literature, and gain 
more knowledge of China’s health system and policies in general. Then, key informants 
at the central level and the managerial level of the hospital level were interviewed 
alternately to allow the researcher to contrast and process different sources of 
information and hone the focus of the next set of interviews. 
 
Semi-structured interviews with prescribers and patients 
Semi-structured interviewing was suited to examining prescriber’s knowledge of 
antibiotic use and accounts of antibiotic prescribing at local hospitals in urban Beijing. 
The semi-structured interview is conducted “on the basis of a loose structure consisting 
of open-ended questions that define the area to be explored, at least initially, and from 
which the interviewer or interviewee may diverge to pursue an idea or response in 
more detail” (Britten, 2006). Whereas the agenda for the in-depth interviews used in 
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this research were much less pre-determined and had more room for informed and 
iterative improvisation in further probing, the semi-structured interviews used here 
contained more predetermined categories and probes, and the researcher kept a firmer 
hand on the wheel to make sure some of the key issues pertinent to the research 
questions were covered. The increase in the structure of the interview was justified by 
the fact that this part of empirical research, which essentially focused on the influence 
of health system on prescribing incentives and behaviours, was well researched and 
likely to contain more expected and confirmatory elements; this was supported by the 
findings of the overview of China’s healthcare system in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System 
Background).  
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with patients to examine, from 
the other side of the prescriber-user dyad, their knowledge about antibiotic use and 
accounts of antibiotic prescribing at local hospitals in urban Beijing. Therefore, the 
predetermined categories and probes used here, as explained later in this section, 
matched with those used in the semi-structured interviews with prescribers. As patients 
showed little interest in being interviewed in the busy waiting areas of hospitals, the 
researcher modified the method of the interview and introduced a structured 
questionnaire to encourage patient participation. However, the purpose of, and the 
approach to the semi-structured interview remained the same. The questionnaire was 
used as an alternative form of interview guide for the patient to respond and the 
interviewer to probe. How the structured questionnaire was introduced as an adapted 
form of the interview guide for semi-structured interview with patients in this research 
will be explained later in this section.  
The interviews with prescribers and patients were designed around a tracer 
condition being the common cold. Using a tracer condition as a proxy to study other 
conditions or phenomena in healthcare research was first introduced by Kessner et al. 
(1973). Using the common cold as a tracer for studying antibiotic prescribing has been 
established as a common method (Reynolds & McKee, 2009). 
The common cold can be a good tracer for studying the influencing factors of 
antibiotic prescribing for several reasons. Firstly, it can help identifying unnecessary 
antibiotic prescribing. By medical definitions, the common cold is a viral infection that is 
self-limiting; the use of antibiotics cannot be justified in the early stages of the disease, 
when the lining of the epidermal cells of the respiratory tract is still relatively intact, and 
concomitant bacterial infections is yet to take place. Secondly, it can help clarifying the 
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rationale for, and the process of establishing a treatment decision. In reality, the line 
between the two phases of infections is blurred: a prescriber could prescribe 
treatments based on experience, or based on evidence. Here, several aspects could 
be examined: a prescriber’s knowledge, the steps taken by the prescriber to diagnose 
the common cold, and a patient’s understanding of the medical rationale and 
procedures involved. Thirdly, it can help understanding the preferences and incentives 
for certain treatments. As the common cold is very much self-limiting, technically 
nothing needs to be taken for treatment of the viral aetiology of the disease. Most of the 
common cold treatments available sought to relieve common cold symptoms. 
Therefore, there is great flexibility in the treatment selection. Besides medical rationale, 
other considerations are very likely to influence treatment selection; and these 
considerations may reveal the preferences and incentives of prescribers and patients.  
The hospitals visited, and prescribers and patients interviewed, were listed 
chronologically in Table 6-6.   
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Dates Informants interviewed Source of 
informants 
Purpose 
17th 
July 
Prescriber at a university hospital (U) (n=1) Internal 
medicine 
dept. 
To pilot the semi-structured 
interview to be used with 
other prescribers 
21st – 
22nd 
July 
Prescribers at a small community health 
centre (S) (n=3) 
General 
practice dept. 
To gather data from actors at 
the prescriber and user level 
Patient at a small community health centre 
(S) (n=1) 
General 
practice dept. 
To pilot the semi-structured 
interview to be used with 
other patients 
29th 
July 
Prescribers at a large community health 
centre (L) (n=3) 
General 
practice dept. 
To gather data from actors at 
the prescriber and user level  
30th – 
31st 
July 
Prescribers at a tertiary hospital (H) (n=3) Respiratory 
medicine 
dept. 
Patients at a tertiary hospital (H) (n=4) Respiratory 
medicine 
dept. 
To pilot the semi-structured 
interview to be used with 
other patients 
Patients at a tertiary hospital (H) (n=9) Respiratory 
medicine 
dept. 
To gather data from actors at 
the prescriber and user level  
4th 
August 
Prescribers at a TCM tertiary hospital (T) 
(n=3) 
Emergency 
medicine 
dept. (n=2), 
paediatric 
(n=1) 
Patients at a TCM tertiary hospital (T) (n=8) Respiratory 
medicine 
dept. 
5th – 
6th 
August 
Patients at a large community health centre 
(L) (n=7) 
General 
practice 
Patient at a small community health centre 
(S) (n=4) 
General 
practice 
Total (n=46) 
Prescribers (n=13):  
• University hospital (U) (n=1) 
• Small community health centre (S) (n=3) 
• Large community health centre (L) (n=3) 
• Tertiary hospital (H) (n=3) 
• TCM tertiary hospital (T) (n=3) 
 
Patients (n=33): 
• Small community health centre (S) (n=4) 
• Large community health centre (L) (n=7) 
• Tertiary hospital (H) (n=9) 
• TCM tertiary hospital (T) (n=8) 
 
Table 6-6 Semi-structured interviews with prescribers and structured interviews with patients 
 
Overall, 13 interviews with prescribers and 33 interviews with patients were 
conducted in five sampled hospitals. Interviews with prescribers were conducted face-
to-face in private locations of the interviewees’ choice, so that they were comfortable 
with the environment, and could talk in confidence. Interviews with patients were 
conducted in the open waiting area. The wording of both interviews was designed to 
give an impression of neutrality to encourage both the prescribers and patients to 
respond to the more sensitive questions. In order to build trust and rapport and 
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encourage responses from the position of a stranger, the researcher actively stressed 
that the interviews were not recorded, and only notes were taken. The interviews were 
then written up within 24 hours. Each interview with a prescriber lasted between 30 
minutes and 45 minutes. With patients, the length of each interview was significantly 
shorter, lasting between 15 minutes and 20 minutes. Not all interviews were included in 
the analysis: the pilot interviews with the patients did not produce enough information 
and were excluded. All other interviews, including the pilot interview with a prescriber at 
a university hospital, were all included in the analysis.  
The sampling of hospitals was conducted with the purpose of capturing a range 
of characteristics reflective of healthcare settings that common cold patients visited in 
urban Beijing, even though the process was subjected to limitations due to pragmatic 
reasons, and it was achieved through the assistance of Gatekeeper 2. The background 
of the hospitals sampled is described in Table 6-7.  
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 A small 
community 
health centre 
(S) 
A large community 
health centre (L) 
A university 
hospital (U) 
A tertiary 
hospital 
(H) 
A TCM tertiary 
hospital (T) 
Tier of the 
hospital 
Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 3 Tier 3 
Number of 
beds 
(approx.) 
N/A 20 50 > 1,000 > 1,000 
Number of 
prescribers 
(approx.) 
20 Over 40 Over 40 Over 200 Over 200 
Patient visits 
per day 
(approx.) 
200 1,000 1,000 Over 5,000 Over 5,000 
Main 
population 
served 
Regular residents of the neighbourhood communities Residents of 
neighbouring 
districts and 
sometimes 
provinces 
Residents of 
Beijing and 
visitors from 
the northern 
part of the 
country 
Provision of 
TCM services 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financing 
mechanism 
as described 
by 
interviewees 
The district 
government 
allocates a 
performance-
based global 
budget to 
cover all 
operational 
costs; the 
health centre 
hands over all 
the revenue to 
the district 
government.  
The district 
government 
allocates a 
performance-
based budget to 
cover a significant 
portion of the 
operational costs; 
the health centre is 
responsible for 
generating 
revenue to cover 
the rest.  
The 
university 
allocates a 
global budget 
to cover all 
operational 
costs; the 
hospital 
manages the 
budget and 
keeps the 
surpluses.  
The government allocates a 
small budget; the hospital is 
responsible for generating 
most of the budget required to 
cover all operational costs.  
The hospital keeps the 
surpluses.  
Composition 
of prescriber’s 
remuneration 
as described 
by 
interviewees 
Basic salary 
plus bonus 
based on the 
fulfilment of 
public health 
management 
in line with the 
performance 
indicators for 
the health 
centre 
Basic salary plus 
bonus based on 
the fulfilment of 
public health 
management in 
line with the 
performance 
indicators for the 
health centre, and 
the volume of 
healthcare service 
provision 
Basic salary 
plus a very 
small bonus 
based on 
capitation 
Basic salary plus bonus based 
on a number of performance 
indicators based on capitation, 
volume and quality of service 
provision, in line with the 
performance indicators for the 
hospital 
Table 6-7 Overview of the hospitals sampled 
 
This sample managed to capture two types of hospitals: community health 
centres, and tertiary hospitals. These hospitals differed in their catchment areas. 
Tertiary hospitals had a much wider catchment areas, sometimes reaching other 
provinces; in contrast, primary care providers mainly served residents in the 
neighbouring areas. These hospitals also differed in financing mechanisms. Tertiary 
hospitals were required to generate revenue to finance themselves whilst community 
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health centres largely operated on global budgets. These community health centres 
had varied degrees of incentives to provide services based on the size of the budgets: 
community health centre L had to generate revenues from service provision to 
supplement a comparatively partial budget to that of community health centre S. Due to 
the zero-mark-up policy for essential medicines, prescribing was precluded from 
revenue-generating services; instead, they provided healthcare services that were 
popular amongst the locals, such as TCM services. Provision of TCM services was 
prevalent amongst hospitals in China. All hospitals sampled either included TCM 
departments or specialist TCM prescribers to provide these services. These 
characteristics were in line with the descriptions in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System 
Background).  
After access was secured at the local hospitals sampled, the researcher was 
able to negotiate directly with the contact person of each hospital to recruit prescribers. 
The researcher was also able to recruit patients of various characteristics in the public 
waiting area directly. As with the sampling of key informants, the principle of purposive 
sampling also applied here. The purpose is to capture, as many types as possible, 
prescribers and patients of various characteristics and backgrounds from which a 
diverse range of themes can be elicited, and a more enriched narrative could be 
constructed by building on the argumentative skeleton and sequence of events 
provided by the theory.  
In recruiting prescribers, it was crucial to consider how to capture the possible 
range of prescribers in various departments that a common cold patient may see in 
urban Beijing. After consulting with Gatekeeper 2, the contact persons in each 
hospitals and spending time making observations and inquiring nurses inside the local 
hospitals, the researcher identified some of the departments that common cold patients 
were most likely to visit when they visit their hospitals, including general practice (for 
community health centres), internal medicine, respiratory medicine, emergency 
medicine and paediatrics (for other hospitals). All these departments above were 
outpatient departments. The characteristics of the prescribers sampled are 
summarised in Table 6-8. 
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 Hospitals 
S L U H T 
Prescriber S1 S2 S3 L1 L2 L3 U1 H1 H2 H3 T1 T2 T3 
Gender F F M F F F F F F M M F F 
Age group 30 – 39 30 – 39 40 – 49 20 – 29 40 – 49 30 – 39 40-49 40 – 49 30 – 39 50 – 59 40 – 49 30 – 39 40 – 49 
Department General 
practice  
General 
practice  
General 
practice 
General 
practice 
General 
practice 
General 
practice 
Internal 
medicine 
Respiratory 
medicine 
Respiratory 
medicine 
Respiratory 
medicine 
Emergency 
medicine 
Emergency 
medicine 
Paediatrics 
Professional 
grade 
Attending 
physician 
Attending 
physician 
Chief 
physician 
Attending 
physician 
Associate 
chief 
physician 
Attending 
physician 
Associate 
chief 
physician 
Associate 
chief 
physician 
Attending 
physician 
Chief 
physician 
Attending 
physician 
Attending 
physician 
Associate 
chief 
physician 
Level of 
education 
Undergrad Undergrad Undergrad Masters Undergrad Masters Undergrad Undergrad Undergrad Undergrad Undergrad Undergrad Undergrad 
Specialty at 
graduation 
Clinical 
medicine 
Clinical 
medicine 
Clinical 
medicine: 
gastro-
intestinal 
medicine 
Combinatory 
medicine 
(TCM and 
western 
medicine) 
General 
TCM 
TCM: 
oncology 
Clinical 
medicine 
Clinical 
medicine: 
respiratory 
medicine 
Clinical 
medicine: 
respiratory 
medicine 
Clinical 
medicine: 
respiratory 
medicine 
TCM: 
respiratory 
medicine 
TCM: 
emergency 
medicine 
TCM: 
internal 
medicine 
Table 6-8 Characteristics of the prescribers sampled 
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The researcher negotiated with the contact persons, who agreed to assist with 
the sampling of 13 prescribers with varied demographic background and professional 
experience from 5 hospitals. Three prescribers were selected in each hospital apart 
from the university hospital U, where only one prescriber was sampled for the pilot 
interview. The sample captured prescribers of three different professional grades, 
namely Attending Physician, Associate Chief Physician, and Chief Physician (in 
ascending order of rank). Professional grades were reflections of prescriber’s clinical 
experience. Although these prescribers differ in levels of education and their initial 
specialties at graduation. Most importantly, all of them saw common cold patients daily.  
 Likewise, in recruiting patients, it was crucial to consider how to capture 
common cold patients of various characteristics visiting local hospitals in urban Beijing. 
The ideal scenario would have been to sample common cold patients who could be 
matched with the recruited prescribers, and the best way to achieve that would have 
been to recruit patients waiting outside the prescribers’ consultation room in spaces 
assigned to specific departments. In reality, this was highly difficult to execute. Firstly, 
the prescribers usually invited the researcher for interviews during their off-hours, when 
no patients were visiting. That meant the researcher had to return to the hospitals on 
separate occasions for patient interviews. Secondly, patients very often sat where they 
liked, and patients with various conditions could be found in the waiting area originally 
assigned to one department. Sometimes these areas were simply unassigned. Thirdly, 
as many prescribers noted, summer was not a peak season for common cold patients 
compared with winter. Therefore, the most sensible thing to do was to try to recruit 
patients in areas assigned to the department to which the recruited prescribers 
belonged. An exception to this strategy was the TCM tertiary hospital, in which 
prescribers in both the paediatric department and the emergency medicine department 
were recruited. As the emotional tension was high in the paediatric department, and the 
conditions of patients in the emergency medicine department were too serious in 
general, it was decided that patients were to be sampled from the respiratory medicine 
department, in consistence with recruitment strategy in the tertiary hospital. In addition, 
due to lack of access, no patients were sampled from the university hospital. The 
characteristics of the patients recruited in each hospital were summarised in Table 6-9.  
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 Number of patients by hospitals S L H T Total 
Overall sample size 7 4 9 8 28 
Source of sample General practice Respiratory medicine  
Gender Female 4 3 4 4 15 Male 3 1 5 4 13 
Age group 
20 – 29  1 2 2 5 
30 – 39  1 1 4 6 
40 – 49 2 1 3  6 
50 – 59 2  1 1 4 
60 – 69 2 1 2 1 6 
Over 70 1    1 
Level of 
education 
Primary education   1  1 
Secondary education 4 2 5 3 14 
Higher education 3 1 3 3 10 
Postgraduate education  1  2 3 
Financing 
method 
GFH (Government-Funded Healthcare) 1  2  3 
UEBMI (Urban Employee Basic Medical 
Insurance) 5 3 2 5 15 
URBMI (Urban Resident Basic Medical 
Insurance) 1   2 3 
NRCMS (New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Scheme)   2  2 
Self-funded  1 3 1 5 
Table 6-9 Characteristics of the patients sampled 
 
 The researcher aimed to recruit at least twice the number of patients as 
prescribers, so that a range of characteristics and sufficient accounts could be included 
to compare and contrast with those of the prescribers. Overall, 28 patients were 
sampled from four hospitals, with 11 patients from two community health centres S and 
L, 9 patients from tertiary hospital H and 8 patients from TCM tertiary hospital T. With 
purposive sampling, the researcher was able to even out patients with various 
demographic characteristics including gender, age group and level of education across 
different healthcare settings. However, there was over-representation of patients with 
urban social health insurance for employed people (the UEBMI), and under-
representation of patients with other financing methods including other social health 
insurance schemes and self-funding. Furthermore, only 5 patients out of the total of 28 
were self-funded patients. Considering the study setting of urban Beijing, this sample 
could in a way reflect the pattern of insurance coverage of the urban residents, most of 
whom were employed. Finally, from Table 6-6, it could be seen that the number of 
patients sampled were decreasing over the course of the interviews. This was because 
the data collected by the researcher was gradually reaching saturation using the semi-
structured interview. As explained earlier, the questionnaire was not employed as a 
structured and restricted instrument with limited capacity to capture qualitative data, 
which would be the case when it was used in a survey; rather, the questionnaire 
instrument was an alternative form of interview guide that enabled the researcher was 
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to probe effectively into patients’ knowledge, perceptions and experience of common 
cold, antibiotic prescribing and health seeking in general. By the time 4 patients were 
interviewed in the large community health centre, the researcher decided that there 
was sufficiently similar information captured by previous interviews already, and did not 
carry on recruiting more patients. 
 In order to compare and contrast the accounts of the prescribers and patients, 
the interview guides for both the prescribers and the patients were designed to have 
the same pre-determined analytical categories. The interview guide designed before 
the fieldwork was piloted and worked well with a prescriber at a university hospital. 
Only minor changes were made in the final version, which was put to use with 3 
prescribers at a small community health centre a few days later. However, the original 
format of the interview did not work well for the patients, yielding very limited responses 
after two pilot interviews. The patients were hesitant to engage, with some of them 
stating that they were unsure about where the questioning was heading despite the 
researcher’s attempt to explain the purpose of the research and the themes that the 
interview would examine. In addition, as the interview took place in the waiting room, it 
was extremely difficult to get productive interviews, especially when the waiting times 
were sometimes unpredictably short. Eventually, as the researcher learned more about 
the local context from interviews with prescribers at three hospitals by 30st July, a pilot 
questionnaire instrument was developed for the purpose of improving patient 
engagement and response. The questionnaire was not left to the patients for them to 
complete on their own; instead, the researcher used questions from the questionnaire 
as a starting point of discussion and to conduct further probing where necessary in the 
same process as the semi-structured interview, so that patients could speak freely and 
provide more information in the process. Using the questionnaire as an instrument to 
initiate and aid the semi-structured interview markedly improve patients’ willingness to 
speak and elaborate on their ideas in an open environment as patients had a much 
better idea about the interview itself upon reading detailed questions outlined on one 
page of paper: nearly 90% of the patients approached after the questionnaire 
instrument was introduced agreed to an interview, compared with less than 40% before 
the questionnaire was used. Furthermore, the questionnaire helped the researcher to 
control the duration of the interviews and improved completion rate of the interviews: 
apart from one interview which was incomplete as the patient left halfway, all other 
interviews were complete in the sense that responses were available for every 
question. After several trial interviews, the questions were adjusted and finalised on 
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31st July. The information sheets, consent forms and final topic guides for the 
prescribers and the patients are available in Appendices 2b, 2c and 2d respectively. 
towards the end of Appendix 2d is a table showing how analytical categories from 
prescriber and patient interviews were matched in data analysis.  
The sequence of the interviews undertaken in various hospitals was largely 
determined by the process of negotiation of access, and by the way the interview 
techniques were developed. On reflection, conducting interviews with more prescribers 
before the patients was a sensible idea in any case, as they tended to produce much 
more in-depth information than the patients. The interviews with patients consequently 
served a better role in triangulating with the accounts of the prescribers, especially after 
the introduction of the questionnaire instrument that was developed based on the 
interviews with the prescribers. 
Additionally, completing the interviews with prescribers and patients in 
Subgroup 3 (Table 6-6) before the bulk of the interviews with key informants in 
Subgroups 1 and 2 commenced (Table 6-5a and 6-5b) helped the research process. 
Effectively, interviews related to Subgroup 3 acted as a link between the early key 
informant interviews and the later key informant interviews. Later key informant 
interviews were able to benefit from operating on the information obtained from 
interviews with prescribers and patients.  
 
6.4. Phase 2 fieldwork in Shanghai (hospital case study) 
 Phase 2 fieldwork took place in Shanghai in October 2017. Having gained 
understanding of the perspectives of policy actors on the context and process of the 
implementation of The Campaign at the central and hospital levels in phase 1 
fieldwork, the primary purpose of phase 2 was to conduct a more detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of how top-down policies from the central government was 
implemented at a single hospital through a case study that examined the perspectives 
of all the policy actors involved, which was not the case for phase 1 fieldwork as 
interviews with managers from a nationally leading tertiary hospital (subgroup 2) and 
with prescribers and patients from 5 hospitals in Beijing (subgroup 3) were conducted 
separately, so that a single case study of policy implementation that drew on the 
perspectives of all the actors involved was not possible.  
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Selection of phase 2 fieldwork site 
 Phase 2 fieldwork continued to focus on the urban Chinese setting. However, 
contrary to the study of hospital implementation in Beijing that took place within a 
nationally leading hospital, the case study aimed to depict policy implementation in a 
more typical and less resource-rich urban healthcare scene in China instead, from 
which more generalised policy implications could be drawn. And for consideration of 
comparability to Beijing in terms of its metropolitan nature and predisposition for health 
reforms and policies, the site for phase 2 fieldwork would be ideally in a suburban 
district of a similarly metropolitan city with a sufficient level of activities in health 
reforms and policies.  
 Having explored options for the sites and possibilities of establishing functional 
collaborations vital for the research access and support for an in-depth case study, the 
metropolitan city of Shanghai was selected to be the city where phase 2 fieldwork 
would take place. Formal research collaboration was set up with Fudan University, who 
provided critical assistance in the selection of sites and negotiation of access. To 
reflect a more typical and representative urban Chinese setting with a track record in 
piloting healthcare reforms and policies, a suburban district in Shanghai was chosen by 
the researcher together with the local collaborators.  
The researcher and his collaborators then successfully gained access to a 
small secondary hospital within the district. The 300-bed hospital was an intermediary 
between the smaller primary care clinics and the larger tertiary hospitals in the district, 
capable of providing a level of complex and specialised healthcare services, including 
CT scans and endoscopy that were not available at primary care clinics. However, it 
was not equipped to provide the same level of technologically advanced services 
offered by tertiary hospitals.  
 The choice of a secondary as opposed to a tertiary hospital for the case study 
also provided an extra element to investigate the extent of implementation of The 
Campaign.  As described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), The Campaign mainly 
aimed at improving antibiotic stewardship at higher level hospitals, especially tertiary 
hospitals. Whilst implementation activities were expected to be pronounced at the 
previously studied nationally leading hospital in Beijing, the extent to which The 
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Campaign impacted on antibiotic prescribing in a typical secondary hospital remained 
to be seen.  
 
Data collection in phase 2 fieldwork 
The aim of the case study in phase 2 fieldwork was to achieve analytic 
generalisability to allow for in-depth understanding of a phenomenon in relation to 
interpretations by existing theory, rather than statistical generalisability to enable 
statistic inferences to be made (Yin, 2009, 2010). Due to lack of access to data on 
antibiotic use (which could have provided very useful background on changing 
prescribing patterns from before to after The Campaign), the case study in phase 2 
fieldwork employed the semi-structured interview as the only data collection method.  
The policy actors interview included: 
• Non-clinical managers, who were part of the senior managerial team of the 
secondary hospital in Shanghai; 
• Manager-prescribers, who were senior prescribers or heads of clinical 
departments who were responsible for both managerial duties and prescribing; 
• Prescribers, who were supervised by manager-prescribers and did not have 
managerial roles; 
• Patients in the area outside outpatient department. 
The selection of the interviewees was informed both by previous research in 
phase 1 fieldwork and by constructive discussions with the senior managers of the 
hospital studied. Three of the actor groups above were derived from, and in line with 
those from subgroups 2 (managers) and 3 (prescribers and patients) in phase 1 
fieldwork. After initial discussions with collaborators prior to the interviews, manager-
prescribers were considered to be an additional group of actors that functioned 
differently to non-clinical managers; by having them as a separate group of actors in 
the case study, their dual role both as implementers and as prescribers could be better 
analysed. Further discussions with the collaborators then revolved around the types of 
clinical settings to be captured. Based on their feedback on my sampling strategy, 
which aimed to capture departments with frequent antibiotic use, the collaborators and 
I agreed that nephrology, respiratory medicine, orthopaedics, surgery, paediatrics, 
obstetrics and gynaecology, A&E and dentistry would be the key departments to 
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investigate for this case study. At least one manager-prescriber or prescriber was 
interviewed for each department; for larger departments with more antibiotic use, such 
as respiratory medicine, orthopaedics, surgery and paediatrics, at least one manager-
prescriber and one prescriber were interviewed.  
The interviews took place in October 2017. Over the course of 4 weeks, 17 
hospital staff and 11 patients were interviewed. The information sheets, consent forms 
and final topic guides for all the actors at the secondary hospital studied in phase 2 
fieldwork – managers, manager-prescribers, prescribers and patients – are available in 
Appendices 3b, 3c and 3d respectively. The details of the interviews are described in 
the next section.  
 
Semi-structured interviews with non-clinical managers, manager-
prescribers, prescribers and patients (more about sampling procedure) 
 Whereas the in-depth interview was used in phase 1 fieldwork to understand 
policy implementation at the central level and at the nationally leading tertiary hospital, 
the semi-structured interview was employed as the only method for data collection in 
phase 2 fieldwork, which was significantly informed by the findings of phase 1 
fieldwork.  
As opposed to general questions about policy implementation, the case study 
focused on the specific implementation activities at the hospital level as set out by The 
Campaign using a detailed instrument. The final version of the instrument, which is 
available in Appendix 3d, comprised 6 themes: overview of the hospital; background of 
the interviewee; perception of The Campaign; key actors for antibiotic stewardship; 
implementation process of The Campaign (which examined the policies of The 
Campaign that were relevant to the hospital level one by one); and the perceived 
influence of The Campaign.  
Informed by the findings from phase 1 fieldwork in its design, the instrument 
was designed to gather detailed data from hospital staff, and it was fine-tuned and 
revised throughout the fieldwork process to reflect increasingly in-depth understanding 
of policy implementation at the hospital. The questions and probes for the non-clinical 
managers, manager-prescribers and prescribers were similar overall. During interviews 
with these actors, heavy focus was devoted to theme 5 – implementation process of 
The Campaign – which examined every antibiotic stewardship policy set out in the 
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Campaign documents. Questions and probes in this theme also incorporated top-down 
characteristics emerged from phase 1 fieldwork, especially line of command, target 
approach, punitive measures and redundancy. However, the instrument was not set up 
to be restrain the inquiry to merely the intended and seemingly linear implementation 
process specified by the contents of the official documents. In order to capture the 
nuances and complexities of hospital-level implementation from the bottom-up 
perspectives of frontline implementers, further probes and open questions to 
understand the roles of antibiotic prescribing in different clinical settings, and how 
actors reacted to those government policies and top-down measures and eventually 
translated them into implementation activities within their respective clinical contexts. 
For example, the question about the target approach (“Did the government or the 
hospital set any target for antibiotic prescription”) was followed by both the probes that 
examined the intended implementation activities (such as what the targets were, 
whether there would be punishment for not hitting targets) and the probes that explored 
how the policy implementation responded to contextual factors (such as how targets 
differed across clinical settings, and whether they were aligned with clinical needs). As 
all levels of contextual factors were explored, the researcher actively related the 
discussions to the clinical experience of manager-prescribers and prescribers 
throughout the interviews to understand how those factors effected on prescribing 
behaviours.   
The focus of patient interviews was also on theme 5 (implementation process of 
The Campaign). Here, questions about policy implementation were indirect: to ensure 
patients could relate better with the interview subject, the questions were adapted 
around the common cold tracer and patients’ experience in getting antibiotic 
prescriptions rather than the actual policies themselves. Though not addressing 
contextual factors at higher levels, patient interviews provided a crucial angle to 
understand the influence of individual factors attributed to patients on antibiotic 
prescribing. Lessons learned from phase 1 fieldwork were reflected upon in the design 
of phase 2 patient interviews. Although the structure questionnaire introduced for 
patient interviews in phase 1 fieldwork did improve effectiveness of patient 
engagement, it was not an ideal instrument for use in semi-structured interviews; 
consequently, patient responses had the propensity to be framed around the very 
specific questions from the questionnaire. Therefore, a decision was made at the 
beginning of the study by the researcher to amend the tool and use a more 
conventional interview guide with more open questions and probes. With the feedback 
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from previous research, the predesigned instrument turned out to work well in the field 
and required minimal revisions during fieldwork when patients were willing to properly 
engage with the researcher. However, difficulties in the initial recruitment of and 
engagement with patients persisted; this issue will be discussed in detail in section 6.7 
(Commentary on the methodology used).  
 The types and numbers of interviewees sampled are listed in Table 6-10. 
Type of 
informant 
Departments Number of informants 
Non-clinical 
managers 
Medical affairs, pharmaceutical 
affairs, hospital infection control 
n=3 
Manager-
prescribers 
Nephrology, respiratory medicine, 
orthopaedics, surgery, paediatrics, 
obstetrics and gynaecology, A&E, 
dentistry 
n=7 
Prescribers n=7 
Patients Outpatient waiting area n=11 (males; n=6, females: n=5; age 20-30: 
n=2, age 30-40: n=3, age 40-50: n=1; age 50-
60: n=3, age 60-70: n=2; local residents: n=7, 
migrant workers: n=4) 
Table 6-10 Interviews with hospital staff and patients at the secondary hospital in Shanghai 
  
The 17 interviews with hospital staff were conducted in private rooms arranged 
by the hospital. Fourteen out of the 17 interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim; notes were taken for the remaining 3 interviews. Each interview lasted 
between 40 and 90 minutes. The 11 interviews with patients were conducted in the 
waiting area of the outpatient department. The patient interviews were relatively short, 
each lasting not longer than 20 minutes. To encourage patient participation, none of 
the interviews were recorded, and notes were taken instead. All interviews were 
conducted in Chinese, written up within 24 hours, and eventually included in the final 
analysis.  
  As before, the interviewees for the case study were purposively sampled by the 
researcher. Key managerial staff were selected based on previous fieldwork in the 
nationally leading hospital in Beijing. Manager-prescribers and prescribers were 
sampled from a variety of clinical departments, which were likely to be dealing with very 
different patterns of antibiotic use and challenges in implementing The Campaign. The 
sampling of patients also aimed to capture patients with varied personal background. In 
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particular, a few migrant workers were sampled to reflect the demographic 
characteristic of the district.  
As described earlier, the sampling process was a collaborative one between the 
researcher, academics from Fudan University and the senior management staff of the 
hospital. The sampling frame described above was put forward by the researcher, and 
it was large accepted by all collaborators; minor revisions were made as to the specific 
clinical departments from which manager-prescribers and prescribers were sampled 
based on the collaborators’ description of the basic information of the hospital. Patients 
engagement was less of a concern that imagined as about 1 in 3 patients approached 
would be happy to be interviewed. However, the interviews did not come across any in-
depth conversation that could last for more than 15-20 minutes, which was likely down 
to the constraints of the method of recruiting and interviewing patients waiting for 
treatments in the open space itself.  
 
6.5 Analysis of empirical data 
The thematic analysis of the transcripts and notes of the interviews, and field 
notes was conducted in a grounded approach, whereby themes and hypotheses were 
derived in an iterative cycle between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning 
(Pope & Mays, 1995), and deviant cases were used to test the explanatory power of 
the themes and hypotheses (Silverman, 2006). This overall approach of analysis was 
applied to data generated from both phase 1 and phase 2 fieldwork. This process was 
repeated until all the data was accounted for, and the analytical categories, themes and 
hypotheses could explain all the data. As the sample size of each subgroup in phase 1 
fieldwork and of the case study in phase 2 fieldwork was reasonably small, it was 
possible to examine all the data within each subgroup thoroughly to repeat the iterative 
analysis process whereby the inductive analytical categories, themes and hypotheses 
were constantly subjected to scrutiny and reorganisation to generate an overarching 
narrative that could account for the full set of data across the 2 phases of fieldwork. 
 
Data analysis of phase 1 fieldwork 
For the data from the in-depth interviews conducted in subgroups 1 (central 
actors) and 2 (managerial actors from a nationally leading hospital), initial themes and 
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analytical categories pertinent to both context and process of implementation were 
generated in a grounded and iterative approach. Where relevant, theoretical elements 
pertinent to policy implementation as described in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background) 
were introduced to create theory-driven themes and analytical categories.  
For the qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews and conducted with 
prescribers and patients in subgroups 3 (prescribers and patients from 5 hospitals in 
Beijing), the data analysis process was more structured than grounded. The qualitative 
data collected from prescribers using conventional semi-structured interviews were 
analysed in conjunction with those collected from patients using an atypical approach 
described earlier, which involved the use of a structured questionnaire as a tool to 
improve patient engagement and to probe. The approach was effective in collecting 
sufficient detailed responses from patients that constitute a limited body of qualitative 
data for this analysis. Some initial analytical categories about contextual factors 
influencing policy implementation had already emerged during the data collection 
process and were reflected in the instruments, as some of the findings from the semi-
structured interviews with prescribers were fed the designing of the interviews with 
patients. Therefore, themes and hypotheses to be generated first from examining the 
data from the prescribers, and then tested by examining the qualitative data from 
patients. 
 
Data analysis of phase 2 fieldwork 
Data analysis for the case study was initially driven by existing themes that 
were derived from the findings of phase 1 fieldwork, including those about top-down 
implementation characteristics (subgroups 1 and 2), and those about contextual factors 
at system, organisation and individual levels (subgroups 1, 2 and 3). As explained in 
section 6.4 (phase 2 fieldwork in Shanghai), these themes had already explicitly fed 
into the design of the instrument and strongly informed the way that the data were 
collected, which gave the data from this phase of fieldwork much better structure 
comparing to those from phase 1 fieldwork. New themes under those bigger existing 
categories, which emerged through an exhaustive reading of the data in an iterative 
process that cycled between iterative and deductive reasoning, were then further 
developed as the analytical process zoomed in on crucial details of that data that 
revealed the relationships and interactions between context and process. These key 
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discoveries from the data were used as an analytical lens to apply to the interpretation 
of the whole dataset. This process was repeated until no further themes was identified.  
 
Application of the theoretical framework for synthesis 
In later stages of data analysis, all the themes and analytical categories 
emerged from all the subgroups were subjected to reorganisation and integration 
based on the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background). As 
explained in Table 6-11, the data analysis process was aligned with and guided by the 
theoretical framework, with the aim of creating a parsimonious narrative that explained 
the implementation of The Campaign in terms of both the context and the process.  
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 Theoretical 
perspective 
Factors 
pertinent 
to context 
Implementation process to be examined Data analysis and results 
Level of 
implementation 
Focus of 
analysis 
Aspects of policy implementation 
with respect to the activities of The 
Campaign to be examined 
Fieldwork 
phase 
Data 
source 
Theoretical 
ideas pertinent 
to data analysis 
Analysis of process and 
context in result 
chapters 
Macro 
level  
Top-down: 
focus on “the 
Centre” 
- Policy 
factors 
- Health 
system 
factors 
- National 
implementation 
of The Campaign 
- Context and 
process of 
central 
implementation 
- The overall role and activities of the 
central government in top-down 
implementation 
- Phase 1 - Subgroup 
1 
- Top-down 
implementation: 
preconditions for 
“perfect” 
implementation; 
managerial 
accountability; 
target approach 
Chapter 7: 
- Top-down features of 
implementation 
- Implications of contextual 
factors for the policy 
approach 
- Influence of contextual 
factors on policy 
implementation 
Micro 
level  
Bottom-up: 
focus on the 
local settings 
- Hospital-
level 
factors 
- Individual-
level 
factors 
- Local 
implementation 
and adaptation of 
The Campaign 
carried out by 
local hospitals 
- Context and 
process of 
hospital 
implementation 
- The overall role and activities of the 
nationally leading hospital in 
implementing top-down policies at 
the hospital level 
- Subgroup 
2 
- Frontline 
implementers’ 
perception and 
experience of 
the 
implementation 
The Campaign 
and antibiotic 
use in hospitals 
in general 
Chapter 8: 
- Implications of contextual 
factors for the policy 
approach 
- Influence of contextual 
factors on policy 
implementation 
- Policy implementation at 
a national tertiary hospital 
- Context of 
hospital 
implementation 
- Not applicable - Subgroup 
3  
- Context and 
process of 
hospital 
implementation 
- A detailed analysis of the role of the 
secondary hospital in Shanghai in 
setting up an accountability 
mechanism, introducing stringent 
penalties for irrational antibiotic use 
in hospitals and maintaining a 
reporting line between hospitals and 
the government 
- A detailed analysis of the 
implementation of hospital-based 
policies including conducting 
internal surveillance of antibiotic 
resistance and use, strengthening 
inter-professional support, 
introducing stringent qualification 
requirements, implementing 
formulary restriction, regulating 
antibiotic formulary, controlling 
antibiotic use through targets, 
conducting internal prescription 
review, applying information 
technology platform and improving 
health promotion with patients 
- Phase 2 - Hospital 
case 
study 
- Top-down 
implementation: 
managerial 
accountability; 
target approach 
- Frontline 
implementers’ 
perception and 
experience of 
the 
implementation 
The Campaign 
and antibiotic 
use in hospitals 
in general 
Chapter 9: 
- Top-down features of 
implementation 
- Perception of top-down 
implementation 
- Interaction between 
contextual factors and 
policy implementation 
Table 6-11 Extended conceptual map of the study illustrating data analysis and results 
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The theoretical framework, which incorporated theoretical ideas of both top-
down and bottom-up implementation and conceptualised the relationship between 
context and process, were used in driving data analysis and deriving themes.  
Top-down elements of implementation exemplified by managerial accountability 
and target approach were used to understand the process of policy implementation at 
the central (Chapter 7) and hospital levels (Chapter 9). Additionally, preconditions for 
“perfect” implementation were introduced in Chapter 7 to examine the role of the 
government in leading and shaping implementation at the central level for its suitability 
to understand the role of a strong government in an assumed linear implementation 
process.  
The overarching influence of macro-level contextual factors on policy 
implementation at both central and hospital levels – which was conceptualised in the 
theoretical framework – was reflected in the way how system-level contextual factors 
shaped the policy approach of The Campaign into focusing on only secondary and 
tertiary hospitals. In analysing how the organisation, delivery and financing of China’s 
healthcare system and its relevant reforms influenced the policy approach, themes 
were drawn from data from multiple actors at both at both the central (Chapter 7) and 
the hospital levels (Chapter 8). 
Finally, the bottom-up approach to understanding policy implementation was 
particularly vital in understanding implementation at the hospital level from the 
perspectives of local policy actors. As set out in the theoretical framework, frontline 
implementation was influenced by contextual factors at the system, hospital and 
individual levels; however, frontline implementers were likely to experience the results 
of the complex interactions between context and process merely as a need to change 
and adapt their routine clinical and administrative activities. Whilst phase 1 fieldwork 
focused on the managerial perspectives about how one of the best hospitals in China 
introduced measure to counteract contextual factors in policy implementation (Chapter 
8), phase 2 fieldwork engaged all levels of actors at the hospital – most crucially 
prescribers and patients – to examined the dynamic interactions and mutual influences 
between top-down government interventions and frontline activities and prescribing 
behaviours at a typical secondary hospital (Chapter 9). 
In order to aid the mechanics of the analysis process, NVIVO 10 was used to 
help the categorising and coding of the data. For Subgroup 3, which contained a 
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reasonable amount of structure, Excel was used to record the data from the structured 
interviews, and pivot tables were used to look for patterns in patients’ responses and 
help testing and generating new hypotheses that could be tested in data from the 
prescribers.  
The analysis of the data, which were in Chinese, was conducted first in 
Chinese. After the researcher became familiar with all the materials, the categories, 
themes and quotes were translated into English, and from that point on, English 
became the main language of analysis.  
 
6.6 Ethical issues 
In order to conduct fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai, formal ethical approval 
was sought from ethics committees at LSHTM, Peking University and Fudan 
University. All approvals were gained before fieldwork started in July 2015 and October 
2017. Consent of the organisations and hospitals in Beijing and Shanghai to participate 
in the research were sought individually, in line with the advice provided by Peking 
University and Fudan University respectively.  
In conducting the research, the researcher was constantly heeding three crucial 
aspects of ethical issues – anonymity, confidentiality and informed consent – outlined 
by Goodwin (2006).  
Firstly, anonymity was applied to all the organisations and individuals involved 
in the research. Necessary descriptions of the organisational contexts and the roles of 
the individuals were provided in order to allow readers to make sense of the analysis; 
however, the researcher ensured, to the best possible extent, that the level of detail 
provided were not sufficient for outsider readers to identify the organisations and 
individuals. In particular, the researcher opted to not to record the names of the 
patients in order to gain their trust and make them more comfortable in speaking in 
open space. However, as gatekeeper 1 worked very closely with a lot of the high-level 
informants (explained in Section 6.3), a few high-level informants from subgroups 1 
and 2 in phase 1 fieldwork may be able to guess the identifies of some of the 
informants.  
Secondly, concerning confidentiality, all the informants agreed that all the 
content discussed during the interview could be used as part of the study; none of the 
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data obtained during the interviews contained confidential information, and all the data 
were used in analysis.  
Thirdly, informed consent was obtained before the start of every interview. The 
researcher used the information sheet for participants to explain the purpose of the 
research and the interview, and sought the signatures of the interviewees on the 
Informed Consent form, which included consent to participate and to allow quotes to be 
used in the thesis.  
The ethical approvals from LSHTM and local collaborators for the 2 phases of 
fieldwork are available in Appendices 2a (phase 1) and 3a (phase 2) respectively. And, 
as previously described, the consent forms and information sheets used in the 2 
phases of fieldwork are available in Appendices 2b and 2c (phase 1) and Appendices 
3b and 3c (phase 2) respectively.  
 
6.7 Commentary on the methodology used 
Recognising that philosophical assumptions underpins all forms of research 
(Hammersley, 1992), it is necessary to explicitly identify and discuss the 
epistemological position – or the way of acquiring knowledge – taken by this research, 
and its implications for interpreting social data. This research takes the position of 
critical realism, which acknowledges the existence of independent, knowable 
phenomena (Silverman, 2006), but at the same time accepts that such phenomena 
cannot be accessed directly without mediation (Hammersley, 1992). In this research, 
this position is reflected by the fact that the knowledge of policy implementation had to 
be acquired through the researcher’s interaction with interviewees who experienced 
policy implementation directly or indirectly in the social world. Such knowledge is 
therefore socially produced, contained within specific contextual accounts (Green & 
Thorogood, 2009) that reflects existing patterns and constraints in the social world 
(Hughes & Sharrock, 1997).  
This epistemological stance has several implications for the methodology used 
in this research. Firstly, rather than scrutinise the truthfulness of the data, the aim of 
social research is to “discover the correct manner” to interpret the available data, taking 
into account the nature of the data source, and the social environment in which the 
data is obtained. In understanding the implementation process of antibiotic stewardship 
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policies in China through the lenses of the policy documents and the interviewees, the 
researcher’s role was to maintain a panoptic balance of the different accounts and 
achieve a critical interpretation of the accounts within the research context.  
Triangulation of data – the use of multiple methods or data sources in 
qualitative research (Patton, 1999) – may help this process. Yin (2009) argues that 
triangulation can increase the validity of a case study, in that hypotheses can be 
established and challenged from the perspectives of different actors, and the narratives 
generated from different methods. Although the concept of validity stems from positivist 
notion that accepts the existence of a “correct” version of truth (Silverman, 2006), 
triangulation of data in a qualitative study could help the researcher construct a more 
balanced and rounded version of the overall narrative that exists within the given 
dataset. In this sense, better “validity” can be achieved in a qualitative case study. In 
this study, the lack of publicly available quantitative data on antibiotic use and lack of 
access to the data at all the hospitals studied precluded the possibility of triangulation 
through the use of quantitative data collection methods; however, triangulation was 
instead achieved through counterbalancing the qualitative data from interviews with a 
critical literature review of quantitative studies on the impact of The Campaign in 
Chapter 3 (Literature Review) and a descriptive review of the national policy context 
based on literature and policy documents in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context).  
Secondly, the social world has a “reflexive” nature; both the researcher and the 
interviewees in this research were part of the process of knowledge coproduction that 
took place in the form of conversation in very specific contexts (Giddens, 1993; Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). Therefore, it was necessary for the researcher to be wary of the 
context and social situations in which these interviews took place in interpreting and 
understanding what the social data were really suggesting. It was equally important for 
the researcher – the “instrument” in social research (Patton 2002) – to be reflective of 
their own values and agenda. How a researcher viewed and studied policy 
implementation very much depends on “who we are, whom we want to influence and 
who is paying for our work” (Hill & Hupe 2002:83). These factors could implicitly shape 
a researcher’s normative judgements, and inform their methodological choices (Ryan, 
1995; Mays & Pope, 2008). Through critical reflection, these assumptions and their 
potential effects in shaping the research could be made explicit, and the bias 
introduced as a result of these assumptions could be mitigated (Mason, 2002). 
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An important factor to consider, therefore, was the social position of the 
researcher in different types of interviews that took place in different contexts. Most of 
the interviewees for subgroup 1 of phase 1 fieldwork (actors at the central level) were 
acquainted with the researcher before the fieldwork formally took place in high-level 
conferences or meetings. This meant that my identity, as viewed by these key 
informants, would be one of a credible young researcher. In particular, the introduction 
through gatekeeper 1 as described in Section 4.3 further enhanced the connections 
between the researcher and the government-related informants. These factors 
enhanced the rapport between the researcher and these informants. However, the 
accounts of the informants were inevitably influenced by their positions: academics 
may be influenced by some of their stronger views on the subject of interest; the former 
antibiotic specialist at a pharmaceutical company may be influenced by their 
experience and feelings with the former employer; and most prominently, the officials, 
senior officers and experts close to the government may be influenced by their political 
roles in the government to various levels. It is highly probable that officials and senior 
officers were inclined to provide rhetorical and official accounts on behalf of the 
government. It was part of their professional responsibility to ensure that the 
presentation of the government’s public image in this research was in accordance with 
that in other academic outlets. In addition, as discreet and respectable civil servants, 
they were not necessarily at liberty to disclose all their personal opinions in their 
professional capacity.  
Similarly, although the interviewees for subgroup 2 of phase 1 fieldwork 
(managerial actors at the hospital level) were meeting the researcher for the first time 
during the interview, the introduction through Gatekeeper 1 was instrumental in the 
researcher’s mostly successful attempts to build trust and rapport with these informants 
as a trustworthy researcher. Still, out of their concerns as managerial actors for one of 
the best hospitals in China, some of the informants had initial doubts and reservations 
about the research, citing some of their concerns over the negative opinions about 
China’s hospitals that they had read about in English-language journals. As the 
interviews took place in private settings, the researcher was able to allay these 
concerns by going into lengths explaining the purpose of this research, and the 
background of the researcher. By being honest and open, the researcher was able to 
encourage more productive engagements with these informants. However, similar to 
the situation described previously, it was very likely that the informants provided a lot of 
accounts on behalf of their hospital.  
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With the interviewees for subgroup 3 of phase 1 fieldwork (prescribers and 
patients), the situations were different, in that the researcher had to negotiate with new 
contacts in the local hospitals. Despite Gatekeeper 2 providing significant assistance in 
introducing the researcher, the researcher had to gain the trust of each and individual 
prescriber that was recruited. From the responses of the prescribers, it could be 
concluded that the researcher’s attempts were largely successful, although some 
prescribers were less passionate in engaging in conversation in general due to their 
busy schedule, as they themselves explained. Recruitment of the patients was in fact 
more straight-forward. As previously explained, patients were hesitant to engage in the 
beginning due to the unsuitable format of semi-structured interview in an open setting. 
Seeing that the researcher was a university student trying to undertake serious work, 
prescribers and patients were generally supportive of the research. As the interview 
questions concerned personal incentives and reported behaviours, patients may be 
more likely to provide opinions that were closer-aligned with their actual experience or 
behaviours than prescribers, as prescribers may still feel obliged to provide responses 
that were in line with the public image of their hospitals.  
For the case study in phase 2 fieldwork, interviews with all actors including non-
clinical managers, manager-prescribers, prescribers and patients at the secondary 
hospital in Shanghai went smoothly largely due to the fact that formal collaboration 
between the researcher, Fudan University and the hospital had been in place before 
the fieldwork commenced. Engagement with the hospital staff were facilitated by the 
hospital, and engagement with patients was executed by the researcher alone at the 
hospital’s approval. Similar to previous interviews, hospital staff were unlikely to be in a 
position freely to express their opinions due to their concerns about their employment 
at the hospital (especially when the researcher was introduced to them by the hospital), 
and patients were likely to have reservations about the interview process itself. But as 
the hospital staff were briefed fully about the research and the fact that it was part of a 
formal collaboration by both the hospital and Fudan University beforehand, they were 
very willing to engage with the research topic and spoke in-depth about some of the 
issues raised, often citing events, data and policies within the hospital that were 
confirmed by one another interviewees. Interactions with patients, on the other hand, 
proved more difficult. Although their recruitment in the waiting area of the outpatient 
department was expectedly easy and the patients generally accepted the researcher 
well upon learning the fact that the research was for a university thesis, few patients 
displayed real interest towards the interviews themselves. The semi-structured 
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interview process was unable to not last for more than 15 to 20 minutes. Some of the 
interviews raised concerns in respect of confirmation bias, as a couple of patients 
actively asked the interviewer whether or not they were “saying the right things”.  
Another important factor to consider was the method through which the 
interviews were conducted. For all the interviews, questions were phrased neutrally in a 
non-judgemental manner. When asking sensitive questions (such as the financial 
incentives to prescribe), the principle of appreciative enquiry was applied, more positive 
rhetoric was used in questions concerning negative experiences (such as unsuccessful 
attempts of implementation), or socially undesirable behaviours (such as irrational 
antibiotic prescribing). No questions involved probing of personal details. Where 
appropriate, questions were asked in the third person to further distance the 
interviewee from the situation of interest, so that responses could be gathered for some 
of the less engaging questions. In addition, the researcher consciously tried to design 
the order of questions in a way that did not predispose the interviewees to a certain 
topic that was to be asked later. This was more difficult to execute in-depth interviews 
as the key informants were in charge of the flow; in the semi-structured interview, the 
topic guides were designed to achieve that purpose. For example, in the semi-
structured interviews with patients, the question of whether antibiotics were necessary 
for the common cold was asked long after previous questions about the patients’ 
preferences for common cold medicines. Lastly, the researcher consciously sought to 
cross-examine information on a certain subject with different interviewees on the 
premise that it would not lead to the disclosure of the source of information or 
predispose the interviewee to responses from other interviewees.  
Furthermore, the temporal arrangements of both phases of fieldwork meant that 
the research was likely to be subjected to potential recall bias. Phase 1 fieldwork took 
place in 2015 and phase 2 in 2017, which was 2 years and 4 years from the end The 
Campaign respectively. However, potential problems with recalling events during The 
Campaign was unlikely to be an issue of concern as interviewees recognised that the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies was an ongoing effort. In particular, 
hospital staff from the nationally leading hospital in Beijing and the secondary hospital 
in Shanghai all felt that the policies and measures of The Campaign were lasting and 
becoming intensified.  
Lastly, in order to ensure replicability of the case study (Yin, 2009), the research 
methodology and other related research activities were meticulously documented, as 
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evidenced by the descriptions made in this chapter. During the fieldwork, the 
researcher kept a research log that detailed the daily activities and meetings, and a 
notebook to record thoughts and field notes. The researcher also kept records of all the 
written materials over the course of the PhD. Particular to this project, the researcher 
created a list of Chinese to English translations of the important elements of 
vocabularies to ensure consistent translations. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
Given the practical constraints, the qualitative case study design as detailed in 
this chapter presents an appropriate way of investigating the implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship policies in China whilst incorporating the crucial elements 
conceived of the theoretical framework: the study is organised into three nested 
subgroups representing three groups of actors at the macro (central) level and the 
micro (hospital) level. Considering the nature of social data, and the researcher’s 
perceived roles in the different research settings, it is necessary that careful 
interpretation be made of the multi-faceted qualitative data collected through using 
different forms of interviews with different groups of actors and gathering key policy 
documents from the government. Overall, the study methodology achieves the balance 
between achieving what is practical possible and mitigating limitations and concerns. 
The following chapters will discuss the results of data analysis and how they relate to 
answering the research questions.  
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Chapter 7. Policy Implementation at the Central Level 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Drawing on the data from actor subgroup 1 in phase 1 fieldwork, this chapter 
applies the top-down perspective to analyse the implementation of The Campaign at 
the central level, including the relevant macro level (system level) factors pertinent to 
the healthcare system context that can influence policy implementation. The themes in 
relation to the implementation process are analysed in respect of the roles and 
activities of “the Centre”, namely the state and non-state actors at the central level, and 
the alignment between “the Centre” and local actors in policy implementation.  
 
7.2 Top-down features of implementation at the central level 
Having highlighted the external influence of system level contextual factors, it is 
now necessary to examine key elements that were intrinsic to the implementation 
process of The Campaign at the central level. Some of the elements identified through, 
and summarised in the literature review in Chapter 3 (Literature Review) resonated in 
the interviews with the key informants, including state capacity and mandate for policy 
implementation, support from non-state actors, administrative accountability, and 
extent of decentralisation. These elements will be discussed in light of the relevant 
theoretical ideas discussed in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), including the 
preconditions for “perfect implementation” (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984), the concept of 
accountability (particularly managerial accountability) (Mulgan, 2000; Bovens, 2007; 
Day & Klein, 1987), the target approach to monitor the delivery of policy (Hood, 2006, 
2007; Bevan & Hood, 2004), and the “redundancy” of accountability mechanisms 
(Scott, 2000; Allen et al., 2016). 
 
Dominance of the state in policy implementation 
As pointed out in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), a foremost premise of 
the top-down perspective of policy implementation is extensive control exerted by the 
central government (O’Toole, 1989; Ryan, 1995; Winter, 2006), which was required to 
represent, and have the mandate to protect public interest (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). It 
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would therefore be necessary to examine the role of the state in The Campaign and the 
existing mandates for antibiotic stewardship in respect of the aforementioned concepts.  
The dominant involvement of the central government in the implementation of 
The Campaign was explicitly recognised by all the central level key informants, without 
exception. In describing its compulsory, domineering characteristic of the 
implementation of The Campaign, the key informants had the tendency to attribute the 
perceived effectiveness of central-led, top-down administrative campaigns to China’s 
autocratic political system in a positive way, despite that campaigns of such nature 
could take place in other political systems as well. This was clear from a series of 
responses from the key informants to the researcher’s question, “What was the 
greatest driving force behind the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies 
during The Campaign”:  
Senior officer (C): “This is a Campaign implemented with ‘Chinese 
Characteristic’. There’s no better way to explain it. What we mean by that, is the 
extent and effectiveness of administrative intervention imposed by the central 
government of China.” 
Government official (A2): “There’s no fundamental difference between The 
Campaign and other social campaigns in China, except that this time the focus 
is on antibiotic stewardship.” 
Government official (A1): “The effectiveness of policy implementation during the 
Campaign period has to do with the advantages of the political system of China 
compared with the Western democracies. Overall, China has a very centralised 
political system that can wield a huge amount of power in policy 
administration—much more than the Western countries. If the government is 
determined to push through an intervention through administrative brute force, 
it’s definitely going to work over the short term. In other countries, the civil 
society has a much bigger role in driving changes. In China, the government is 
the most dominant agent for initiating policy change.” 
Given that the necessity for a top-down campaign – unsatisfactory progress of 
implementation of preceding antibiotic stewardship policies – was already established 
in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), what was really being emphasized behind the 
official rhetoric was that the strong central government of China indeed provided extra 
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advantage to the implementation of top-down campaigns, in which a strong central 
government was exactly what was most required.  
Using the example of expanding surveillance networks for antibiotic resistance 
and use – one of the Key Policies of The Campaign – the key informants described the 
marked improvement of policy implementation after the central government became on 
board: 
Senior officer (C): “Between 2005 and 2011, the surveillance network on 
antibiotic resistance, CARSS, only managed to cover about a hundred or so 
hospitals in China. During The Campaign in 2012, we decided to expand the 
network significantly. Our goal was to enrol many more hospitals and increase 
the representativeness of CARSS. By the end of 2013, we already covered 
more than 1,300 hospitals. Enrolment was mandatory: after the government 
decided which hospitals were to be enrolled based on scientific evidence, the 
enrolment process would go ahead with obtaining the hospital’s consent. Many 
hospitals only found out about their enrolment after they had been enrolled.” 
Senior officer (B3): “Once The Campaign took off in 2011, the expansion of 
CAS, the surveillance network for antibiotic use, was even more rapid than that 
of CARSS. Within 3 years we were able to cover more than 2,000 secondary 
and tertiary hospitals in China. 80-90% of tertiary hospitals became enrolled in 
our network.” 
 The dramatic improvement of policy implementation on such a scale was not 
only the result of the involvement of the central government in The Campaign; it was 
also engendered by the creation of new official mandate. Midway through the 
implementation period of The Campaign in 2012, the government enacted the 
Measures for the Administration of Antibiotic Use in Hospitals (The Measures for short), 
a Ministerial Decree that enshrined all the core antibiotic stewardship policies to date, 
including those of The Campaign. Rather than providing new means for specific legal 
rights for citizens, The Measures was used as a means to create and solidify the official 
mandate for antibiotic stewardship policies, and a “statement of intent” (interview with 
senior official B1) to mark the central government’s authority and resolution to 
implement antibiotic stewardship policies not only during The Campaign, but also 
beyond: 
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Government official (A2): “The establishment of high-level legal institution for 
the stewardship of a particular type of pharmaceuticals set a precedent in 
China, making the enactment of The Measures a monumental event. With a law 
on antibiotic stewardship, strong actions against failure to implement the stated 
policies were now justified.”  
Government official (A1): “The Campaign was short and intense, and it 
generated significant awareness of the importance of antibiotic stewardship in 
the short term. The establishment of The Measures heightened the importance 
even more, and it showed that antibiotic stewardship would be a priority in the 
long run.” 
 
With its strong presence and new mandate for policy actions, it could be 
concluded that the salient dominance of the central government of China in the 
implementation of The Campaign resonated significantly with the focus on “the Centre” 
in the top-down approach to understanding policy implementation, and the suitability of 
applying this approach to analyse this policy case became even more apparent when 
considering the top-down enforcement and mandatory nature of The Campaign.  
 
Collaboration between the central state and non-state actors in policy 
implementation 
Even in the case of a dominant central government, studies reviewed in 
Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background) revealed that proactive collaboration between 
central state and non-state actors was a key element to effective policy implementation 
at the central level. Literature on implementation theory also pointed out that policy 
implementation would involve multiple state and non-state actors (Buse, Mays & Walt, 
2012). With appropriate coordination, their collaboration could lead to more effective 
implementation (O’Toole, 1986; Bowen, 1982). The roles of both groups of actors and 
the ways they worked together were therefore explored and examined in depth during 
the fieldwork.  
As first introduced in Chapters 5 (National Policy Context) and 6 (Study Design 
and Methods), three groups of actors at the central level were explored in this 
research: the state actors were represented by the central government (specifically the 
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Bureau of Medical Affairs of the NHFPC) and the government-affiliated research 
organisations (such as the NIHA and the CERDU); the non-state actors were 
exemplified by the academic and professional associations including the CHA, the 
CPA, the CMA and the CPhA. An overview of the interdependent relationships 
between these three groups of actors are represented in Figure 7-1 below.  
 
Figure 7-1 The relationships between the state and non-state actors at the central level (i) 
 
 The collaboration between the state and non-state actors at the central level in 
the implementation of The Campaign showed that complex yet orchestrated 
relationships could be crucial, if not indispensable, to delivering policy implementation. 
In the first relationship indicated in Figure 7-1, the government-affiliated research 
organisations and expert groups provided technical expertise in research and project 
support to the NHFPC. In the implementation of The Campaign, they were responsible 
for collecting hospital-level data on antibiotic use and resistance and reporting their 
findings to the government regularly. Surveillance of antibiotic use in hospitals was 
conducted by the Centre for Antibacterial Surveillance (CAS) managed by the NIHA; 
surveillance of antibiotic resistance was conducted by the China Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System (CARSS) managed by the CERDU.  
 In the second relationship indicated, the academic and professional 
associations worked actively with the NHFPC in developing and promoting best 
practices for key health policy areas, including antibiotic stewardship. As described in 
Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), their professional focus and self-
regulating functions were beneficial to promoting antibiotic stewardship activities, and 
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their extensive networks were an especially valuable resource for the delivery of 
education and training activities.  
 In the third relationship indicated, the government-affiliated research 
organisations and expert groups and the academic and professional associations were 
essentially interconnected; in a way, they represented each other. It was not a 
coincidence that these groups had some overlapping roles in supporting the NHFPC. In 
fact, two of the most involved government-affiliated research organisations and expert 
groups – the NIHA and the CERDU – shared the same group of staff of two of the most 
involved academic and professional associations – the CHA and the CPA. Their 
relationships are represented in Figure 7-2 below.  
 
Figure 7-2 The relationships between the state and non-state actors at the central level (ii) 
 
 Figure 7-2 illustrates that the CAS was managed by a team based in the 
Department of Pharmaceutical Affairs and Management of the NIHA, and the CARSS 
by the Secretariat of the CERDU. This way, both networks were effectively controlled 
and managed by the NHFPC. These teams operated under different names according 
to the roles they played in different organisations: the team in the Department of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs and Management of the NIHA was the same one operating as 
the Committee on Pharmaceutical Affairs and Management in the CHA; similarly, the 
Secretariat of the CERDU was simultaneously acting as the Secretariat of the CPA.  
 These interdependencies and collaborations were crucial to the implementation 
of The Campaign in three ways. Firstly, these collaborations provided resourceful 
platforms for the central government to work with domestic experts. The key informants 
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mentioned plenty of examples: professional associations including the Chinese 
Hospital Association (CHA), the Chinese Medical Association (CMA) and the Chinese 
Pharmaceutical Association (CPhA) co-developed early antibiotic stewardship policies 
with the central government; the Committee of Experts on Rational Drug Use 
(CERDU), which brought together leading experts in China, reported directly to the 
central government on advancing policies that promoted rational use of antibiotics as 
well as other kinds of pharmaceuticals; the National Institute of Hospital Administration 
was a think tank for the central government that regularly advised on, and evaluated 
health policies that concerned healthcare providers.  
Secondly, the non-state actors, especially academic and professional 
associations, created flexible platforms for the state actors to work with other 
stakeholders of antibiotic use, including the private industry and foreign governments. 
While the key informants agreed that official agreements in these collaborations were 
important, there were situations in which the lead time for the development of official 
responses was too long. In these cases, the central government could harness the 
established networks between professional associations with the relevant partners in 
pursuing official policy agenda in antibiotic stewardship:   
Senior officer (C): “Our government has been working with foreign partners on 
antibiotic stewardship. Formal collaborations are the best options, but 
sometimes it takes time for these official channels to be established. The fact 
that academic associations are non-government organisations can be an 
advantage. They can organise unofficial seminars and visits in ways that are 
much more flexible, without all the administrative hurdles. And these exchanges 
can effectively pave way for official, government-level collaborations”.  
Senior officer (B1): “It’s not uncommon for professional associations to work 
with the private pharmaceutical sector. Many pharmaceutical companies are 
willing to support work on antibiotic stewardship because it’s in their interest to 
ensure the sustainability of their products. However, any collaboration of this 
type must be transparent.” 
Thirdly, the multiple roles held by the same teams of both the state and non-
state actors provided a way for them to gather official and professional mandates 
necessary for implementing policies originated from the central government. This was 
especially important, because as described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), the 
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non-state actors were also directly responsible for implementing The Campaign. For 
example, both the CERDU and the NIHA benefited from having multiple organisational 
names and roles in the implementation of The Campaign:  
Senior officer (C): “The prescriber is the one who prescribes. But as it 
happened, the CPA was given the responsibility by the MoH to improve and 
promote rational use of medicines, including antibiotics. Although the MoH was 
hoping to enhance the status of clinical pharmacists through this move, it was 
still less than appropriate for the CPA to take on this task given the status quo. 
Therefore, the MoH established the CERDU, which shared the same 
Secretariat with the CPA, so that the CPA team can now legitimately carry out 
work to improve use of medicines by both prescribers and pharmacists”.  
Senior officer (B2): “Collecting data on pharmaceutical use from hospitals at the 
national level involves working closely with the Department of Pharmaceutical 
Affairs of all the hospitals included in the CAS surveillance network managed by 
the NIHA. At the same time, this has been a responsibility of the Committee on 
Pharmaceutical Affairs of the China Hospital Association as well.” 
 On a fundamental level, the central role and the dominance of the central 
government remained the most essential characteristic in all the foregoing forms of 
relationships and collaborations. Besides having “absolute control over the databases” 
of the surveillance networks managed by the non-state actors (interviews with 
Academic D1 and Senior officers B1, B2 and B3), the central government also closely 
monitored the activities of the non-state actors and took control in all forms of 
collaboration. In citing reasons for that, the key informants once again emphasised the 
characteristics associated with China’s political system: 
Senior officer (B1): “Domestic non-governmental organisations in China, 
especially professional associations that work with the private sector, may have 
incentive to pursue financial gains. Some academic and professional 
associations are excellent, but other less so. There are not sufficient 
mechanisms to regulate these organisations in China’s political system yet. 
Even if regulations are in place, it’s unlikely that China would commit to a small 
government. The central government always remains the most trustworthy and 
authoritative entity, and it has to take control.” 
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 Whilst the dominance of the state in policy implementation in China was 
repeated emphasized by the key informants and thus indubitably established within the 
context of this analysis, there were concerns with regards to the resources for policy 
administration at the central level. In face of the enormous workload due to high level of 
centralisation, the capacity of the central government became very stretched: 
Senior officer (B1): “Officials of the central government have to process a vast 
amount of information and work with many experts. For a huge country like 
China, we have only at most 500 officials working for the central NHFPC. In 
comparison, the Department of Health in the UK, a much smaller country, may 
enjoy more resources: the Care and Quality Commission alone had over 2,000 
employees. Many policies in China would not have taken place without a lot of 
our officials voluntarily put in extra hours and sacrificing personal time.” 
Still, with much capacity of the central government dedicated to ensuring central 
control, it could be argued that the coordination amongst the state and non-state actors 
effectively enhanced the processes of implementation led by the central government, 
further extending its capacity for top-down implementation.  
 
Clear line of accountability 
A close relationship within the central actors alone was insufficient to ensure 
policy implementation; the next crucial conduit of implementation rested on the 
alignment between the central and the local actors. To understand how the central 
actors in authority “demand and obtain” a high level of compliance from the local actors 
(Hogwood & Gunn, 1984), the concept of “programme accountability” (Mulgan, 2000; 
Day & Klein, 1987) was introduced. This provides a lens to examine ways that the 
activities and priorities of the individuals delegated to deliver the desired outcomes of 
The Campaign were scrutinised and judged by those in higher authorities against their 
responsibilities in policy implementation.  
Establishing accountability was a cornerstone for the implementation of The 
Campaign. As described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), programme 
accountability across all levels of actors introduced through a “chain of command” was 
enlisted as one of the Key Policies of The Campaign. “Pledges” for the implementation 
of The Campaign “as serious as military orders” were signed between adjacent levels 
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of actors in this reporting line that spanned across all the actors at every level, 
including: the central government; corresponding arms of the local governments; the 
chief director of each hospital; heads of departments within the hospitals; and individual 
prescribers (interview with senior officer C). In a move to translate central control to the 
activities at the hospital level, “most of the responsibilities of ensuring implementation 
within this long reporting line rested with the chief directors of hospitals”, who, in 
accordance with one of the Key Policies of The Campaign, were duly appointed the 
“First Responsible Persons” for antibiotic stewardship for their power over the activities 
within their hospitals (interview with government official A1).  
 
Target approach 
Programme accountability and further alignment between the activities of policy 
actors with predetermined policy goals could be introduced through the “target 
approach”, which involved setting measurable outcomes for various aspects of the 
policy of interest for the policy actors to achieve (Hood, 2006, 2007; Bevan & Hood, 
2004). The three typical mechanisms of this approach were the target system, in which 
aspirational standards were expressed as numeric thresholds; the ranking system, in 
which comparable units were measured and compared against one another; and the 
intelligence system, in which background information and data that were not part of the 
previous systems were collected and analysed (Hood, 2007).  
The heavy use of all three mechanisms of the target approach was a signature 
characteristic of The Campaign. At the heart was a target system of core numeric 
indicators of antibiotic stewardship activities at the hospitals level. As summarised in 
Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), these indicators included inpatient and outpatient 
antibiotic prescribing rates, antibiotic consumption, and rates of antibiotic use under 
specific pre-operative and post-operative circumstances. Achieving the defined target 
thresholds for these indicators – for example, antibiotics should be prescribed in less 
than 20% of all outpatient encounters and less than 60% of all inpatient encounters, 
and antibiotic consumption should be less than 40DDD/100 patient days – was set out 
as one of the Key Policies of The Campaign: 
Senior officer (B2): “The targets were there, and hospitals had to find their own 
ways to achieve them no matter what. The Key Policies in The Campaign were 
unlike technical guides, they didn’t tell prescribers what antibiotics to use and 
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when; rather, they provided broad-brush directives on the general policies to 
implement if the ultimate targets were to be achieved.” 
Complementary to the target system was a ranking system based on the 
foregoing numeric targets at both the central and the hospital levels. At the central 
level, after data on those targets collected by the surveillance systems was analysed 
by the government-affiliated research organisations at regular intervals, there would be 
both discreet feedback to the hospitals and some form of public reporting of the results: 
Senior officers (B2): “Appropriate feedback was provided to all the hospitals. 
Without disclosing all the data – some of them were confidential, and the full 
dataset could be accessed only by the central government – they were given 
enough information to know how well or how badly they did, and how they 
compared to the best hospitals, so that they could improve on specific aspects.” 
Senior officer (B1): “The results and findings were published in national 
conferences for hospital directors, so that they could their national standing in 
terms of not only antibiotic stewardship, but also standard of healthcare. That 
proved very helpful in motivating the directors to do better: if some hospitals 
could achieve the thresholds for the target indicators, other hospitals should be 
able to do the same.” 
At the hospital level, similar processes took place based on the data collected 
by each individual hospital, and the ranking system concerns different departments 
within the hospital. From the perspective of the actors at the hospital level, however, 
the ranking system was a motivator for doing better as much as a deterrent for doing 
badly, as shown in the following quote: 
Head of outpatient affairs of the national tertiary hospital (OA): “We rank the 
departments within our hospitals on the target indicators, and the health 
authority in Beijing ranks the hospitals, including us. Whoever exceeds the 
thresholds for the indicators will be seen by everybody else, and it won’t look 
good at all.” 
Providing the fundamental data support for both the target and the ranking 
systems was the intelligence system, which comprised the surveillance networks for 
antibiotic use (CAS) and resistance (CARSS). As described in Chapter 5 (National 
Policy Context), the expansion of these surveillance systems was one of the priorities 
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in the Key Policies of The Campaign. The vital importance of data collection was 
recognised by the key informants, as was pointed out in the below quotes that 
measurement was the first step to understanding, and then improving antibiotic 
stewardship:  
Senior officer (B2): “Why do we need to control antibiotic use in hospitals? Why 
do we need to implement antibiotic stewardship policies? To what extent do we 
need to control antibiotic use in hospitals? Convincing answers to these 
questions need to be justified by data. Without data on antibiotic use and 
resistance, any policy would be purely guesswork.” 
Government official (A2): “We’ve been developing the surveillance networks for 
antibiotic use and resistance for nearly 10 years now. They provide the 
absolutely crucial evidence base for policy making and the monitoring and 
evaluation of the policies.” 
Due to the importance of data, the actors at the central level went to great 
lengths to ensure the quality of data. The main measures of quality assurance including 
providing extensive training programs, and establishing a core set of data based on the 
more capable and resourceful hospitals, are illustrated in the following quotes: 
Senior officer (C): “The quality of data is of utmost importance. Since the 
establishment of CARSS, multiple training events on laboratory techniques and 
computerised data systems have been held at the provincial, regional and 
country levels. In the near future, a national centre also will be set up to monitor 
and help improve data quality for all the hospitals in the surveillance network.” 
Senior officer (C): “The surveillance of resistance is conducted in both active 
and passive approaches. In the active approach, representative isolates of 
bacteria collected by the core member hospitals are gathered and analysed 
collectively by the central surveillance team. In the passive approach, the 
isolates were analysed locally within the member hospitals, before they upload 
the relevant data to the central database.” 
Senior officer (B3): “Out of a total of over 2,000 hospitals, the 300 or so core 
member hospitals are considered influential and technologically advanced 
within their provinces. To ensure the quality of the analysis, data with quality 
concerns are sometimes analysed separately to account for their limitations.” 
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What is more, with the surveillance systems becoming fully computerised, 
gaming on data reporting at the hospital level became difficult to conceal: 
Head of outpatient affairs of the national tertiary hospital (OA): “In theory, a 
prescriber could reduce the prescribing rate by writing antibiotic prescriptions as 
separate prescriptions from other medications, thereby increasing the total 
number of prescriptions and consequently, the rate of antibiotic prescriptions 
against total prescriptions. However, prescribers can no longer hide their 
prescribing patterns, because everything is on the electronic records. These 
records are passively uploaded and monitored by the health authorities, so are 
the suspicious prescribing patterns.” 
 
Punitive measures 
The target approach in the implementation of The Campaign was also strongly 
associated with a punitive aspect in the event of failure to meet the targets (Bovens, 
2007; Hood, 2006). To reinforce accountability, punishments in the form of deductions 
in performance-based bonus, or in serious cases, suspension of authorities and 
significant penalties in hospital accreditation could be incurred on all the relevant actors 
in the aforementioned chain of command, from “the prescribers concerned to their line 
managers, their departments, or even the whole hospital” (interview with senior officer 
C). Echoing Voltaire’s quote “But in this country, it is sometimes good to kill an admiral 
to encourage others” (1759), the key informants pointed out that the draconian punitive 
measures were meant to “set negative examples to warn others” by drawing blood, or 
in the local idiom, “killing the chicken to warn the monkey” (interview with senior officer 
C).  
 Coupled with the salient punitive aspects, the three systems that comprised the 
target approach effectively assisted policy implementation on two levels. On one level, 
the “extremeness” of the punitive measures and the stringent nature of the target 
system were vital to “reshaping prescribers’ awareness of the importance of antibiotic 
stewardship at the hospital level” (interview with senior officer C), so that “even some of 
the more remote areas began to pay attention to antibiotic stewardship” (interview with 
senior officer B3). On a more fundamental level, this approach successfully mobilised 
actions. As described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), The Campaign signified 
the central government’s intention to intensify implementation of antibiotic stewardship 
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policies, and the emphasis was on actions. In this context, the below quotes effectively 
demonstrated the central government’s view of the target approach in advancing policy 
implementation:  
Government official (A2): “At the end of the day, the number is just a number. In 
principle, we are not pedantic about the numbers, and we know that some of 
our indicators are not perfect. But our view is that in China, it would be very 
difficult to operationalise any policies and get the wheels moving if you don’t 
mention any numbers or targets.” 
Senior official (B1): “Not all the people could fully understand the rationale for 
antibiotic stewardship; but The Campaign made clear there wasn’t any other 
choice apart from implementing the policies and meeting the targets. They just 
had to do it.” 
 
Redundancy 
Besides the target approach, a further way to strengthen accountability was 
having multiple, if not excessive or “redundant”, mechanisms of monitoring and 
regulations. Represented by the “belt and braces” approach, redundancy could provide 
fail-safe mechanisms by having two or more overlapping yet independent mechanisms 
that were capable of working on their own (Scott, 2000).  
In the implementation of The Campaign, redundancy was manifested in two 
aspects. The first aspect concerned a two-way reporting mechanism described in the 
Enforcement sections of the Campaign documents. Whilst official inspections came 
from “the top to the bottom”, internal inspections at hospitals were reported from “the 
bottom to the top” (interview with senior officer C). The second aspect concerned the 
incorporation of target indicators for antibiotic stewardship into other regulatory 
mechanisms outside the inspection mechanisms associated with The Campaign. As 
introduced in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), the performance and quality 
of services provided by hospitals in China were regulated both by government-
associated organisations responsible for hospital administration, such as the NIHA, and 
by social insurance payers. As crucial aspects in the policy area of healthcare quality, 
criteria concerning antibiotic use in hospitals and the control of antibiotic resistance 
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were increasingly introduced into these regulatory mechanisms, as indicated by the 
following quotes: 
Senior officer (B1): “All of the target indicators and thresholds outlined by the 
Key Policies had become an important part of the hospital accreditation. Some 
of these indicators existed before The Campaign in the context of hospital 
accreditation, but it was because of The Campaign that they became some of 
the central indicators to which the hospitals pay due attention to.” 
Head of outpatient affairs of the national tertiary hospital (OA): “In our internal 
prescription reviews we also have to comply with the regulations set by the 
social insurance payers. These regulations look at whether the types and 
dosages of medications used are appropriate to the clinical indications as 
defined by the rules of reimbursement. For example, omeprazole can only be 
reimbursed when used for treating stomach ulcers, but not other diseases 
including acid reflux. Another example, cephalosporin, can be reimbursed when 
used for treating mild upper-respiratory tract infections, but heavy dosage or the 
use of combinations of different antibiotics in this case will be judged as non-
compliant and therefore can’t be reimbursed.” 
Whilst these multiple independent regulatory requirements “created extra 
workload” to the actors at the hospital level (interview with academic D1), they were 
“highly consistent” with the target approach employed in The Campaign (government 
official A2). The combination of these approaches provided supporting arguments for 
the strong alignment between the central and the local actors in the implementation of 
The Campaign.  
 
7.3 Implications of contextual factors for the policy approach 
System level contextual factors posed “external constraints” (Hogwood & Gunn, 
1984) to the range of policy implementation and the scope for policy action. The 
Campaign was tailored for secondary, and especially, tertiary hospitals. The levels of 
healthcare addressed by The Campaign were first discussed in Chapter 5 (National 
Policy Context), in which it was explained that The Campaign was intended to focus on 
secondary and tertiary hospitals as opposed to primary care providers. The rationale 
was that most of the antibiotics and healthcare services in China, as demonstrated in 
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Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), were provided by secondary and tertiary 
hospitals.  
As illustrated in the theoretical framework of the study established in Table 2-1 
of Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), system level contextual factors pertinent to the 
fundamental aspects of China’s healthcare system can affect policy implementation at 
the central level. As described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), these 
factors included the governance and administration of healthcare by multiple 
government ministries, the organisation, delivery and financing of healthcare, and the 
healthcare reforms that sought to address issues within the system. An important 
precondition for effective policy implementation was that these contextual factors, 
which were “external to the implementing agency”, did not pose “crippling constraints” 
(Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). In this research, two important system level factors were 
identified by the key informants at the central level.  
The first factor concerned the positive impact of existing healthcare reform 
measures on antibiotic use at different levels of healthcare. Whilst the key informants 
perceived that most of China’s healthcare reform shared consistent policy goals with 
antibiotic stewardship in “ensuring rational and cost-effective use of pharmaceuticals” 
(interview with government official A2), the comprehensive policy package centred 
around Essential Medicines was designed specifically to tackle overprescribing by 
removing the link between pharmaceutical sales and healthcare financing. As 
described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), the implementation of the 
New Essential Medicines Policy in conjunction with concomitant healthcare financing 
reforms exemplified by the zero-mark-up policy and the introduction of global budget 
had made significant impact.  
Even though the essential medicines policy package was not designed to 
directly impact on prescribing practices (empirical evidence reviewed in Chapter 4, 
Healthcare System Background, suggested that the policy package did not lead to 
improvement in the rationality of antibiotic prescribing), its chief functions as a 
restrictive policy on the availability of pharmaceuticals and as an instrument to facilitate 
reforms in healthcare financing provided an indirect boost for antibiotic stewardship at 
primary care level in two significant ways. 
Firstly, these policies were perceived by the key informants to be effective at 
restricting the availability of advanced antibiotics at the primary care level, so that these 
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potent antibiotics were less likely to be used and the resistance against them was less 
easily developed. Aiming to include “commonly available and affordable 
pharmaceuticals that are sufficient to meet the clinical problems encountered at the 
primary care level” (interview with medical expert M), the Essential Medicines List only 
enlisted basic first-line and second-line antibiotics but not the more advanced third-line 
treatments and above, and considered these basic antibiotic range sufficient for the 
minor infections that primary care providers were likely to encounter and manage. 
Consistent with the description in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), the New 
Essential Medicines Policy effectively became a gatekeeping policy for antibiotics 
accessed through healthcare providers, as the government stipulated that the vast 
majority of pharmaceuticals available at primary care providers must be limited to 
essential medicines; consequently, the more advanced antibiotics were now only 
accessible through secondary and tertiary hospitals. In this way, the scope of 
stewardship of advanced antibiotics could afford to become – and appropriately so – 
more focused on secondary and tertiary levels most of the antibiotic use in hospitals in 
China took place: 
Senior officer (B2): “Practically speaking the Essential Medicines List became a 
cap for antibiotics available at the primary care level. Not that the reforms 
themselves have helped primary care prescribers better prescribe antibiotics – 
to be honest irrational antibiotic use remains a big problem there – but now 
irrational use at primary level became much more limited because it concerned 
a smaller set of mostly basic antibiotics.” 
Senior officer (C): “Secondary, and particularly tertiary hospitals, are more likely 
to receive and manage patients with more serious infections, which is one of 
the reasons why those hospitals require better, more advanced antibiotics to 
manage them.” 
Secondly, these policies were also considered to be effective in removing 
prescribers’ incentives to overprescribe antibiotics at the primary level. Consistent with 
the descriptions provided in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), the key 
informants pointed out that the associated reform measures on healthcare financing at 
the primary care level, including the zero-mark-up policy on pharmaceutical sales and 
the introduction of global budget to cover operational and staffing cost, largely 
“removed the means and incentives to generate revenue from prescribing” (interview 
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with government official 1) where the set of reform policies were implemented by the 
beginning of the implementation of The Campaign in 2011. 
However, at higher levels of healthcare providers, such impacts on antibiotic 
stewardship were absent. This was because the full Essential Medicines policy 
package was not implemented at secondary and tertiary hospitals. Firstly, as described 
in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background) and earlier in this section, higher-tiered 
hospitals were not restricted to using mainly the essential medicines in the way that 
primary care providers were. As China’s healthcare system lacked meaningful 
gatekeeping at the primary care level, patients could circumvent the restricted range of 
antibiotics at the primary care level by self-referring to higher levels of hospitals, where 
advanced antibiotics became once again accessible. And secondly, unlike primary care 
providers, which were now funded mainly by global budgets, comprehensive 
healthcare financing reform to replace revenue generation through service provision 
did not take place at secondary and tertiary hospitals. Higher-tiered hospitals could 
apply the government-sanctioned mark-ups on the many pharmaceuticals outside the 
Essential Medicines range, and pharmaceutical sales remained “a crucial source of 
revenue that could take up to 40-50% of the total revenue of secondary and tertiary 
hospitals” (interview with senior officer B1). As already demonstrated in Chapter 4 
(Healthcare System Background) the financing mechanism of public hospitals was 
unlikely to change when there were no viable alternative means of financing available: 
Head of medical affairs of the national tertiary hospital (MA): “In a pilot reform 
that took place in Beijing, five hospitals imposed zero-mark-up policy on all 
pharmaceuticals, including those outside the essential medicines range; at the 
same time, medical consultation fees were increased and paid for by the social 
health insurance schemes on behalf of the patients. However, this pilot reform 
stalled only after one year. Why? The revenues were not sufficient to fund the 
hospitals’ activities in operation, construction of buildings and medical research. 
Revenue was the deal-breaker for such reforms.” 
Head of outpatient affairs of the national tertiary hospital (OA): “Any potential 
zero mark-up policy must ensure that hospitals can attain similar level of 
revenues in other areas, for example, medical consultation fees, nursing fees 
and other service fees. Medical consultation fees in China are ridiculously low. 
Some of our prescribers are amongst the best in the country, and their 
consultation fees are 5 Yuan per consultation (researcher’s note: roughly 
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equivalent to 50 pence), and not even all of that goes into his account. A 
prescriber’s earning from the consultation fees of 20 patients would only be 
enough for a lunch box. The best quality of nursing in one of the best hospitals 
in the country costs 9 Yuan per day (researcher’s note: roughly equivalent to 90 
pence). These prices were fixed by the government in the early 1990s.” 
The second factor concerned the capacity for implementing antibiotic 
stewardship at different levels of healthcare in terms of resources available and policy 
administration. As described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), although 
the tiered system to organise hospitals was mainly based on the size of catchment 
area, in reality it was also associated with the level of healthcare services that a 
hospital could provide.  
The gap in resources between primary care and the higher levels of healthcare 
was an evident theme. In general, secondary and tertiary hospitals were much more 
technically equipped for antibiotic stewardship than primary care providers. For 
example, the necessary microbiology tests to inform the use of advanced antibiotics, 
including the establishment drug sensitivity and resistance profiles, could only be 
performed in microbiology labs in higher-tiered hospitals, but not in primary care 
providers. Referring to some examples of stewardship policies, key informants 
perceived these differences to be sufficiently significant to affect policy implementation 
in different levels of healthcare providers. One important aspect of resources concerns 
technology: 
Senior officer (C): “Having a competent microbiology lab was the most basic 
criterion for enrolling in the surveillance network for antibiotic resistance. 
Tertiary hospitals were the first to be enrolled, followed by secondary hospitals 
with improved laboratories. Primary care providers don’t have labs of sufficient 
standards.” 
Senior officer (B3): “Unlike secondary and tertiary hospitals, most of the primary 
care providers do not meet technical requirements for the surveillance of 
antibiotic use. Some of them didn’t even keep a full record of patients’ histories 
to start with.” 
 Another aspect of resources concerns human resources:  
Government official (A1): “There’s a huge gap in the quality between 
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prescribers working at secondary and tertiary hospitals and those working at 
primary care providers. The former are much better trained and more 
knowledgeable.” 
Government official (A2): “Many primary care providers simply don’t have the 
capacity to conduct stewardship activities. Some health centres at county level 
are operated by one single prescriber. This prescriber would be responsible for 
everything, from the provision of healthcare to administration affairs. It would be 
incredibly difficult to see how this prescriber could take up complex tasks 
related to antibiotic stewardship in this situation.” 
These significant differences between different levels of healthcare were 
reflected in the policy administration of healthcare providers, in which primary care was 
considered a separate policy area. Although the Bureau of Medical Affairs was 
responsible for the overall regulation of medical practices and standards, the 
Department of Primary Care was primarily responsible for health policies and reforms 
that specifically aimed at the primary care level. Consequently, “the administration of 
health policies at the primary care level and at the higher levels of healthcare” in the 
central government was “notably different”, as was the extent to which medical 
practices were regulated in different levels of healthcare (interview with senior officer 
B3). For example, regulatory policies and guidelines at the primary care level tended to 
be less detailed and less followed than those at higher levels of healthcare (Academic 
D2).  
Therefore, at the primary care level, healthcare reform policies that limit 
availability of antibiotics and prescribing incentives could indirectly improve antibiotic 
stewardship, but the introduction of actual stewardship policies were likely to be 
hampered by the lack of resources and complicated by potentially disconnected policy 
administration. At the higher levels of healthcare, healthcare reform policies were much 
less effective at improving antibiotic stewardship, making the introduction of 
stewardship measures such as those delineated by The Campaign even more 
important; helpfully, hospitals at this level were equipped with the human and 
technological resources to implement stewardship policies. Therefore, by focusing on 
secondary and tertiary hospitals, the policy actors at the central level had chosen an 
appropriate area of policy intervention, and at the same time mitigated uncertainties 
and constraints posed by to the external circumstances (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). 
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7.4 Influence of contextual factors on policy implementation 
Ultimately, even with reinforced alignment between central and local actors, the 
influence of the central government in the implementation of The Campaign was bound 
to be more limited than what was assumed in the top-down approach to understanding 
policy implementation, which envisioned policy implementation to be a direct, rational 
and linear process (Schofield, 2001) that took place within a “completely unitary 
administrative system” (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). On the contrary, as argued in 
Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), the complex reality facing policy implementation 
could lead to heterogeneities in the implementation process, exemplified by 
“discretions in implementation” (Ryan, 1995).  
Regional delegation, or even decentralisation in the implementation of The 
Campaign was inevitable. For example, without sub-national networks at regional and 
provincial levels, the administration of both the surveillance networks, which comprised 
thousands of hospitals across the country, would be “practically impossible” (interviews 
with Senior Officers B2, B3 and C). However, resources were unevenly distributed 
across different regions. Whilst hospitals in the more affluent areas could “afford fully 
computerised systems and the most advanced models of laboratory equipment”, some 
of the less advanced areas were “still keeping hand-written records of all sorts of data”; 
the more resourceful districts could conduct “centralised prescription reviews”, but the 
less resourceful districts lack the means to achieve that (interview with senior officer 
C). Consequently, local policy implementation had to consider resource availability 
along with other local sets of circumstances and constraints. Furthermore, as described 
in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), extensive decentralisation – both in 
terms of fiscal capacity and administrative autonomy – meant that local governments 
were likely to have different policy priorities and approaches to implementation within a 
unified framework outlined by the central government. The inevitability of 
decentralisation was reflected in the below quotes: 
Government official (A2): “Central policies are very macroscopic, and there’s 
room for adjustment in local implementation. For instance, the central 
government is proposing that hospitals should strengthen their departments of 
infectious diseases within a proposed timeframe. However, if a hospital doesn’t 
even have any infectious disease specialists, then it would have to wait until 
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they can recruit some. This is where the hospital can apply discretions in 
implementation.” 
Senior officer (C): “Within the policy framework set out by the central 
government, provincial governments make their adjustments and specific 
demands; then follow by city-level governments; then district-level 
governments; and then followed by individual hospitals. Although the targets 
remain the same, it’s very difficult to ensure the standardisation of the actual 
implementation process at different levels.”  
Therefore, the decentralised nature of China’s healthcare system raised a 
question for the long-term implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies beyond The 
Campaign. Even with dominant administrative interventions from the central 
government, decentralisation still strongly influenced the implementation process. 
Given that such high level of involvement of the central government was seen to be 
“unsustainable” post-Campaign (interviews with Government officials A1 and A2), the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in a decentralised system was much 
less likely to be dictated in a top-down manner, and much more likely to engender 
more variations and heterogeneity based on local context. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Based on empirical data, this chapter has described the implementation of The 
Campaign at the central level in respect of both context and process. It could be 
concluded that policy implementation at this level was relatively controlled.  
Based on the system level context in terms of the impacts of existing healthcare 
reform policies and the capacity of different levels of hospitals, the central government 
of China – the most dominant actor in implementation – took steps to refine the scope 
of policy implementation to secondary and tertiary hospitals, so as to enhance the 
effectiveness of implementation.  
With the central government exerting strong control, the implementation 
process could be appropriately analysed through the top-down approach to 
understanding policy implementation. The dominance of the central government was 
demonstrated by its role in enforcing mandatory policies, and was strengthened by new 
legal mandate for action during The Campaign. The central government also presided 
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over its collaborations with other state and non-state actors, and through these 
collaborations it broadened its reach in capacity, resources and networks. By 
introducing the target approach and a series of other independent regulatory 
mechanisms on antibiotic use, the central government reinforced the accountability of 
local actors through the administrative chain of command.  
However, decentralisation in implementation could pose challenges to the 
extent of central control in local implementation, which was strongly influenced by the 
characteristics pertinent specifically to the local context and administration. To explore 
these factors, the next chapter examines the implementation of The Campaign at the 
hospital level. 
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Chapter 8. Policy Implementation at the Hospital Level, 
Part I: Analysis of the Perspectives of Multiple Actors 
from Hospitals in Beijing 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central Level) presented the first part 
of analysis of policy implementation in this research, and its conclusion drew on the 
importance of examining implementation at the hospital level in the context of China’s 
decentralised healthcare system. Hence, as the second part of the analysis of policy 
implementation, this chapter analyses the implementation of The Campaign at the 
hospital level, including the relevant macro level (system level) and local level (hospital 
level and individual level) factors pertinent to the healthcare system context that can 
influence policy implementation, and the implementation process. The analysis of 
context is based on data from all three subgroups, including actors at the central level, 
managerial actors in the national tertiary hospital and prescribers and patients from 
other studied hospitals. The analysis of process is based on in-depth interviews with 
managerial actors in the national tertiary hospital from Subgroup 2 only. 
Both the bottom-up and top-down approaches to understanding implementation 
are relevant in this analysis. On the one hand, actors at the hospital level – both the 
managerial and the prescribing levels – as a whole are as the frontline implementers of 
The Campaign, and their perception of policy implementation represents a bottom-up 
perspective. On the other hand, managerial actors at exert a high level of control within 
the hospital level, so that top-down characteristics of implementation are also present 
within this level.  
In demonstrating the organisational structures, processes and environments 
revolving around the understanding, incentives and behaviours of policy implementers 
at the hospital level, the themes in relation to the implementation process are analysed 
in respect of some of the factors crucial to hospital level implementation identified 
through the literature review in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background).  
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8.2 Implications of contextual factors for the policy approach 
In section 7.3 of Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central Level), 
analysis of the data from central-level actors in subgroup 1 of phase 1 fieldwork 
showed that the policy approach of The Campaign to focus on implementation activities 
at higher-level hospitals was precipitated by 2 system level contextual factors, namely 
the effect of the New Essential Medicines Policy in constraining the availability of 
antibiotics at primary care level (which, in turn, concentrated the prescribing of the 
more advanced antibiotics to higher-level hospitals), and the disparity of resources 
between higher-level hospitals and primary care clinics (which constrained the ability of 
the primary care level to implement antibiotic stewardship). These themes have re-
emerged from data from hospital-level actors in subgroups 2 and 3 of the phase 2 
fieldwork, in which interviewees described in detail their perception of the crowdedness 
at higher-level hospitals especially tertiary hospitals and explained why that was the 
case.  
 Firstly, due to the implementation of the New Essential Medicines Policy, the 
availability of non-Essential Medicines at the primary care level became highly 
restricted, and at times they were not sufficient to meet the general needs of patients. 
Although limiting the range of antibiotics available at the primary care level was, as 
analysed in Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central Level), a positive enabler 
for antibiotic stewardship, limiting the range of other medicines could force patients to 
visit tertiary hospitals instead, where non-Essential Medicines were available: 
Prescriber L2 from community health centre L: “Now community health centres 
have to use Essential Medicines, but they often simply run out. The 
procurement system was not very responsive. The range of antibiotics included 
is sufficient for the problems at the community level, but the range of medicines 
in general is not. In my view, the Essential Medicines policy is restricting the 
ability of primary care providers to respond to patients’ need.” 
Prescriber H2 from tertiary hospital H: “There’re not enough Essential 
Medicines for chronic diseases. Supposedly it’s more convenient for patients to 
manage their chronic diseases at community health centres, but too often they 
have to visit tertiary hospitals, where they can get what they need.” 
A patient complaining about availability of pharmaceuticals at the primary level: 
“I don’t come here (community health centre S) very often. They don’t always 
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have what I need for my condition. Sometimes I end up going to tertiary 
hospitals anyway.” 
Secondly, the concentration of patients in higher-level hospitals was caused by 
the concentration of healthcare resources in the hospitals, which ultimately led to 
tertiary hospitals siphoning patients from lower levels of healthcare especially primary 
care level, leading to overcrowding. 
Despite the government’s effort to improve the capacity of primary care 
providers, patients remained more attracted to tertiary hospitals, and found it “difficult to 
trust community health centres” (interview with prescriber H1 from tertiary hospital H) in 
face of the perceived disparity in resources and quality of services between primary 
care providers and tertiary hospitals. Fundamentally, patients’ trust was highly 
correlated with the availability of experts in a hospital. The lack of experts at primary 
level was perceived by all kinds of actors to be a crucial factor in patients’ preference 
for tertiary hospitals in general, where experts were based: 
Head of medical affairs of the case study hospital (MA): “Patients are after the 
best doctors. Before renovation our main building was old and cramped, but still 
more patients than we could manage came here. In contrast, many new 
community health centres have been rebuilt over the last few years and they 
have very decent facilities, but patients simply don’t want to go there.” 
Patients who felt prescribers at community health centres were less skilled than 
those at tertiary hospitals:  
“Experts don’t come to community health centres. They’re always at tertiary 
hospitals.” 
“Some people don’t trust the prescribers at community health centres. I wouldn’t 
go as far as that. I think they would do as well as those at tertiary hospitals in 
terms of dealing with general complains, say, common cold. However, 
specialists and consultants at tertiary hospitals are undoubtedly superior in their 
subject areas. Many of them are conduct academic research as well. This is not 
something prescribers at community health centres can do.” 
The quality of facilities and equipment available at the primary care level was 
another main concern to the patients, as some of them experienced perceivable 
difference in the quality of healthcare offered by different levels of hospitals:  
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Patients who explicitly expressed concerns about the facilities in community 
health centres: 
“Not every community health centre is equipped to do the blood tests. The 
community health centre near where I live is very poorly staffed, and they don’t 
have the right equipment to do the tests either. I’ve never had a blood test 
there, but it’s not because I don’t want to.” 
“The labs of community health centres are second-rate at best, and very often 
their results are not recognised by secondary and tertiary hospitals. Perhaps 
basic tests like blood tests are ok; I wouldn’t count on community health centres 
for more advanced tests.” 
“I don’t trust community health centres. Once I came to this community health 
centre to test the levels of a certain liver enzyme, and the result was 
astonishingly high – it indicated that I had a life-threatening condition. I had the 
same test at a tertiary hospital not long ago and that was several times lower! 
Deeply worried, I immediately went back to a tertiary hospital to do the test 
again, and luckily this reading was consistent with what I had last time. This 
goes to show the appalling standards of equipment at community health 
centres.” 
 Consequently, most of the caseload was heavily concentrated at tertiary 
hospitals. The average reported daily caseload for a prescriber working at tertiary level 
hospital was 80 patients, compared to 50 patients for a prescriber working at primary 
care level. The responses from patients also showed that despite certain advantages 
associated with visiting community health centres, they clearly had stronger affinity for 
tertiary hospitals than for community health centres. Community health centres offered 
convenience in terms of shorter waiting time. For example, for common cold, the typical 
waiting time for consultation at a community health centre reported by the patients was 
“5-15 minutes”, which was much shorter than the “more than 30 minutes” required at a 
tertiary hospital. According to some patients, they also offered “slightly higher rate of 
reimbursement than tertiary hospitals” (a patient at community health centre S), and 
the medicines they offer are “generally quite cheap, unlike tertiary hospitals” (a patient 
at community health centre L). Despite these advantages, patients were keen to 
explore options other than community health centres in the case of common cold. 
When having light symptoms, most of the patients interviewed would opt for self-
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medication or rest, considerably more than those who would consider visiting a 
community health centre. When having heavy symptoms, most of the patients would 
consider visiting a tertiary hospital, significantly more than those who would consider 
visiting a community health centre. This health-seeking pattern was also noted by 
some of the prescribers: 
Prescriber L1 from community health centre L: “If their symptoms are worse 
than a cough and a sneeze, patients are likely to visit tertiary hospitals.” 
Prescriber T1 from TCM hospital T: “The department of emergency medicines 
should deal with patients with severe and urgent infections. Still, it’s common for 
us to receive common cold patients. Some of them think they need to come 
here because of a fever, and about 20% to 30% of the patients don’t even have 
a fever.” 
Prescriber T3 from TCM hospital T: “In theory, patients should first visit 
community health centres, and if necessary, be referred to tertiary hospitals. My 
department usually focus on complex respiratory problems, but with many 
patients sidestepping community health centres and coming here directly, we 
have to take up many very simple common cold cases.” 
 
8.3 Influence of contextual factors on policy implementation 
Section 7.4 of Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central Level) also 
established that policy implementation in China was unlikely to be a uniform or linear 
process; regional decentralisation, a major characteristic of the Chinese political 
system, would likely engender adaptative approaches to policy implementation at the 
hospital level, which was strongly dependent on the local context. As established in 
Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), the implementation context at the hospital level 
was a result of the interaction between central and local settings (Berman, 1978; 
Maynard-Moody, Musheno & Palumbo, 1990; Elmore, 1978). In this light, the 
theoretical framework of the study outlined in Chapters 2 proposed that the contextual 
factors that influenced policy implementation at the hospital level existed at system 
(financing, organisation and delivery of healthcare), hospital (specific organisational 
settings and characteristics of each hospital) and individual levels (prescribers’ and 
patients’ understanding, relationships and behaviours). Key informants and other 
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interviewees in this research identified several factors at each of these levels; they are 
discussed in turn in the sub-sections below.  
 
System level contextual factor: increasing perceived demand for 
healthcare and pharmaceuticals 
At the level of system, China’s social health insurance schemes released high 
levels of perceived demand by patients for healthcare services and pharmaceuticals 
across all levels of hospitals. This posed significant challenges for maintaining the 
quality of healthcare service delivery and imposing restrictive measures on drugs in the 
implementation of The Campaign. 
The very high level of demand facing healthcare service providers in China was 
in part encouraged by the successful expansion of social health insurance schemes in 
recent healthcare reforms. As described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System 
Background), social health insurance was to become the dominant form of healthcare 
financing in China since the three schemes designed to provide universal health 
coverage for all Chinese citizens were introduced in the late 2000s. Its effect on 
stimulating healthcare supply – as described in Chapter 4, healthcare providers were 
incentivised to provide more care for insured than the uninsured – was matched by its 
effect on stimulating healthcare demand, which was achieved through the lowering of 
financial barriers to accessing healthcare services. Specifically, prescribers claimed 
that they were acutely aware of patients’ ability to pay and only prescribe medications 
they were most likely to afford.  
 Patient demand for pharmaceuticals was stimulated by social health insurance 
commensurately. Due to the critical role of pharmaceutical sales in healthcare financing 
as discussed in Chapters 3 (Healthcare System Background) and 6 (Policy 
Implementation at the Central Level), prescribing was regarded to be “integral to 
healthcare service provision in China”: not only was prescribing a main form of service 
“integral” to the healthcare financing, on an administrative level prescribing was also an 
activity “integral” to healthcare provision, in that clinical consultations and the 
acquisition of pharmaceuticals consequential to the consultations must take place 
within the same hospital, rather than separately in other hospitals or retail pharmacies 
(interview with Head of Pharmaceutical Affairs at the national tertiary hospital PA). This 
connection between prescribing and the provision of hospital-based healthcare 
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services was reflected in, if not reinforced by, the fact that social insurance schemes 
were more likely to offer reimbursements for pharmaceuticals prescribed at hospitals 
than those sold at retail pharmacies: 
Prescriber H2 from tertiary hospital H: “Hospital pharmacies are not connected 
with the outside network of retail pharmacies. Only hospital pharmacies can 
manage patients’ prescriptions consistently.” 
Prescriber L2 from community health centre L: “When patients come to the 
hospital they want to get reimbursements for their prescriptions. Otherwise they 
can visit retail pharmacies: not all the retail pharmacies are points of 
reimbursement, and usually patients pay out-of-pocket there.” 
 This view was confirmed by the patients themselves, as insured patients were 
much more likely to prefer obtaining pharmaceuticals from hospitals. Out of the 12 
patients who prefer to obtain pharmaceuticals from hospitals as opposed to having no 
preference for either hospitals or retail pharmacies, all but one patient had social 
insurance, and a third of them explicitly cited the lack of insurance reimbursement as 
the main reason for their preference of hospitals.  
 As a result, patients were incentivised to take full advantage of the 
reimbursement system by obtaining reimbursable pharmaceuticals at hospitals, further 
creating hospital visits and increasing demand for hospital-based healthcare services:  
Prescriber H1 from tertiary hospital H: “The vast majority of patients now have 
health insurance. Some of them really know how to pick the best time to visit: 
they come in just before their insurance accounts are closed before the end of 
the financial year. This way they make sure they use up their annual 
reimbursements. We jokingly call these patients ‘the blitz squads for 
prescriptions’.” 
Prescriber S1 from community health centre S: “Some of the common cold 
patients actually have cold-like symptoms. Others don’t have any symptoms: 
they just want to take advantage of their social insurance to obtain 
pharmaceuticals and stock them for later. It’s common practice.”  
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Hospital level contextual factor: decentralised implementation 
With decentralisation being a strong characteristic in policy implementation in 
China, policy implementation across all levels of hospitals was also dependent on the 
local circumstances. For instance, policy implementation was noted to be more 
stringent in Beijing than in other regions, where local health bureaus conducted annual 
inspections on rational use of medicines (interview with prescriber U1 from university 
hospital U). However, within Beijing, the requirements of different districts could be 
different. For example, although prescribers from all hospitals claimed that blood test 
results were pre-requisite to establishing whether or not antibiotics were needed for 
upper-respiratory tract infections, the actual rules in each hospital could be different: 
Prescriber L3 from community health centre L: “Every district has its own way of 
implementing antibiotic stewardship. Some stipulated that antibiotics can’t be 
prescribed without results of blood tests. We’re a bit more relaxed in this 
aspect. As we have to deal with a huge number of patients every day – more 
than most if not all the community health centre in this district – we’re forced to 
relax the rules a little bit.” 
 Patients also reported mixed experience with antibiotic prescribing within 
Beijing. A good number of patients felt that it was not particularly difficult to get 
antibiotic prescriptions from prescribers, although it would depend on their rapport with 
specific prescribers. Although some patients perceived that there were clear 
restrictions on antibiotic prescribing, and prescribers were more reluctant to simply 
prescribe antibiotics without blood test results, most patients felt it was difficult to say 
whether prescribers were markedly less willing to prescribe antibiotics based on their 
experience. Therefore, in analysing the implementation of The Campaign at the 
hospital level, it would be very necessary to examine contextual factors that were 
specific to the hospital of interest. 
 
Hospital level contextual factor: financing mechanisms of hospitals 
Even though The Campaign accounted for variations due to specialty settings, 
other factors could still influence the implementation of The Campaign in different 
hospitals. As described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), the ways that 
hospitals were financed could determine the ways that prescribers were paid, and in 
turn influence their incentives to prescribe. In this research, the sampled hospitals in 
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urban Beijing employed different ways of financing, and they created incentives for 
prescribers to provide various services that did not necessarily involve prescribing, 
which were beneficial for the introduction of antibiotic stewardship policies.  
Primary care centres were mainly supported by the government, and they were 
incentivised not to prescribe. The two community health centres, S and L, operated 
mainly on government budgets, with varied degrees of incentives to provide services 
based on the coverage of the budgets. Community health centre L had to generate 
revenues from service provision to supplement a comparatively partial budget to that of 
community health centre S. Consistent with the description in Chapter 4 (Healthcare 
System Background) and analysis in Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central 
Level), prescribing was precluded from revenue-generating services due to the 
implementation of zero-mark-up policy along with the New Essential Medicines Policy. 
To secure performance-based budgets vital to their operations from the district health 
bureaus, both community health centres were required to focus on providing public 
health services rather than healthcare services, such as “providing immunization”, 
“building personal health profiles of neighbourhood residents”, and “managing patients 
with chronic diseases” (interview with prescriber S1 from community health centre S). 
Salaries of the prescribers of the community health centres were also linked to these 
public health-focused activities. Whilst in the past salaries were linked to prescribing 
activities, they were now linked to the public health duties delegated to the prescribers 
by the hospitals (interview with prescriber L1 from community health centre L). The 
university hospital U, which was considered a tier 1 hospital, operated mainly on a 
global budget like the community health centres. However, the authority responsible for 
delivering the budget was the university rather than the district health bureau. As the 
university “covered all the operational costs” for the hospital, the hospital was required 
to “maintain a healthy balance and surplus before the budget was renewed”, and one 
of the key aspects of this was to “limit the expenses on pharmaceuticals”, which had to 
be sold at “without mark-up” (interview with prescriber U1 from university hospital U). 
Because of the capitation budget, the salary structure encouraged prescribers to serve 
more patients: a “small bonus” was added on top a regular salary, which was linked to 
“the volume of patients served” (interview with prescriber U1 from university hospital 
U).  
 By contrast, tertiary hospitals had to generate much of their own income, of 
which revenues from service provision were a vital source. Tertiary hospitals H and T 
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mainly relied on the revenue they generated through service provision. As a result, 
salaries of prescribers were in general linked to service provision as well. For example, 
in tertiary hospital H, part of the bonus was linked to the performance of the hospital 
overall, and part of it to the department to which a prescriber belonged (interview with 
prescriber H1 from tertiary hospital H). However, the performance indicators on which 
prescribers were assessed did not always promote prescribing. As discussed in 
Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central Level), these indicators at the same 
time reflected various regulations for healthcare cost and quality, such as the those by 
social insurance payers. In tertiary hospital H, the performance indicators concerned 
“volume of patients”, “revenue generated through different means including medical 
services”, “prescribing and examinations”, and “adherence to prescribing indicators”; 
some of these were positively correlated with bonus, others were negatively correlated 
with bonus – too much prescribing could incur a fine (interview with prescriber H1 from 
tertiary hospital H). However, even with regulations in place, prescribers’ incentives to 
prescribe could still be influenced by the pharmaceutical distribution industry outside 
hospitals’ management, as the industry “took advantage of a grey area” to offer a 
“direct reward” to prescribers who actively promoted the sales of certain products 
(interview with government official A1).  
 
Hospital level contextual factor: variations across clinical settings 
The specific characteristics of, and financing arrangements for, various hospital 
settings could both impact the scope for implementing antibiotic stewardship policies in 
healthcare providers, especially the larger and more differentiated higher-level 
hospitals.  
The appropriateness of antibiotic stewardship policies in different clinical 
specialties could significantly affect their implementation. Due to different clinical 
needs, a one-size-fits-all solution was unlikely to be appropriate for all kinds of 
specialties. For example, it would be unrealistic and unreasonable to impose policies 
for outpatient settings to inpatient settings, because antibiotics were, as briefly 
described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), a particularly crucial class of 
pharmaceuticals for inpatient services, and the strength and frequency of antibiotic use 
in inpatient settings was bound to be higher for a start. Another notable example 
concerned emergency settings, in which the “crucial need for timely and appropriate 
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use of highly advanced antibiotics” could be in conflict with some of the stewardship 
policies that sought to restrict formula and authorities of prescribers (interview with 
senior emergency prescriber from the national tertiary hospital E). The differences in 
specialties was also manifested at the hospital level. Compared with comprehensive 
hospitals, which “receive all types of patients”, specialist hospitals such as children’s 
hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and oncology hospitals “cater for very specific spectra of 
patients”, and their respective specialties had “significant implications on how and how 
much antibiotics are used” (interview with medical expert M). 
Some crucial policy adjustments were made to accommodate the needs in 
different clinical specialty settings at the level of policy design. In the 2011 version of 
the Campaign document, different target indicators and thresholds were set for 
inpatient and outpatient settings respectively. In the 2012 version of the document, new 
standards were specified for emergency settings and for different types of specialist 
hospitals, where target thresholds were appropriately revised. Furthermore, despite 
one of the Key Policies mandating hospitals strictly to restrict the number of types of 
antibiotics available in their antibiotic formulary (50 types of antibiotics for tertiary 
hospitals, and 35 types of antibiotics for secondary hospitals), hospitals were allowed 
to temporarily procure advanced antibiotics excluded from the selections in the existing 
inventories under verified emergency circumstances. 
 
Individual level contextual factors 
At the individual level, prescribers’ and patients’ understanding of antibiotics 
and attitudes towards antibiotic prescribing could strongly influence prescribing 
behaviours and the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies across all levels of 
healthcare. 
Prescribers’ understanding of rational antibiotic use was fundamental to the 
implementation of The Campaign. In this research, interviewed prescribers in urban 
Beijing showed competent levels of understanding of rational antibiotic use in the 
context of treating the common cold, despite uneven understanding of antibiotic 
stewardship. All the prescribers, regardless of training background (conventional 
medicine or TCM), were able to explain the common cold from a scientific perspective, 
pointing out that the common cold was an upper respiratory tract infection most 
commonly caused by viruses rather than bacteria, and stressed that it was generally a 
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self-healing condition. They also noted that due to the lack of cost-effect antivirals, 
symptomatic treatments were the most appropriate for the common cold. However, 
they also recognised that bacterial infections could present in the later stages of the 
common cold, and potential antibiotic use needed to be informed by indicative 
symptoms of bacterial infections such as the presence of pus in sputum, or elevated 
levels of white blood cells in blood test results. The prescribers were also prudent 
about the use of intravenous infusions. Noting its effect on health, all of them agreed 
that oral administration was the preferred option.  
Prescriber S2 from Community health centre S: “According to our supervisors 
we have to control the percentage of prescriptions containing antibiotics to 
below 15%. The district health bureau also monitors these figures.” 
Prescriber H2 from tertiary hospital H: “We’ve been implementing antibiotic 
stewardship policies for about ten years now at this hospital, so prescribers are 
highly aware of rational antibiotic use. We have internal rankings for different 
departments based on indicators, and these are regularly published within the 
hospital.” 
However, not all the prescribers were as well-informed about the antibiotic 
stewardship policies in their respective hospitals. Whilst some prescribers had a good 
understanding of the policies in their hospitals, others were less well-informed:  
Prescriber S3 from community health centre S: “I know that some rules 
concerning antibiotic use are getting stricter. But I’m don’t know about the 
specific rules. I prescribe antibiotics prudently so I never got into trouble 
anyway.” 
Prescriber L2 from community health centre L: “There’re some rules. The 
hospital doesn’t seem to be too strict about them.” 
Prescriber T3 from TCM hospital T: “All of the prescribers in the hospital can 
check the statistics on antibiotic use, which are collected and monitored by the 
Department of Medical Affairs and the Drug and Therapeutic Committee. I’m 
not sure if there’s any punitive measures for those who fail to meet the 
standards.” 
 As consumers of antibiotics, patients’ understanding of rational antibiotic use 
was equally crucial. In this research, their understanding was found to be less uniform 
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and more heterogeneous. In terms of understanding the common cold, the vast 
majority of patients identified with explanations based on meteorological aetiology, 
claiming that a combination of external factors, such as change of climate and 
temperature, and internal factors, such as weakened bodily strength and immunity, 
could cause the common cold. Some patients also identified elements of conventional 
medicine relating to infections, and these patients tended to be of higher educational 
status, having received at least college level education. Even though few patients 
explicitly pointed out antibiotics were inappropriate for viral infections, most of the 
patients showed caution and discretion to using antibiotics for the common cold, with 
none of them choosing “Yes” for the question “Is it necessary to take antibiotics for 
common cold”. Here, their rationale was mainly based on their perception of side 
effects and severity of symptoms. Patients who chose an outright “No” for this question 
noted antibiotics had strong side effects from their experience, and felt that there were 
other pharmaceuticals that were effective and with fewer side effects. Of the patients 
considered using antibiotics discretionally, about a half of them relied on their own 
judgement of the severity of disease based on heavy symptoms like fever or very sore 
throat, whilst the other half would consult prescribers’ advice. One of the potential 
reasons for the lack of use of scientific knowledge to inform patients’ antibiotic use was 
the lack of effective education: although many patients agreed that there was notably 
more promotion for rational antibiotic use in the past few years, few felt that the 
information helped them understand the science behind antibiotic use. Similarly, none 
of the patients considered intravenous infusion as the preferred route of administration 
for medicines. Many patients explicitly preferred oral administration, citing convenience, 
safety and side effects to the body as main criteria of consideration. Other patients 
would again seek prescribers’ advice.  
 The willingness of patients to follow prescribers’ advice, however, was a 
separate question that concerned the prescriber-patient relationship, a vital factor that 
could decisively shape prescribers’ and patients’ attitudes towards antibiotic 
prescribing. The contemporary context of prescriber-patient relationship in China was 
one of tension, which could at times escalate to violence. In recent years, there have 
been more and more incidents which involved patients “causing physical harms to 
prescribers” across the country, in which the patients felt justified to resort to violence 
for their “demands were not met satisfactorily by prescribers” (interview with head of 
medical affairs of the national tertiary hospital MA). Although all the prescribers agreed 
that, in general, most the patients they had seen were respectful, they also pointed out 
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that in their career, they had experienced a number of incidents in which patients 
strongly demanded antibiotics and were unwilling to back down; in these cases, the 
tense relationship could create very strong pressure for prescribers to prescribe:  
Senior emergency prescriber from the national tertiary hospital (E): “Prescribers 
in good hospitals are normally very good at sticking to the guidelines. But 
sometimes even they feel helpless and desperate in face of the pressure from 
the patients who demand antibiotics very strongly. The prescriber-patient 
relationship in society is already at a low, and it’s not uncommopn for 
prescribers and patients to engage in heated disputes because of antibiotics. 
Sometimes certain patients would stop at nothing to get antibiotics, and we 
could do nothing but to prescribe in the end. It’s very, very difficult to handle 
sometimes.” 
Prescriber T3: “Defensive medicine is very understandable; currently the 
tension between prescribers and patients can be unbearable.” 
 In the setting of community health centre, some prescribers suggested that if 
good rapport could be established, patients could become more compliant:   
Prescriber S1 from community health centre S: “Many patients are our 
neighbours, we see them very often, and we have friendly chats. These patients 
are very willing to listen to us when we have differences. If they have 
reasonable demands, we’ll also try to work with them.” 
 In the setting of tertiary hospitals, patients were more likely to be suffering from 
more severe conditions, and some prescribers found that to be a beneficial factor to 
increasing patients’ compliance: 
Prescriber T1 from TCM hospital T: “In the emergency department most of the 
cases are severe, and naturally prescribers take all of the decisions after 
consulting with patients. Very few patients make special demands here.” 
Prescriber T3 from TCM hospital T: “By the time parents come to the specialist 
paediatrics they’ve probably tried many things out and are running out of 
options. They desperately want their kids to get better, and usually they’re very 
willing to listen to the prescribers.” 
 Most of the patients interviewed identified themselves to be compliant in this 
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research, with most of them claiming that they were ready to follow prescribers’ advice 
if they were told that their demands were not reasonable. Even so, some of them 
acknowledged that they had demanded and successfully obtained antibiotics from 
prescribers in their experience. Several patients explicitly expressed unwillingness to 
follow prescribers’ advice if their demands were not met, especially so if the incidents 
took place in community health centres. 
In the context of strained prescriber-patient relationship and strong demand for 
pharmaceuticals, the use of TCM became a helpful alternative to antibiotics especially 
in conditions that were not severe. As described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System 
Background), provision of TCM services (excluding the prescribing of patent medicines 
of TCM formulas) was prevalent amongst hospitals in China. All hospitals sampled 
either included TCM departments or specialist TCM prescribers to provide these 
services. The main form of TCM prescribed by the prescribers and used by the patients 
was TCM patented medicines, which were pharmaceuticals made with TCM formulas.  
TCM patented medicines were popular amongst prescribers of different training 
backgrounds, including those who were not trained in TCM. Many prescribers, 
regardless of their training background, reflected the view that TCM had less side 
effects than conventional medicines, and some even believed that they could 
complement the effects of conventional medicines when both pharmaceuticals were 
used together. This perception was more likely to be of a cultural nature rather than 
evidence-based scientific judgement, but it did influence prescribing practices, as 
almost all the prescribers reported experience of polypharmacy that involved using 
conventional medicines and TCM patented medicines at the same time. 
 Similarly, for the patients, TCM patented medicines were a very popular choice 
of pharmaceuticals, especially in the case of light cold symptoms. Almost all patients 
reported that they had been, or they were becoming frequent users of TCM patented 
medicines, with many patients believing that TCM had fewer side effects, compared to 
conventional medicines. Polypharmacy was frequent, as patients reasoned that TCM 
could help reducing the side-effects of the perceivably more efficacious conventional 
symptomatic treatments.  
For these reasons, most of the prescribers agree that as access to antibiotics 
became increasingly regulated, TCM patented medicines could become more and 
more frequently used to satisfy demands from the patients, who welcomed their use.  
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8.4 Policy implementation at a national tertiary hospital 
Having outlined the three levels of contextual factors that could influence policy 
implementation at the hospital level in the setting of urban Beijing, it is now necessary 
to examine key elements to the implementation process of The Campaign in the 
national tertiary hospital, which was first introduced in Chapter 6 (Study Design and 
Methods). This analysis uses elements from both the top-down and the bottom-up 
approaches to understanding policy implementation as described in Chapter 2 
(Theoretical Background). Top-down elements as applied in Chapter 7 (Policy 
Implementation at the Central Level) such as accountability, target approach and 
coordination amongst different actors were present in the implementation process in 
the national tertiary hospital. At the same time, the bottom-up perspective was adopted 
through the identification representative frontline implementers from the national 
tertiary hospital and focusing on their conceptualisation of The Campaign, the internal 
organisational structures and the actions taken in respect of policy implementation 
within the national tertiary hospital (Elmore, 1979; Hjern & Hull, 1982; Hjern & Porter, 
1981).  
Whilst incorporating important aspects of hospital level implementation 
identified through the literature review in Chapter 3 (Literature Review) including 
prioritisation by the management, administrative resources, human resources and 
support from medical professionals, the analysis here also sheds light on the way the 
national tertiary hospital responds to the three levels of contextual factors during the 
implementation process, before finally reflecting on the role of policy implementation at 
the central level, which was analysed in Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the 
Central Level). 
 
Perception of the impact of The Campaign 
Even though the key informants from the national tertiary hospital repeatedly 
stressed that policy implementation took place well before The Campaign, they 
highlighted that the implementation of The Campaign on a macro level had far-reaching 
implications for policy implementation at the hospital level.  
Chapter 8. Policy Implementation at the Hospital Level, Part I 
176 
 
Firstly, The Campaign legitimised measures that would have been otherwise 
difficult to introduce. For example, formulary restriction was difficult to implement before 
The Campaign because it was “against the interest of the pharmaceutical industry”, 
which was concerned about its impact on market access; with the central government 
stipulating formulary restriction, hospitals were “emboldened” to become more 
discerning about product quality, so that in effect new market forces were created to 
“put products that were of lower standards out of the market” (interview with head of 
pharmaceutical affairs PA). It was important, too, that “all the hospitals had to 
implement antibiotic stewardship policies” such as this: “when everyone had to do it, 
everyone felt equal” (interview with head of medical affairs MA).  
Secondly, The Campaign helped formalise existing stewardship policies in the 
national tertiary hospital. Whereas most of the policies were “advisory” and their 
implementation relied on “knowledge and self-discipline of medical professional” in the 
past, after The Campaign these policies became “formalised and institutionalised” 
(interview with head of pharmaceutical affairs PA), which led to much more effective 
implementation:  
Head of medical affairs (MA): “The Campaign was a useful exercise in a sense 
that it helped us formalise and standardise the specific practices. For example, 
we trained and introduced clinical pharmacists to advise and monitor antibiotic 
use before The Campaign; after the Campaign, we were able to further develop 
their job specifications, detailing the specific departments and prescribers that 
each pharmacist worked with. As we’ve had a lot of progress with antibiotic use, 
our focus is now on the rational use of other pharmaceuticals in general with a 
similar approach.” 
 Thirdly, The Campaign was aligned with China’s on-going effort towards 
healthcare reform, which introduced and normalised new understanding and practices 
that were crucial to rational antibiotic use and beyond: 
Head of infection control (IC): “The Campaign could be considered as a political 
movement. In the even grander scheme, it also had to do with the political 
concept of ‘Creating the New Norm’, which is the flagship project of the current 
government promoting ethical practices and eradicating corruptions in the 
Chinese society.” 
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 The top-down nature of the implementation of The Campaign was also reflected 
in the implementation in the national tertiary hospital to an extent. The target approach 
stipulated by the central government to strengthen programme accountability was 
indeed reinforced in the national tertiary hospital: 
Senior emergency prescriber (E): “There’s a host of target indicators related to 
antibiotic stewardship that would be public published within Beijing’s hospital 
system at the end of the year. These are also publicly reported within the 
hospital across the various departments and within each department. Along our 
reporting lines, prescribers report to their supervisors, and the supervisors 
report to departmental directors. If we’re told that we’ve used excessive 
antibiotics, we’d try to reduce it. There had never been any administrative 
interventions as formal as this, but as prescribers we can see the benefit for 
controlling antibiotic resistance is huge.” 
 Even so, it was not seen by the key informants as the main approach to 
implementation. Key indicators of antibiotic use and resistance had been monitored 
since 2009, which was before the Campaign started, to inform strategies to contain 
hospital-acquired infections in the national tertiary hospital. As a result, key informants 
pointed out that they were well aware of the fact that the targets represented means 
rather than ends, and ultimately the focus was the implementation of policies that were 
designed to improve rational antibiotic use in hospitals: 
Head of medical affairs (MA): “We didn’t direct our energy solely to paying 
attention to achieving those indicators when The Campaign started. We knew 
we had to reduce the overall antibiotic prescribing rate from 78% to 40%, but 
looking at the numbers alone would not give anyone any clue as to how this 
could be achieved. Our strategy was to focus on things we could do to improve 
rational antibiotic use instead.” 
In order implement the policies effectively, the national tertiary hospital took 
measures to address contextual factors at system, hospital and individual levels as 
described in the earlier sections. 
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Interaction between contextual factors and policy implementation 
Even with The Campaign, managerial actors at the national tertiary hospital 
actively employed strategies to counteract the influence of contextual factors in the 
implementation of The Campaign, which came at system, hospital and individual levels. 
 
Addressing system level factors 
As a leading tertiary hospital in Beijing and in China, the national tertiary 
hospital processed a very high volume of patients, averaging more than 10,000 patient 
visits per day. Volume of services at such stupendous scale mounted an enormous 
challenge to implementing antibiotic stewardship policies. For example, in an ideal 
situation, the hospital should “review all the prescriptions prior to handing them to 
patients”, but this was made impossible by the huge number of patient visits (interview 
with head of pharmaceutical affairs PA). In response, the national tertiary hospital 
introduced measures to limit the supply of healthcare services, and in effect refer 
patients in a reverse direction to lower tiers of hospitals, so that the number of patient 
visits could be reduced.  
One of the key measures was the cancellation of intravenous infusion services 
in the outpatient department, which targeted patients who sought infusions for minor 
conditions:   
Head of infection control (IC): “If patients want to come here simply for getting 
intravenous infusions, they can do that no more. They would have to go back to 
their community health centres.” 
Head of medical affairs (MA): “We may not be able to prevent patients from 
coming to our hospital for minor complaints, but at least we’re reducing the 
services that we provide, services that we consider to be redundant at tertiary 
levels of healthcare. Tertiary hospitals should be dedicated to serving patients 
with complicated conditions, not minor complaints. As China’s gatekeeping 
system is still in its early stages, we have to come up with other approaches to 
achieve similar effects of encouraging patients to visit community health centres 
for minor healthcare services.” 
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 Another measure was to introduce other services such as prescription 
consultations to divert patients from prescribers, and thus relieving some of prescribers’ 
workload: 
Head of outpatient affairs (OA): “With our prescription consultations, patients 
who simply wanted to learn more about how they should manage their 
conditions using existing prescriptions, or the potential side effects and 
interactions of their prescriptions can directly consult clinical pharmacists in an 
open area next to the pharmacy inside the hospital. This service also aims to 
improve rational use of medicines in general, including antibiotics.” 
  
Aligning hospital level factors 
 In line with the approach of The Campaign discussed earlier, the national 
tertiary hospital took further steps to adapt the Key Policies for different specialty 
settings. For emergency medicine, in particular, relaxation was introduced in the policy 
of formulary restriction, which stipulated that the authorisation levels for prescribing 
non-restricted, restricted and reserved classes of antibiotics be assigned to the 
prescribers according to their professional grades: a junior prescriber, for instance, 
would not be authorised to prescribe the most advance antibiotic treatments. Although 
this policy could limit access and ensure prescribing decisions were made by 
appropriately qualified prescribers, it could also prevent patients from timely access of 
antibiotics in absence of the authorised prescribers. In emergency situations, the 
implications of this policy could be very negative. Therefore, alternative measures to 
resolve the potential problems surrounding access in emergency situations were 
introduced, which involved temporary authorisations and retrospective review of 
actions: 
Senior emergency prescriber (E): “In emergency medicine, when no other 
prescribers with higher levels of authorisation are present within 24 hours, a 
prescriber may override their authorisation and prescribe advance antibiotics in 
the best interest of the patient. The patient is seen, and the prescriptions are 
reviewed within 24 hours by prescribers of higher professional grades. This 
measure can help us ensure rational antibiotic use and work towards the 
prescribing targets without jeopardising patient’s safety.” 
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 As discussed previously, accounting for specialty settings was not sufficient to 
ensure effective policy implementation at the hospital level, as the ways that hospitals 
were financed could influence prescribing incentives and behaviours strongly. In this 
respect, the national tertiary hospital possessed certain enabling characteristics that 
could enhance implementation of The Campaign.  
 The national tertiary hospital was very capable of generating revenue from 
activities outside prescribing, as it was a highly resourceful and technologically 
advanced tertiary hospital that could attract patients from all over the country. Being 
less reliant on pharmaceutical sales, the national tertiary hospital could find greater 
room for manoeuvre in the regulation of prescribing, and prescribers were less 
incentivised to prescribe as a result:  
Head of infection control (IC): “In this hospital, there has been an increase in 
revenue that is not related to prescribing. Mostly its down to the significant 
increase in the number of patients that we serve, and consequentially, the 
amount of services that we provide. For us, the year-on-year percentage of 
increase in patient visits could reach 20%.” 
Head of outpatient affairs (OA): “Our revenue generation never relies on 
pharmaceutical sales, which only takes up about 15% of our total revenue; its a 
very low figure. Prescribers’ bonuses have nothing to do with prescribing either. 
Here the pursuit of revenue generation is linked to the pursuit of technological 
advancement, such as cutting-edge devices for radiotherapy. Prescribers’ pay 
is linked to performance, which is represented by the provision of advanced 
medical services.” 
 Also, as one of the leading hospitals in China, the national tertiary hospital 
prided on its ethos, which was underlined by a heightened sense of professional ethics. 
As an internationally renowned hospital, the national tertiary hospital also frequently 
faced close scrutiny by government authorities. This helped to create an environment 
relatively immune from prescribing activities associated with outside financial rewards: 
Head of medical affairs (MA): “We uphold very high standards of professional 
ethics. Financial probity is at the heart of this hospital’s value. We have zero 
tolerance for any under-the-table dealings between prescribers and other 
interests.” 
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Head of pharmaceutical affairs (PA): “Having achieved excellent results in our 
work, we had the honour to be appointed by the government to receive high-
level foreign delegations to share our experience. Our prescribers always need 
to give their very best.” 
Given the background and characteristics of the national tertiary hospital, 
several factors crucial to policy implementation at the hospital level were identified, 
which were highly consistent with the factors summarised in Chapter 2 (Theoretical 
Background). Firstly, underlying the initiation of these activities – some of which were 
not necessarily well-received by prescribers at the beginning – was an effective 
administrative structure of the management, which is represented in Figure 8-1, and 
their responsibilities are described in Table 8-1. In this structure, the Department of 
Medical Affairs were given a stronger mandate than other departments, as the Head of 
the Department was jointly appointed as Assistant Director of the Hospital.  
 
 
Figure 8-1 The structure of the management of the national tertiary hospital 
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Administrative department Summary of roles and functions and remits 
Department of Medical Affairs Supervision of all activities pertaining to the delivery of healthcare 
services across all departments of the hospital, with a focus on the 
inpatient departments 
Department of Outpatient 
Affairs 
Supervision of activities pertaining to the delivery of healthcare 
services in the outpatient departments 
Department of Pharmaceutical 
Affairs 
Supervision of activities pertaining to the procurement, supply and 
prescription and application of pharmaceutical products for use in 
medical treatments and clinical trials for research 
Department of Infection 
Control 
Supervision of activities pertaining to the surveillance, prevention and 
control of nosocomial infectious diseases in the hospital, especially in 
the inpatient departments 
Table 8-1 Summary of the roles and functions of the managerial departments in the national tertiary hospital 
 
 Secondly, this structure ensured that the Department of Medical Affairs could 
take on “a leading role” in prioritising antibiotic stewardship policies, and rolling out its 
implementation (interview with head of medical affairs MA). This was especially crucial, 
as the key informants identified “early prioritisation of antibiotic stewardship” by the 
management of the hospital to be the prime factor for effective implementation, which 
took place even “before The Campaign came into existence” (interview with head of 
infection control IC). Perceived as a continuum in the way described in Chapter 5 
(National Policy Context), antibiotic stewardship policies had been framed as a vital 
aspect of “healthcare quality and safety” by the key informants at the hospital (interview 
with head of medical affairs MA). This policy framing was also consistent with that by 
central level actors, also described in Chapter 5:  
Head of medical affairs (MA): “Rational antibiotic use is an issue of healthcare 
quality and safety. At the beginning, alarms were raised by the potential risks 
and detrimental consequences of hospital-acquired infections, especially those 
that could take place in surgical wounds. Inpatient departments, especially the 
intensive care units, are likely hotbeds for hospital-acquired infections by highly 
resistant bacteria. That’s because most of the antibiotic use takes place in 
inpatient departments as opposed to outpatient departments.” 
Head of infection control (IC): “Controlling hospital-acquired infection is a task 
that is stipulated by the health authorities. In our profession, it’s considered to 
be the litmus test for quality of healthcare.” 
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 Thirdly, this administrative structure also ensured effective coordination across 
departments of different disciplines and functions within the national tertiary hospital. 
As described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), antibiotic stewardship required 
interdisciplinary collaboration amongst clinical pharmacists, prescribers and 
microbiologists. Clinical microbiologists “provide the necessary molecular evidence for 
prescribers”; prescribers “make the diagnoses and prescribe antibiotics”; and “clinical 
pharmacists review the prescriptions, provide further advise for difficult cases” 
(interview with head of clinical microbiology CM). Such interdisciplinary collaboration at 
the departmental level to ensure rational antibiotic use was underlined by the set-up of 
the Drug and Therapeutic Committee (the DTC), an expert committee that functioned in 
parallel with the administrative departments reporting to the medical director of the 
example hospital. Similar to the Committee of Experts on Rational Drug Use at the 
government policy level as described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), the DTC 
comprised working groups of different specialties with experts appointed from various 
departments of the hospital including expert consultants, clinical pharmacists, clinical 
microbiologists, specialist nurses, epidemiologists and IT specialists, and it was 
responsible for monitoring and reviewing prescriptions both prospectively and 
retrospectively. As discussed in Chapter 7 (Policy Implementation at the Central Level), 
the coordination of multiple prescribing indicators as dictated by different policies could 
be challenging; in the example hospital, these indicators were collectively managed 
and monitored by the DTC: 
Head of outpatient affairs (OA): “The DTC monitors and reviews our 
prescriptions based on a number of criteria. To start, there’re indicators on 
rational antibiotic use in line with antibiotic stewardship policies. Then there are 
similar indicators with hospital accreditation. Last but not least, social health 
insurance schemes also stipulated some indicators in order to control medical 
expenditures. These indicators overlap quite a lot. To make sure that we can 
achieve all these indicators, the DTC has created an overall indicator 
framework that accommodates all of them, and use it to guide our internal 
prescription reviews.” 
 In line with its responsibilities in pharmaceutical affairs, the Department of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs played a pivotal role in coordinating the DTC and organising 
monthly meetings on the state of pharmaceutical use in the example hospital, of which 
antibiotic use was a main working group. At the same time, other departments actively 
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work with the DTC to address aspects of antibiotic stewardship within their respective 
remits based on the DTC’s findings and feedback: 
Head of clinical microbiology (CM): “As part of the DTC we work closely with 
other Heads of Departments. Besides the Department of Pharmaceutical 
Affairs, the Department of Infection Control also chairs a session on the state of 
hospital infections in the monthly meetings.” 
Head of outpatient affairs (OA): “The DTC produce reports on antibiotic use for 
both the government and the hospital itself. They provide feedback for 
administrative departments as well as individual medical departments on the 
patterns of antibiotic use and potential issues of concerns. They also compare 
the results across different departments and publish them publicly in the 
hospital. Administrative departments such as Medical Affairs and Outpatient 
Affairs engage with medical departments based on the results, so that the 
problems and the relevant personnel can be addressed in a timely fashion, and 
appropriate cautionary measures are issued duly.” 
 Fourthly, in order to strengthen the capacity of clinical pharmacists, who were 
vital to the technical and administrative functions of implementing antibiotic stewardship 
policies but were generally under-developed across China, the managerial actors of the 
national tertiary hospital devoted much support to the training of clinical pharmacists 
before the implementation of The Campaign started: 
Head of medical affairs (MA): “Our hospital was one of the first in China to have 
a team of clinical pharmacists. When they were first introduced in the early 
2000s, they felt too underqualified to speak in front of prescribers because of 
lack of clinical experience. Therefore, very early on they were asked to 
participate in mandatory clinical work and work alongside prescribers in their 
diagnosis. With time, their clinical experience became much more enriched. 
A crucial step in this process was to develop support from prescribers, who 
were “at first unwilling to listen to the clinical pharmacists” as they feared that “their 
clinical independence would become compromised” (interview with head of medical 
affairs MA). In order to create trust, the managerial actors first introduced clinical 
pharmacists in cases that prescribers found difficult to handle, to create opportunities 
for the two groups of professional to develop appreciation of each other and ways to 
collaborate:  
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Head of medical affairs (MA): “For example, surgeons realised that with the 
help of clinical pharmacists, they could focus precious energy on conducting 
surgeries, rather than all aspects of the follow-up treatments and infection 
prevention. Also, prescribers realised that clinical pharmacists possessed 
expertise that they lack when working on rare and complicated cases of 
infection.” 
 
Managing individual level factors 
In the national tertiary hospitals, the key informants identified that a gap in 
knowledge was responsible for the overuse of prophylactic antibiotics after surgeries. 
Many prescribers applied antibiotics prophylactically to clean and uninfected Type I 
surgical wounds, when in fact antibiotic use could increase the potential of infection by 
increasing the selective pressure for resistant bacteria. In order to improve prescribers’ 
understanding of rational antibiotic use, behavioural interventions and interdisciplinary 
trainings were introduced in the national tertiary hospital: 
Head of medical affairs (MA): “To improve their understanding, clinical 
pharmacists gave prescribers regular briefing on best practices, and 
demonstrated the positive impact of lessening antibiotic use using the data on 
prescribing and antibiotic resistance. Also, we introduced an annual “Hand 
Hygiene Week” several years ago, and showed that good hand-washing 
practices could effectively reduce hospital infections, further reducing incentives 
to prescribe antibiotics prophylactically. Once prescribers saw the evidence, 
they became convinced.” 
The key informants also identified that the strained prescriber-patient 
relationship remained a key driver of irrational antibiotic use, and prescribers became 
accustomed to practicing defensive medicines in order to “mitigate patients’ 
dissatisfaction and blaming” (interview with head of pharmaceutical affairs PA). 
Although as described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context) improving health 
promotion and patients’ understanding of rational antibiotic use was part of the Key 
Policies of The Campaign, this element did not appear to be a focus area in the 
national tertiary hospital. Instead, the national tertiary hospital relied on other solutions 
to counter the effect of patient expectations. An effective intervention was the 
introduction of information technology in managing prescriptions: 
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Senior emergency prescriber (E): “Formulary restriction has been built into our 
new IT system. If a prescriber of lower professional grade isn’t authorised to 
prescribe certain antibiotics, their computer system would prevent them from 
prescribing should they attempt to do so. Persisting patients would be able to 
see a notification on the prescriber’s computer about the rules of formulary 
restrictions. This way prescribers have a better way to explain to patients why 
they can’t simply prescribe what they want and satisfy their demands.” 
Head of pharmaceutical affairs (PA): “Now that patients can see what happens 
with formulary restrictions on prescribers’ screens, they’re less likely to read the 
situation with misunderstanding or feel that they’ve been unfairly treated. If one 
patient gets it but another doesn’t from the same prescriber, patients are bound 
to find this ‘unfair’.” 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
Based on the perspectives of the frontline implementers, this chapter has 
described the implementation of The Campaign at the hospital level, especially in the 
national tertiary hospital. Despite the complex set of challenges to implementation 
posed by multiple levels of contextual factors existing in China’s healthcare system, 
implementation at the central level, which was described in Chapter 7 (Policy 
Implementation at the Central Level), created significant impetus and an enabling 
environment for the national tertiary hospital set out measures to counteract some of 
these challenges.  
In addition, the national tertiary hospitals set out measures that addressed 
elements that were crucial on an operational level in the implementation process. The 
strong leadership of the managerial actors in policy implementation showed that top-
down implementation also took place at the hospital level. The managerial actors, 
especially the Department of Medical Affairs and the Drug and Therapeutics 
Committee, benefited from an enabling organisation structure that helped them 
prioritise and coordinate the necessary activities across multiple clinical disciplines in 
order to implement antibiotic stewardship policies effectively.  
Implementation at this level differed with that at the central level in a distinct 
way. Bottom-up perspectives based on the key informants’ perception demonstrated 
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that for the frontline implementers, policy implementation existed as a continuum over a 
number of years, with the necessary activities spanning the period before the 
implementation of The Campaign, much in the same way as described in Chapter 5 
(National Policy Context). Consequently, at the hospital level, the processual view of 
policy implementation became much less distinct, as past policy implementation was 
seen as integral to, and inseparable from the events that took place during the 
implementation of The Campaign.  
However, hospital-level research in phase 1 did not sufficiently examine how 
The Campaign created the necessitating changes in prescribing incentives and 
behaviours that were crucial to policy implementation. On one hand, top-down 
processes at the hospital level were not explored in detail. On the other hand, where 
policy process was examined in some detail at the national tertiary hospital in Beijing, 
there was an absence of bottom-up perception and understanding of policy 
implementation, as it revolved around managers rather than  prescribers and patients. 
Furthermore, the interactions between implementation process and contextual factors 
in shaping prescribing behaviour were not explicitly examined. Lastly, policy 
implementation at the tertiary hospital in Beijing was unlikely to be the same as in a 
more typical urban hospital setting in China. As a result, phase 2 fieldwork – a case 
study at a typical secondary hospital in Shanghai that involved all levels of hospital-
level actors – was set up in response to these issues. The case study is described in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9. Policy Implementation at the Hospital Level, 
Part II: A Case Study of a Secondary Hospital in 
Shanghai 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 (Policy Implementation at the Hospital Level, Part I) delineated a 
range of contextual factors that could influence implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies at the hospital level and presented a partial case study of hospital 
level policy implementation that was based on the views of managerial actors at the 
hospital level. The partial case studied revealed that policy implementation at the 
tertiary hospital studied had top-down characteristics consistent with policies set out by 
the government, but at the same time these characteristics were tempered by the need 
to address contextual factors that made introducing behaviour change in prescribing 
more difficult. In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of implementation within a 
hospital, a further case study was conducted to capture the views of the prescribers as 
well as that of the managers within a single hospital. The purpose of the case study 
was to elucidate how the hospital responded to top-down demands from the 
government and the dynamic influence of contextual factors, and more importantly 
whether and how this process generated the behavioural changes in prescribing 
necessary for policy implementation.  
 The analysis of policy implementation draws on the data from all four types of 
actors included in the case study, namely non-clinical managers, manager-prescribers 
(the unspecified term “managers” is used in this chapter to refer to both types to 
managers collectively), prescribers and patients (to a lesser extent, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, Study Design and Methods). As implementation of The Campaign ended in 
2013 – four years prior to data collection in 2017 – interviewees were asked to recall 
policy implementation as a past event. Throughout the interviews, the researcher 
asked interviewees to clarify the timeframe of events that they were describing, and 
explicitly contrast their experience prior to and after implementation of The Campaign 
where possible. To situate the case study, the background of the hospital will be briefly 
described, including its location, mechanisms of financing and patient mix. This will be 
followed by a description of its administrative structures and the policy actors for 
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antibiotic stewardship at the hospital and their respective roles. Whilst recurring top-
down features of implementation – policy approaches that aligned with the 
government’s description and intention – will be briefly highlighted, the bottom-up 
approach to understanding implementation through the eyes of “street-level 
bureaucrats” will be the emphasis, in which policy actors’ interpretation of the policies 
and their behavioural change during policy implementation were examined. The 
concern here is less about the existence of top-down features per se, but more about 
understanding how different actors perceived and enacted these features in their 
respective roles and unravelling how the subsequent interplay between top-down 
features, bottom-up perspectives and existing contextual factors resulted in behaviour 
change in prescribing during policy implementation.  
 
9.2 Background of the hospital 
The hospital studied was a small secondary hospital with about 300 beds, 
capable of providing a level of complex and specialised healthcare services, including 
CT scans and endoscopy. It was located in a suburban district in Shanghai that was 
known for its track record in piloting healthcare reforms. The hospital was directly 
accountable to the local district government. Although data on antibiotic prescribing at 
the hospital was not made available for this study due to lack of agreement from the 
collaborators, Chapter 3 (Literature review) demonstrated that antibiotic use in 
Shanghai – amongst the most intense in China – had come down dramatically since 
2011, the year The Campaign commenced. 
At the time of the study in late 2017, the main source of revenue for the hospital 
was a combination of service provision, pharmaceutical sales and funding from the 
district government. Financing of the hospital had been undergoing substantial 
changes in recent years. Far-reaching local reforms during, and especially after The 
Campaign had sought to change how healthcare was financed in the area studied, and 
it would likely impact on the extent to which the local government could influence 
hospital administration.  
As a result of these strong crosswinds from reforms in hospital financing, 
growth in pharmaceutical use has plateaued in recent years, according to senior 
managers. On the one hand, contribution to revenue from pharmaceutical sale had 
been dwindling. During The Campaign, service provision and pharmaceutical sales 
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were a substantial part of the hospital’s income. However, over the past five years – 
including the years contemporaneous with The Campaign – the mark-up of 
pharmaceuticals in general has been continuously adjusted downwards from 15% to 
5%. It was expected that a new zero-mark-up policy that applies to all pharmaceuticals 
(as opposed to essential medicines only) would be rolled out in 2017, which would 
affect over half of the pharmaceuticals, which were non-essential medicines, available 
at the hospital.  
On the other hand, contribution to revenue from government funding had been 
increasing. In an ensuing move to restructure the financing of secondary hospitals in 
the district, the district government was to implement a global budget system starting in 
2018. Managers explained that by then, the hospital would have to turn over all the 
revenues to the district government, before the government reallocated the funding for 
covering the costs for operation, development and expansion based on its performance 
and the specific project needs. This new arrangement was similar to the financing 
reforms of primary care that sought to delink revenue generation from service 
provision, as described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Context). However, whereas 
performance was assessed in public health services in primary care, the volume of 
activities in service provision would reportedly still be one of the most important 
performance indicators for them when it came to budget allocation. They also claimed 
that the reform would affect all secondary hospitals in the district. It was unclear if 
similar arrangements would apply to tertiary hospitals in the district, or hospitals in 
other districts in Shanghai.  
Whilst Shanghai overall could be ahead of the curve in terms of introducing 
healthcare reforms due to its municipal status, the aforementioned reforms were largely 
consistent with developments being rolled out in urban areas in China. In this context, 
the studied hospital – a typical secondary hospital in a suburban district away from the 
city centre in Shanghai – represented a modest healthcare setting much more typical to 
common urban areas in China than the markedly more affluent, nouveau-riche 
metropolis. Due to its designated size and scale, the hospital had a limited catchment 
area, and all of its patients came from the nearby community. On average it received 
about 500 – 600 patients per day. Besides local residents, the community was also 
occupied by a large number of migrant workers, who lived in this area for its cheaper 
housing. Non-clinical managers reported that over the past few years, the ratio of local 
and migrant residents had increased from 4:6 to 5:5 due to a crackdown on illegal 
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housing for migrants. The implication here was that the proportion of payments made 
through social health insurance were gaining on that through out-of-pocket payments, 
as the local residents were covered by insurance, but the migrants were not. Therefore, 
the stronger regulation of pharmaceutical use from social insurance payers was 
expected. Overall, however, the hospital claimed that they had been seeing a decrease 
in total patient visits as the hospital continued to adjust to the material changes in 
health financing and demographics in the district.   
 
9.3 Administration and policy actors of the hospital 
A simplified organisational structure of the hospital studied is represented in 
Figure 9-1 below. The department of medical affairs was the central hub for the overall 
administration, supervision and coordination of activities in the clinical departments. It 
reported to the director of the hospital, who was accountable to the district for ensuring 
all aspects of healthcare delivery at the hospital such as quality of healthcare and 
availability and safety of pharmaceuticals, but not directly involved in the day-to-day 
managerial affairs. Most of the managerial functions were performed by medical affairs 
with technical support on data collection and analysis from the Office for the Control of 
Hospital Infection and the Department of Pharmaceutical Affairs. Due to the small size 
of the hospital, medical affairs assumed a range of responsibilities that were normally 
associated with other departments in bigger hospitals, including intensive care 
management (which is usually done by the intensive care unit) and social health 
insurance management (which is usually done by the department of insurance 
reimbursement). Ultimately, medical affairs was accountable to the director of the 
hospital for fulfilling all these functions through various reporting lines.   
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Figure 9-1 Organisational structure of the secondary hospital in Shanghai studied 
 
The reporting line between medical affairs and the director in the case of 
antibiotic stewardship was through the antibiotic stewardship group, which was part of 
the more general drug and therapeutic committee (DTC) headed by the director. 
Groups under the DTC were led by medical affairs on different clinical areas, with 
pharmaceutical affairs being another crucial member. The make-up of the groups 
depended on the clinical setting of interest; for antibiotic stewardship, this included the 
office for hospital infection control and senior prescribers, usually manager-prescribers, 
with expertise in infectious diseases and antibiotic use. The director had the authority 
to make the most crucial decisions in antibiotic stewardship with the support from the 
work of the group, such as the selection of antibiotics to be procured by the hospital, 
but medical affairs oversaw most of the managerial-level decision making that 
concerned how specific activities should proceed and be delivered.  
For the clinical departments where antibiotic prescribing took place, about 80 
prescribers were divided into over 15 specialisations such as respiratory medicine, 
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gastroenterology, nephrology, surgery, orthopaedics, obstetrics, gynaecology, and 
paediatrics. Due to limitations in the size of the hospital and the number of prescribers 
available, these sizes of these clinical departments were small relative to those in large 
hospitals; on average each department contained about 5 prescribers. Administratively, 
each specialisation was led by a head of department, who functioned as a manager-
prescriber who oversaw antibiotic stewardship at the departmental level as a manager 
and at the same time, carried out clinical duties as a senior prescriber. Leading their 
team of prescribers, the manager-prescribers of various clinical departments were 
directly accountable to medical affairs and were responsible for implementing the 
mandated activities through their own actions and through ensuring actions from their 
subordinate prescribers.  
Prescribers at the “bottom” were directly accountable only to the line managers 
of their respective clinical specialisations, meaning that their performance was 
ultimately assessed only by their line managers. However, they also took instructions 
from ward leaders and senior prescribers in various clinical settings. One prominent 
example was the A&E section of the hospital. Again, due to limitations in resources, the 
hospital did not have a large and independent A&E section; the section comprised a 
manager-prescriber and rotating prescribers on duty drawn from various clinical 
departments. Even though the direct reporting managers for the prescribers remained 
the heads of their clinical specialisations, they were also under the supervision of the 
supervisor of the A&E section while they were on duty there. Similarly, they were 
supervised by ward supervisors when they worked in inpatient wards.  
Although the specialisations were clearly defined, the clinical pathways for 
patients with minor complaints such as coughs and colds were less formalised in the 
past than in 2017. Prior to 2015, these patients had been given an appointment to see 
one of the prescribers from a generic “general internal medicine” grouping including 
respiratory medicine, gastroenterology, cardiology, neurology, endocrinology and 
nephrology. In the words of the non-clinical managers, prescribers in these 
specialisations had fulfilled a role similar to general practitioners at the primary care 
level. After better formalised clinical pathways were introduced in 2015, patients were 
diverted to specialisations more specific to their complaints.  
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9.4 Top-down features of implementation at the hospital 
Similar to the tertiary hospital in Beijing, centralisation of administrative authority 
to the medical affairs and closer financial alignment between the hospital and the 
district government described in the foregoing sections significantly enabled top-down 
policy implementation as proposed by The Campaign at the hospital studied. First 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), these top-down elements included a 
clear line of accountability, a target approach supported by numeric targets, ranking 
system and intelligence system, punitive measures and redundancy were all present in 
the hospital. These elements are to be discussed in turn in this section.  
 
Clear line of accountability 
To buttress the existing line of accountability that ran through the district 
government, the hospital, the manager-prescribers and the prescribers, specific 
responsibilities of the actors above departmental level were formalised during The 
Campaign in the context of antibiotic stewardship. Medical affairs acted as the focal 
point of liaison in this continuous line of accountability through its role in the antibiotic 
stewardship group, which was set up per the requirements of The Campaign. In 
addition, an explicit signed document detailed the expected tasks and performance 
was signed between medical affairs and each manager-prescriber, which clearly 
defined managerial responsibilities in antibiotic stewardship. As mentioned before, 
medical affairs took on a central role in representing the hospital, taking orders from 
and reporting to the district government on the one hand and giving order to 
prescribers in the hospital on the other. Centralised internal coordination within the 
hospital would prove crucial, as lines of accountability ran vertically, and departments 
refrained from directly interacting with each other under this model. The implication of 
this will be returned to later in the analysis of the demands for antibiotic use in different 
settings and specialisations, an organisational level factor that influences policy 
implementation.  
 
Target approach 
The accountability structure was driven by a target approach, where restrictive 
numeric targets, or permitted thresholds, were set for many prescribing indicators as 
demanded by The Campaign, such as prescribing rates for various clinical settings, 
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density of inpatient antibiotic consumption, timing and duration of prophylactic antibiotic 
use in surgeries and rate of prophylactic antibiotic use in clean surgeries. The hospital 
was given a set of overall targets by the district government, and managers from 
Medical Affairs then broke down these targets for each clinical department. Data on 
prescribing were analysed by a team of clinical pharmacists, who also conducted 
prescribing review to investigate the medical rationale for the prescriptions themselves.  
The ranking system worked in accordance with the line of accountability. At the 
district level, performance of all hospitals within the district was ranked in annual 
meetings. At the hospital level, the results of the analysis were first discussed and 
ranked in monthly managerial meetings attended by non-clinical managers and senior 
manager-prescribers only, and the manager-prescribers then communicated the results 
to the prescribers in their departments afterwards. At the managerial meetings, every 
manager-prescriber could see how they were doing compared with others. Warnings 
for under-performing departments were issued by medical affairs, and subsequently 
the responsible manager-prescribers took actions to warn prescribers within the 
departments too.  
To enable the collection of a vast amount of data and support coverage of more 
prescriptions in prescription reviews, the hospital switched from a dated data collection 
system that relied on manual collection of information to a computerised data system at 
the beginning of The Campaign and kept on improving it as it progressed. This data 
collection system was connected to that of the district government, and according to 
some of the managers, the same data system had been adopted by other hospitals in 
the district too. Level of access to the system within the hospital was commensurate 
with the levels of authorities of the policy actors. Whilst managers could access the full 
database, prescribers could only access their own data records.  
 
Punitive measures 
Punitive measures in relation to antibiotic stewardship were introduced during 
The Campaign in hand with the target approach along the line of accountability. Levels 
of antibiotic prescribing that exceeded the restrictive targets placed on the prescribing 
indicators specified by The Campaign (e.g. prescribing rates, consumption measured in 
DDD/100 bed-days) would result in the deduction of financial reimbursement in the 
performance assessment of the directors and non-clinical managers of the hospital by 
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the district government, and of manager-prescribers and junior prescribers by the 
hospital. Although manager-prescribers were line managers of their subordinate 
prescribers, they did not assess the prescribers directly; in fact, they had to take on 
responsibilities for their departments’ performance as the hospital assessed their 
performance as manager-prescribers as well. As the assessments were points-based 
and negatively marked, failure to achieve prescribing targets would result in a 
deduction of points: for the hospital, a deduction in financing by the district government; 
for all the prescribers, a deduction in a performance-based bonus. However, it was 
difficult to gauge the extent of knowledge on the punitive measures possessed by the 
interviewees: non-clinical managers did not disclose how exactly points deduction 
correlated with a deduction on financial reimbursement, and manager-prescribers and 
prescribers claimed they did not have the details either. It was likely that manager-
prescribers and prescribers were at least vaguely aware of how the system worked, as 
they suggested that the punitive measures were purely monetary in nature, and that 
they had never heard of any extreme punishments in other hospitals in these districts 
such as sacking of directors or prescribers as a result of failure to hit the administrative 
targets. But it would also make sense for these actors to be apprehensive about the 
system even if they did not fully know how the system functioned: having conspicuous 
punitive measures without giving away specifically how they translated into financial 
penalties would all but have made the system difficult to game. Consequently, 
manager-prescriber and prescribers reported that they were very cognizant of the 
possibility of getting fined for not hitting prescribing targets. 
 
Redundancy 
Redundancy in the form of overlapping monitoring and reporting mechanisms 
and multiple assessments on prescribing helped amplify the regulatory effect of The 
Campaign. Firstly, there were specific monitoring and reporting activities for The 
Campaign. Some manager-prescribers recalled that specific forms were used to report 
prescribing targets to the district government at the very end of the year, and that 
district officials elected to visit some of the hospitals to examine implementation 
activities. Non-clinical managers with the information explained that the hospital studied 
was too small to be selected for inspection, which was why it did not take place there. 
Secondly, there were routine monitoring and reporting activities on antibiotic 
prescribing outside The Campaign. The hospital reported to the district government 
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twice a year on the delivery and quality of healthcare, of which antibiotic prescribing 
was a part. In addition, since the data collection network across hospitals in the district 
went live at the beginning of The Campaign, the district had been able to access and 
review prescribing data in real time throughout the year, and issue cautionary 
messages to the hospital when necessary. Thirdly, prescribing in general was an 
important item in assessments outside the specialist Campaign. As described earlier, 
prescribing was an important aspect of delivery and quality of healthcare. It was also 
part of the assessment for the hospital’s rating, which took place less regularly. 
Additionally, it was also reviewed by social health insurance payers to ensure that 
prescriptions conformed to insurance policies and regulations. These assessments had 
financial implications. In addition to the deduction in financial reimbursement by the 
district government described earlier, social health insurance payers could fine the 
hospital for breaching insurance regulations if their prescribing was judged to be 
inappropriate. The centralisation of administrative duties to medical affairs was 
recognised by manager-prescribers to be crucial in coordinating policies and 
minimising potential confusion and duplication, as was the introduction of computerised 
data collection systems in significantly enhancing the efficiency of information retrieval.  
 
9.5 Perception of top-down implementation 
In order to understand how top-down policy demands from the government 
were translated into actions, it is crucial first to explore perception of policy 
implementation from the perspectives of all the actors, especially the frontline 
implementers including the manager-prescribers and prescribers. This section will 
describe the perception of The Campaign by all managers and prescribers at the 
hospital, including its contents, priorities, limitations, temporality and reported impact on 
behaviour change.   
 Overall, The Campaign seemed to be well-communicated across all levels of 
actors along the line of accountability at the mediation by medical affairs. All managers 
and prescribers reported that municipal and district governments organised policy 
briefing meetings for managers from various hospitals especially from medical affairs, 
who could “download all the materials online and organise training sessions for all the 
prescribers at the hospital afterwards" (Non-clinical Manager M9) and then “talk 
through the materials with prescribers and explain what to be done” (Prescriber P1).  
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 Although all the actors were able to recall the introduction of activities related to 
antibiotic stewardship during the period of The Campaign a few years ago, not all of 
them responded with strong familiarity to the concept of The Campaign. Consistent 
with their exposure to the policy and management aspects of healthcare, all managers 
regarded The Campaign as a managerial exercise which introduced stricter and more 
specific requirements in the prescribing of antibiotics. They very specifically associated 
The Campaign with targets on antibiotic prescribing. On the contrary, prescribers were 
much more cognizant of the required changes in clinical practice than the managerial 
details that were introduced in training. They were less acquainted with The Campaign 
as a policy concept, but they were very conscious about the new restrictions they faced 
in prescribing antibiotics:  
“From the perspective of management, The Campaign was about targets on 
antibiotic prescribing: the rates of prescribing, those rates in different clinical 
settings, and so on. And then we told prescribers about how exactly prescribing 
practices needed to change.” (Non-clinical Manager M5) 
“You keep mentioning ‘The Campaign’, but I don’t actually have a great idea 
about this concept. I’m a prescriber, I don’t study policies. There were meetings 
about the policies, but as an implementer I only learned about those through 
doing my job. Over time, I realised antibiotic prescribing was made less 
convenient by the new rules, and some antibiotics even became locked in the 
system—I couldn’t prescribe them anymore.” (Prescriber P5) 
Regardless of how they perceived, and how they came to perceive The 
Campaign, all the actors understood that they had to change prescribing practices in 
respect of antibiotics. Whilst some managers and prescribers appreciated the rationale 
of The Campaign in “doing good to the patients by giving them fewer drugs” (Manager-
prescriber M1) and “preventing the emergence of antimicrobial resistance” (Prescriber 
P5) more than others, they all accepted that The Campaign was “an administrative 
order” (Non-clinical Manager M9), and its implementation was “an involuntary mission: 
the hospital had to go through the motions, and prescribers had no choice but to move 
along” (Prescriber P2). 
 Summarising the accounts from all the actors, it was clear that not all the 
policies delineated by The Campaign were equally well implemented. Some policies 
were prioritised and implemented right from the start; others went through a more 
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staggered and phased process; still others were even less progressed in 
implementation due to limitations in resources. 
Understandably, top-down elements were prioritised, and their implementation 
penetrated thoroughly across all levels of actors. To constrain the accessibility of 
advanced antibiotics that could significantly influence prescribing targets, the hospital 
quickly moved to introduce formulary restriction in accordance with the line of 
accountability, stripping the rights of junior prescribers to prescribe more advanced 
antibiotics without consultation with their line managers or someone of their 
professional grade. Minor revisions to the hospital’s antibiotic formulary were made to 
comply with the government’s requirement that no more than 35 types of antibiotics 
could be made available. By contrast, patient education, which was a bottom-up 
approach to improving prescribing, was introduced in a more spontaneous way as 
implementation of top-down elements progressed, as manager-prescribers and 
prescribers stepped up their efforts to explain to and persuade patients during clinical 
consultation. Other efforts to educate patients were passive, including distribution of 
leaflets and displaying of posters. 
Policies related to the building of capacity and multidisciplinary collaboration 
across prescribers, pharmacists and microbiologists were gradually rolled out by the 
non-clinical managers throughout The Campaign as complementary measures, but 
progress was uneven. The hospital organised training sessions on clinical practice and 
antibiotic stewardship by experts from tertiary hospitals during The Campaign, and at 
the time of the study introduced new examinations and qualification requirements on 
rational antibiotic use. Clinical pharmacists were given an increasingly key role in 
analysing and reviewing prescriptions in support of the target approach, but their 
relevance in overall clinical practice was still peripheral. Microbiologists provided basic 
support in diagnosis, but the range and quality of tests remained limited. Managers 
admitted that as a secondary hospital, their limited financial and human resources 
contributed to “weaknesses in clinical pharmacology and microbiology” (Non-clinical 
Manager M5); most of the attention had been directed at prescribers, who were “key to 
antibiotic prescribing in clinical practice” (Manager-prescriber M1). This limitation of 
resources resulted in the lack of implementation of tasks related to building surveillance 
of antimicrobial resistance in view of the regional surveillance network, as the hospital 
was “not qualified for it” due to its “small size and lack of advanced equipment 
compared with tertiary hospitals” (Non-clinical Manager M5).  
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 Reflecting on the overall implementation process and especially the 
prioritisation of the top-down elements, all actors concurred with the perception that 
implementation was noticeably patchy prior to The Campaign. They stressed that the 
most essential policies of The Campaign did not suddenly come into existence, and 
they were highly conscious of the strong policy continuity from before The Campaign. 
Manager-prescribers were aware that similar policies, indicators, targets and clinical 
guidelines were already in place in Shanghai nearly 15 years ago, but hospitals were 
not insisting on them at that time. Meanwhile, prescribers had been told not to use 
antibiotics for common cold, and not to prescribe antibiotics if there were alternatives 
from before The Campaign, and lack of substantial actions was down to the lack of 
financial punishment for not implementing them.  
From that, the actors felt that The Campaign was less of a “dramatic 
overhauling process that instantly turned black to white” (Prescriber P5) than of a 
“gradual process that took effect over the three years it encompassed, and beyond” 
(Manager-prescriber M1) in changing prescribing practices. Through a high degree of 
standardisation and fine-tuning of existing policies and enforcement of implementation, 
the process aimed to “normalise antibiotic stewardship” (Non-clinical Manager M9) 
beyond The Campaign. Rather than seeing The Campaign as a standalone and 
defined stretch of time, all managers and prescribers regarded it as a timepoint that 
divided the preceding and succeeding periods, in which the more far-reaching changes 
that could not be promptly implemented within the strict timeframe of The Campaign 
(such as building a comprehensive electronic prescription system with a full set of 
indicators built in that enabled thorough monitoring and reviewing of prescriptions) 
continued to evolve and be introduced in the ensuing years:  
“During The Campaign, clinical pharmacists didn’t review all our prescription 
records, but now they look at every single one with the help of the computerised 
system. Every single one!” (Manager-prescriber M6) 
 “The government is still monitoring our prescribing like it was. So is the 
hospital. Personally, I feel that we’re even more closely watched on prescribing 
than the past. It’s not like rules are relaxed again after The Campaign was over, 
it’s not like that at all.” (Prescriber P1) 
The implementation of the top-down policies experienced by all the actors at the 
hospital had led to changes in antibiotic prescribing behaviours. Firstly, prescribers 
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were more reluctant to prescribe antibiotics. Both manager-prescribers and prescribers 
saw themselves as “gatekeepers to antibiotics” (Manager-prescriber M1), who now 
“proactively try to find ways not to prescribe antibiotics” (Prescriber P4). The way that 
prescribers interacted with patients had also become more proactive and educational. 
They recognised that the most direct and effective way to educate patients about 
antibiotic use was through examples that came up during clinical consultations. 
Through explaining to patients “how common cold progresses from viral to bacterial 
infections, and why antibiotics aren’t useful in the first stage” (Prescriber P1) and why 
“antibiotics can have harmful bad effects” (Manager-prescriber M2), prescribers 
actively attempted to dissuade patients from demanding antibiotics, or at least delay 
prescribing. 
Secondly, prescribers became more judicious in ensuring that their prescribing 
practices strictly followed existing recommendations, instructions and national 
treatment guidelines:  
 “I prescribed antibiotics on an empiric basis in the past. For instance, there’s an 
antibiotic that I used to administer once per day, in its full dosage. But we were 
then told to follow the recommended dosage schedule closely by the hospital. 
To comply with the rules, I’m administering the antibiotics thrice per day in 
smaller dosages.” (Manager-prescriber M1)  
 “Regulations on prophylactic use of antibiotics became so much more 
stringent. One of the biggest changes is the duration of administration. We used 
to administer antibiotics for patients with partially contaminated wounds for a 
good few days after their surgeries, but now we have to stop at 48 hours after 
surgeries.” (Prescriber P4) 
One of the most prominent changes after The Campaign was that antibiotics 
can no longer be prescribed without sufficient indications. Whereas antibiotics were 
commonly prescribed to patients who had a fever in the past, prescribers must use 
blood test to examine indicators for bacterial infections such as levels of neutrophils 
and C-reactive protein, and observe other clinical presentations such as coughing and 
colour of sputum to distinguish between viral and bacterial infections before deciding 
whether antibiotics were needed post-Campaign. 
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9.6 Interaction between contextual factors and policy 
implementation in generating behaviour change from a bottom-up 
perspective 
 Even though the reported behavioural changes highlighted by the actors were 
consistent with the intentions and requirements of the implementation of well-
communicated top-down policies, questions surrounding how the policies were 
implemented in practice, and how such behavioural changes were brought about by 
the policies remained. Any viable mechanism of change would have to be compatible 
with the actors’ varied perspectives on The Campaign, the priorities and constraints for 
the implementation process and the temporal continuity of the policies. As outlined in 
Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), the bottom-up approach to understanding 
implementation recognises that policy implementation and the problems therein occur 
through the interaction between the central-led Campaign and settings of the local 
hospital (Berman, 1978); top-down implementation of The Campaign at the hospital 
studied was therefore subjected to the influence of system-, organisation- and 
individual level contextual factors pertinent to the local context, and the interactions 
between The Campaign and these contextual factors were crucial to shaping and 
creating the necessary change in prescribing behaviour for policy implementation. This 
interaction went both ways: as the local context deflected The Campaign from its 
intended direction and imposed constraints, The Campaign in turn directly addressed 
some of these contextual factors and created better conditions for top-down 
implementation.  
 This section will demonstrate how behavioural change was engendered by the 
interaction between the actors’ responses to the complexities and nuances pertinent to 
contextual factors and the top-down implementation activities associated with The 
Campaign. Drawing on the interviews, the influence of the contextual factors at system 
(perceivable differences in policy context), organisational (financial incentives to 
prescribe; relationship between manager-prescribers and prescribers; availability and 
selection of antibiotics; diagnostic technology; clinical needs in different specialisations) 
and individual levels (patients’ expectations and demands; prescribers’ knowledge and 
experience) on antibiotic prescribing will be described and discussed along with the 
relevant Campaign policies that most directly addressed or impacted on these factors. 
Each subsection will discuss one of the contextual factors described above and 
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examine the combinatorial impact of the contextual factor and implementation of the 
Campaign policies on behaviour change, unravelling the mechanisms of change.   
  
System level factor: perceivable differences in policy context in respect of 
regions and levels of healthcare 
 All actors noted two conspicuous types of difference in the policy context of The 
Campaign: across regions, and across various tiers of hospitals. Both types of 
differences were present during policy implementation, and implementation of The 
Campaign in fact consciously reinforced policy differences across hospital tiers. This 
led to disparate experience of healthcare service provision for patients and difficulties 
in congruently upholding stewardship policies for prescribers.  
In terms of geography, both the manager-prescribers and the prescribers 
consistently felt that antibiotic stewardship policies were much better implemented in 
Shanghai than in other provinces based on their personal experience and exchanges 
with colleagues in other regions; some even felt that there were district-level 
differences within Shanghai. For example, whereas antibiotics were readily available in 
retail pharmacies in other provinces, they could not be purchased without prescriptions 
in Shanghai, where strict regulations of antibiotic use “goes back a long way, even 
before The Campaign took place” (Prescriber P7). One of the reasons why Shanghai 
was subjected to “great scrutiny” in antibiotic stewardship was the city’s early adoption 
of electronic management platforms in hospitals, which enabled better surveillance of 
antibiotic use (Manager-prescriber M8).  
In terms of hospital tiers, managers and prescribers were sufficiently aware of 
the key differences in stewardship policies between secondary and tertiary hospitals. 
Non-clinical managers pointed out that in addition to being permitted to have a bigger 
antibiotic formulary (50 types of antibiotics for a tertiary hospital versus 35 for a 
secondary hospital), tertiary hospitals reserved some of the most restricted and 
advanced antibiotics, which were not accessible to secondary hospitals. Manager-
prescribers, and to some extent, a few prescribers, understood the intention behind the 
policy arrangement: whilst tertiary hospitals were “more likely to encounter highly 
resistant bacterial infections” and “more equipped to managing use advanced agents”, 
secondary hospitals such as the hospital studied “served mostly patients from the 
community” and managed “not much more than minor illnesses and chronic diseases” 
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(Non-clinical Manager M9). In this sense, manager-prescribers and prescribers felt that 
the 35 types of antibiotics were sufficient to address most, if not all, the cases they 
received. However, there were patient exchanges between secondary and tertiary 
hospitals through patients’ self-referrals in China’s ungated healthcare system, and 
through “increasing collaborations between tertiary and secondary hospitals set up by 
the district government to improve service quality in secondary hospitals” (Manager-
prescriber M4).  
Implementation of The Campaign had a mixed effect on the differences in policy 
context: it reduced regional differences on the one hand and increased differences 
across the tiers of hospitals on the other. Non-clinical managers felt that regional 
differences became lessened, as provinces outside Shanghai were brought up to 
speed in implementing regulatory measures during The Campaign, creating an 
“equalising effect” (Non-clinical Manager M3) on the progress of antibiotic stewardship 
across the country. Nevertheless, The Campaign exacerbated the policy differences 
across secondary and tertiary hospitals at the same time, which led to difficulties in 
managing patient expectations. On the one hand, having experienced variation of 
prescribing practices at tertiary hospitals as a result of the tier-specific policies on 
antibiotic formulary, patients could find the limited range of antibiotics available at the 
hospital studied “disappointing and frustrating” (Non-clinical Manager M9), leading to 
complaints. On the other hand, patients transferred from tertiary hospitals often failed 
to respond to antibiotic treatment at the hospital studied due to their previous exposure 
to more advanced antibiotic treatments prior to the transfer. 
  
Organisation level factor: financial incentives to prescribe 
As explained in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), financial 
incentives at the institutional (hospitals receiving financial benefits from pharmaceutical 
companies) and individual levels (prescribers receiving financial benefits from 
pharmaceutical companies) had been a major factor in driving prescribing in general in 
China. In the meantime, social insurance reforms also stimulated demand for 
healthcare, leading to increasing prescribing. Actions were therefore taken by the 
government and the hospital to rectify financial incentives to prescribe, aiding the 
implementation of The Campaign.  
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According to the non-clinical managers, pharmaceutical sales were one of the 
main sources of financing for the hospital studied during The Campaign, which was 
typical with secondary and tertiary hospitals in general. They also recognised the fact 
that the system existing at the time of The Campaign could encourage hospitals and 
prescribers to benefit financially from prescribing. Some of them described their 
previous observations about corrupt practices in hospitals in other provinces; but none 
of them recognised this to be a problem at the hospital studied. Although the overall 
reticence of the interviewees on this issue made it difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which the potential financial incentives influenced prescribing during The Campaign, it 
was clear that the continuous financial reforms that took place in the ensuing years of 
The Campaign were gradually removing the financial incentives to prescribe at the 
hospital level, creating an environment that enabled sustainable policy action on 
antibiotic stewardship after The Campaign. Introduction of zero-mark-up on all drugs 
and a global budget that would reduce the link between the hospital’s revenue from the 
funding allocation would eventually lead to increasing reliance on performance-based 
funding allocated by the district government.  
During The Campaign, when these financing reforms were not yet in place, 
three levels of top-down financial disincentives were employed strongly to discourage 
and reverse incentives to prescribe. On the first level, The Campaign as an integral 
part of the performance assessment by the government in the area of overall 
healthcare quality and expenditure included restrictions on the proportion of 
expenditure on antibiotics in total pharmaceutical expenditure, and how well The 
Campaign was implemented directly affected the size of funding from the government. 
Cost-control was such a potent criterion that restricted prescribing that prescribers felt 
their preferences for using cheaper generics where possible and avoiding using 
expensive branded antibiotics were effectively “shaped and guided by the regulations” 
(Manager-prescriber M8). On the second and third level, assessment of policy 
implementation by the district government was directly linked to the income of the 
hospital directors and of all prescribers (including manager-prescribers), respectively, 
so that “everyone’s pay was linked to The Campaign and its related assessments” 
(Prescriber P1).  
Furthermore, social health insurance imposed further restrictions on 
prescribing. Payment through social health insurance was substantial and it amounted 
to at least half of the total payments received by the hospital from the patients. Social 
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insurance payers imposed extra cost control parallel to that from the government. If a 
hospital was judged to be overspending on prescriptions, the hospital and its staff could 
face financial penalties in addition to not getting the commensurate reimbursement 
from the payer. Therefore, where antibiotics were necessary, prescribers favoured 
cheaper antibiotics and shorter treatment schedules where possible.  
Consequently, all the prescribers were very conscious of the disincentives 
produced by the measures described above and were cautious about when and what 
to prescribe no matter a patient’s insurance status. Prescribers with experience at 
tertiary hospitals felt that their hands were tied even more at the hospital studied, as 
tertiary hospitals were notably more relaxed with prescribing despite these restrictions, 
especially for uninsured patients. Some prescribers argued from their experience that 
this had to do with the fact that tertiary hospitals had more room for manoeuvre 
because of their large patient volume, greater case severity and much more diversified 
revenue sources; by contrast, small secondary hospitals like the hospital studied had a 
small patient base and could not afford financial penalties.  
 
Organisation level factor: relationship between manager-prescribers and 
prescribers 
Prescribers did not have the same level of clinical autonomy; which was 
commensurate to their position within the hierarchy of authority within the hospital, 
subordinate to non-clinical managers and manager-prescribers in the levels above. 
Further formalised by the line of command and accountability for antibiotic stewardship 
described earlier in the chapter, this hierarchy was reinforced by some of the top-down 
measures, most notably formulary restriction. Therefore, manager-prescribers had 
leading roles in steering behaviour change in junior prescribers.   
As line-managers of the clinical departments, manager-prescribers had a close 
working relationship with their subordinate prescribers. The responses from the 
prescribers were sometimes similar to those from their line managers; often it was the 
case that the manager-prescribers were more outspoken than the prescribers, more 
willing to critique and engage in in-depth discussion. Power dynamics were likely to be 
at play; junior prescribers were less secure in status and could fear the repercussions 
of what they discussed. In the context of this research, it was difficult to determine and 
establish whether the prescribers were in genuine agreement with their superiors.  
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Manager-prescribers were supervisors of prescribers from an administrative 
point of view, and mentors from a professional development point of view. Prescribers 
were directly accountable to their line managers, and at the same time they were 
subjected to supervision by other senior manager-prescribers in their rotation across 
various work settings. Manager-prescribers could access and monitor prescribing 
records of all levels of prescribers, which enabled them to track the performance of 
prescribers in their departments in real time. They also attended monthly managerial 
meetings organised by Medical Affairs, where any potential problems in prescribing 
were discussed. Prescribers could only access their own records and were passively 
monitored; they were not eligible to attend managerial meetings, and feedback was 
delivered to them by their managers. Besides manager-prescribers, there were other 
senior supervisors responsible for overseeing all the treatment decisions within certain 
wards or for specific patient cases. As prescribers rotated their roles across various 
settings, they were required to report to the supervisors in charge of those settings and 
follow their strategies for patient management. However, manager-prescribers were 
more than just supervisors: they were effectively their mentors, whose practices they 
closely shadowed and imitated. Both manager-prescribers and prescribers 
acknowledged this influence and felt senior prescribers passing on their experience to 
junior ones was an indispensable part of how “the trade was learned” (Manager-
prescriber M1, Prescriber P5). With antibiotic prescribing this was especially essential: 
as clinical indicators were often insufficient to fully support prescribing decisions, 
prescribers were often required to prescribe based on their experience.  
The Campaign further rigidified this hierarchical structure. Managerial 
supervision became more intensified after the introduction of prescribing targets, and 
the authority of the manager-prescribers was reinforced after the introduction of IT-
enabled formulary restriction, where authority to prescribe in the electronic system was 
linked to the seniority of the profession. Junior prescribers had even less scope for 
decision making, and they were increasingly reliant on the input and clearance from 
manager-prescribers in prescribing decisions. Power dynamics were still an important 
factor at play: whilst most prescribers did not discuss how they felt about the apparent 
hierarchical structure within the hospital, one prescriber noted that “unless one wanted 
to lose their job, acting against the superior and the hospital was out of the question” 
(Prescriber P2), and another confessed that “prescribers perhaps have their own takes 
on things, but will never discuss disagreements openly” (Prescriber P3).  
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Organisation level factor: diagnostic uncertainty 
 Due to limitations in existing diagnostic technology available at the hospital 
studied, prescribers very often relied more on their experience than clinical indications 
to prescribe antibiotics. As resource constraints limited the extent to which the hospitals 
could develop microbiological and diagnostic capabilities within the timeframe of The 
Campaign and beyond, lack of improvement in the reduction of diagnostic uncertainty 
proved to be a sticking point for prescribers in making prescribing decisions.  
Diagnostic criteria for bacterial infections in the outpatient setting were based 
around results from blood tests, with key indications being rising levels of white blood 
cells, neutrophils and C-reactive proteins. Whilst some of the prescribers described 
how the use of these tests could clearly distinguish bacterial infections from viral ones, 
others recognised that they were useful but not definitive indicators for bacterial 
infections, at the end of the day empiric treatments are a norm. In this sense, rather 
than provide clear guidance to indicate antibiotic use, the use of blood tests – which 
only became a strict pre-requisite for antibiotic prescribing at the hospital after The 
Campaign – was more of a justification for delaying prescribing, as they showed 
patients why they were not given antibiotics despite their discomfort and symptoms. 
Prescribers claimed that these were common standards used across all levels of 
hospitals in the country for outpatients. 
In the inpatient settings, microbiological specimens were sometime taken from 
inpatients for further culturing and investigation, which could provide prescribers with 
more information about the bacterial species concerned, and whether they were 
resistant to certain antibiotics. Prescribers complained – and manager-prescribers 
agreed – that this process took too long for meaningful results to be available in time to 
guide timely initial diagnosis and treatment: the process took 5 to 7 days after patients 
were admitted and specimens cultured. Therefore, prescribers again had to rely on 
empiric therapy, as there was “no way for prescribers to delay and then act on that 
information in the first instance, as the patient’s infection may quickly aggravate without 
medication” (Manager-prescriber M7), and “results from the culture only served to 
inform revisions to later treatments” (Prescriber P7). Again, prescribers felt the delay 
from doing bacterial cultures was common to “many if not all hospitals in the country” 
(Prescriber P6).  
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Although The Campaign expected both secondary and tertiary hospitals to 
improve the rate of microbiological culture-based diagnosis in inpatients and contribute 
to the expanding surveillance network of antibiotic resistance, non-clinical managers in 
the hospital were frank in acknowledging that they did not have the resources for some 
of those tasks as the hospital was small in size, and that the hospital was taking only 
“limited initial steps”, and “had a certain level of insufficiency” (non-clinical manager 
M5) in completing the tasks related to microbiology and surveillance in The Campaign.  
As The Campaign did not necessarily lead to a change in the limited diagnostic 
technology and resources available in the country, prescribing behaviours at the even 
more resource-limited secondary hospital studied did not become more informed by 
diagnostic tests compared to before The Campaign. In the outpatient setting, 
prescribers frequently encountered situations where they were sitting on the fence 
about antibiotic prescribing. In these scenarios, patients presented relatively notable 
symptoms but limited indications from blood tests. Based on these indications, 
prescribers were not allowed to prescribe antibiotics, but the diagnostic uncertainties 
and the need to ensure patient satisfaction made it difficult for prescribers to decide 
whether to prescribe. Many prescribers recalled outpatient cases where the strategy of 
delaying prescribing based on clinical indications often prolonged patients’ symptoms 
and ended in multiple visits by the patients and eventual antibiotic prescribing, at which 
point “patients could blame prescribers for not prescribing in the first instance” 
(Prescriber P5). Some prescribers suspected that blood indicators could be 
“suppressed by widespread self-medication, which could mask patients’ symptoms and 
complicating the diagnosis” (Manager-prescriber M1). In the inpatient setting, 
prescribers described choosing initial empiric therapy before microbiological evidence 
was made available as “an educated guess and an exercise of trial and error” 
(Manager-prescriber M7). Despite the test results potentially showing a variety of 
results, they had to go ahead and attempt to control the infection as quickly as possible 
or risk worsening the infection at the patient’s peril.  
 
Organisation level factor: demands for antibiotic use in different settings 
and specialisations 
Patient mix and the nature of clinical conditions determined the demands for 
antibiotic use and, consequently, the patterns of prescribing in different clinical 
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specialisations and settings, giving rise to highly heterogenous contexts of use and 
stewardship cases for antibiotics. Where antibiotic use was higher, the pressure to 
reduce and rationalise use was greater, and at the same time implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship – especially complying with prescribing targets – became more 
difficult. Despite providing some crude consideration for clinical settings by setting 
different targets for outpatient, inpatient and emergency settings, The Campaign as a 
policy by design largely presented itself as a one-size-fits-all solution, at least on paper. 
In contrast, how prescribing targets were operationalised across clinical settings and 
specialisations within a hospital proved to be anything but straightforward, and the 
resultant clinical and managerial complexities required the establishment of mutual 
understanding and coordination amongst managerial actors.  
All managers and prescribers agreed that much antibiotic use was concentrated 
in the department of respiratory medicine. A great proportion of patients in the area 
came to the hospital for respiratory-related complains, many of whom were aged 
residents with chronic obstructive pulmonary disorders and respiratory infections were 
a frequent and major concern; antibiotic use was thus indispensable. Similarly, 
paediatrics also had high level of antibiotic use, as paediatric patients had a narrow 
spectrum of disease mainly focused in respiratory problems. Significant antibiotic use 
also took place in departments that performed surgical procedures, including the 
departments of surgery, orthopaedics and obstetrics and gynaecology. The specific 
use case in these departments depended on the nature of the procedure and the level 
of contamination to the wounds concerned. Policy implementation benefited from the 
formalisation of clinical pathways that took place after The Campaign, which further 
stratified patients and patterns of antibiotic use. As described in Section 8.3, patients 
with minor health problems could visit any prescriber from a generic “general internal 
medicine” grouping that included prescribers from various specialisations before 2015, 
spanning the full duration of The Campaign. Common cold patients “could end up 
seeing an endocrinologist and could obtain antibiotics from any prescriber”. The more 
“leaky” clinical pathways, which enabled patients to see prescribers from a variety of 
clinical departments, in a way helped to dissipate pressure to prescribe from 
departments where antibiotic use was high (mainly respiratory medicine) to those 
where antibiotic use was low (such as cardiology and endocrinology). However, since 
clinical pathways became formalised in 2015, patients were “allocated to visit 
specialisations appropriate to their conditions by nurses at the reception”; as many 
patients had respiratory problems, this led to antibiotic use becoming “even more 
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concentrated in respiratory medicine” whilst “negligible in some other departments” 
(Non-clinical manager M3).  
In terms of clinical settings, all managers and prescribers claimed that most 
antibiotics were consumed in inpatient wards, where patients were significantly sicker 
and had more severe infections. For example, several manager-prescribers estimated 
that close to 90% of inpatients referred to the Department of Respiratory Medicine 
required some form of antibiotic treatment. Accordingly, the most advanced and the 
more expensive antibiotics were reserved for inpatient use only and were not available 
at outpatient clinics. The A&E section was somewhere in between inpatient and 
outpatient settings in terms of antibiotic use. Although initial antibiotic treatments might 
be required to address the urgency and severity of symptoms in the visiting patients, 
the makeshift A&E section was not responsible for further disease management, and 
patients who required further treatment would have to be admitted to inpatient wards.  
There were significant challenges to implementing stewardship policies in all 
these settings. For the outpatient setting and, to a lesser degree, the A&E section, 
patients “had a major and active role in shaping the consultation process that is not 
within a prescriber’s control”, making it very difficult for prescribers to achieve 
outpatient prescribing targets even though the limited choice of antibiotics was 
“straightforward and easy to manage” (Manager-prescriber M1). For the inpatient 
setting, prescribers, especially senior prescribers, were “in control of antibiotic use” and 
patients “were happy to follow orders due to the complexity of the situation” (Prescriber 
P4), and determining the appropriate types of antibiotics to use and dosage schedules 
were the main challenges.  
As described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), The Campaign recognised 
the necessary variability of antibiotic prescribing across clinical settings in drawing up 
targets for prescribing rates and consumption for different clinical settings, but only to a 
limited extent. Consistent with the content of the policy documents, non-clinical 
managers described that target prescribing rates for outpatient, A&E and inpatient 
settings during The Campaign were 20%, 40% and 60% respectively. They remarked 
that these targets, along with other targets in inpatient antibiotic consumption and 
surgical antibiotic use, formed “a strict redline” (Manager-prescriber M1) that the 
hospital as a whole must not cross. As described in Section 8.4, these targets – as the 
core parts of the top-down measures – were monitored by the district government and 
assessed at the end of each year; failure to stay below the target levels would result in 
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financial penalties for the hospital. However, The Campaign did not specify exactly how 
the targets were to be implemented. How the targets were broken down and allocated 
to various clinical departments – the tangible units of administrative accountability – 
was up to the senior non-clinical managers at the hospital. Manager-prescribers and 
prescribers were all aware of the fact that medical affairs was responsible for 
coordinating, determining and allocating department-specific target levels appropriate 
to their demands for antibiotic use, so that hospital as a whole could “even them out 
between the quotas” and “stay below the overall red line set out by the government” 
(Manager-prescriber M2). To exemplify this, whereas the target levels on outpatient 
prescribing rate were as high as 70% for heavy users of antibiotics like respiratory 
medicines and paediatrics, they were as low as 5% for infrequent users such as 
orthopaedics.  
These department-specific targets were said to be flexible and were subjected 
to change over time. In the first instance, medical affairs continuously evaluated and 
revised these targets based on each department’s patient volume, service provision, 
case mix and demands for antibiotic use. Most importantly, manager-prescribers had 
an active role to play in proactively negotiating for larger target levels in contingencies 
where they were likely to exceed the target levels: 
“If manager-prescribers are going to go over the targets they’ll tell medical 
affairs about it well in advance. Medical affairs then needs to investigate and 
discuss with the antibiotic stewardship group, including the director of the 
hospital, about whether possible revision of targets for that department in this 
instance can be justified, whether there’s room for downward adjustment in 
other departments, and whether the hospital as a whole can clear the targets at 
the end of the year.” (Non-clinical Manager M9) 
“Orthopaedics were well below their targets in the past, and their cases mostly 
had clean wounds and they were not too busy. But recently they started to work 
with a large hospital, which transferred a large volume of patients that had 
complex and dirty wounds to their department. Now that they don’t have as 
much time to disinfect the operating theatre between cases and are dealing with 
contaminated wounds, they have to use more antibiotics during surgery and, as 
a result, requires relaxation of their original targets.” (Prescriber P7) 
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 Therefore, to keep the overall target level constant, target revision for one 
department inevitably involved reallocations for other departments at the same time. In 
this sense, the centralised role of medical affairs in the chain of command above all 
other clinical departments made it an effective coordination and communication 
mechanism to avoid possible inter-departmental frictions. Even though manager-
prescribers would be well-aware of levels of antibiotic prescribing and consumption in 
other departments due to their attendance of month managerial meetings, they all 
communicated their positions and opinions to medical affairs rather than to each other:  
“It’s about balancing each department’s target and make sure everyone can do 
their jobs. Medical affairs knows where the extra room can be made, and where 
there’s no scope for the slightest changes.” (Non-clinical Manager M9) 
“Obviously every head of department has a tough job to do and feels there’s 
little we’re willing to give to help out other departments, and no one wants to 
make others’ jobs more difficult, knowing that our targets are already not easy 
to work with. But then sometimes the only way forward is to get a share from 
others, and others are not necessarily happy to give up their share. So the only 
way is to let medical affairs know; they rank above us and they can coordinate.” 
(Manager-prescriber M7) 
.  Although the pressure to negotiate for revision of targets might well have 
stemmed from the potential financial punishment for failure to achieve existing ones, it 
remained unclear whether the points-based system of performance assessment on 
antibiotic stewardship was deployed continuously by the hospital, so that any breach of 
the departmental targets could incur penalties, even if these breaches were internal to 
the hospital and came before the year-end assessment by the government. 
Interestingly, both the manager-prescribers and prescribers had differing accounts 
about their experience with financial punishments, with some claiming that the 
penalties were strictly enforced, whilst others unsure whether and how it took place. 
This could imply a certain level of discretion from the hospital (to manager-prescribers) 
and from the manager-prescribers (to prescribers). What they had strongly in common 
was their understanding of what would be deemed as “reasonable and acceptable 
prescribing practices” (Prescriber P5) from the perspective of a medical professional, 
and recognition of the importance to adhere to this understanding in prescribing and do 
what they thought to be “the right thing to do for the patients” (Prescriber P1) 
regardless of the target requirements:  
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“Prescribers in our department are all on the same page: we all know 
sometimes how difficult it is to decide whether or not to prescribe. As a head of 
department, I’m more than sympathetic to my colleagues. As long as they fully 
explain their medical rationale for why they had to prescribe when the 
indications are not necessarily clear, then I’ll go along with that, because I know 
I’d probably do the same in their shoes.” (Manager-prescriber M1) 
“If we go over the targets the hospital may well fine us. But what do we do — 
we’ve got to use antibiotics when the patients really need it. We want patients to 
get better.” (Manager-prescriber M8) 
“Our head of department never really fines us. Maybe there’ll be a word or two, 
but if our diagnosis and explanation make sense then they’ll say it’s fine; when 
it comes to flu season everyone is a bit over. After all we’re not here not to 
prescribe; we’re here to treat patients.” (Prescriber P1) 
…And what would be deemed as unacceptable:  
“We do try our best to stay below the targets. Our prescribing rates fluctuate 
around the targets, but we’re never too far. But if the target rate is say, 10%, 
and a department comes up with 50%, then no one would accept that, that 
would be highly irrational prescribing.” (Prescriber P5) 
 In summary, the clinical demand for antibiotics in a clinical department 
remained the biggest factor that influenced whether antibiotic prescribing could be kept 
below target levels but going over the target did not necessarily indicate irrational 
prescribing behaviour per se, as manager-prescribers and prescribers already shared a 
heightened awareness of the targets and consensus around rational antibiotic use. At a 
departmental level, effective policy implementation was made possible by the crucial 
coordination by the Medical Affairs, which ensured that implementation process duly 
reflected prescribers’ common understanding and allowed flexibility in antibiotic use out 
of clinical consideration.  
Individual level factor: prescribers’ knowledge and experience 
 Crucial as the system- and organisation-level factors were, the most immediate 
factors that influenced prescribing behaviours were individual level factors. For 
manager-prescribers and prescribers at the hospital, deficiencies in knowledge and 
established patterns in practice were in the way of behaviour change, hindering policy 
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implementation. Some of the policies in The Campaign attempted to improve 
knowledge and experience of prescribers, and as top-down policies initiated by the 
senior management of the hospital, they were implemented to good effect.  
Manager-prescribers and prescribers admitted that their patterns in prescribing 
behaviours were largely shaped by entrenched personal preferences that every 
prescriber developed over their career. Examples of its manifestations include a 
tendency to prescribe a certain type of drug more than others, or a preferred approach 
to managing a condition. As explained in a previous section, these preferences were 
reinforced by the reliance on empiric therapy in the absence of diagnostic certainties, 
and they were easily passed on to junior prescribers in their apprenticeship with senior 
manager-prescribers. Crucially, knowledge also played a key role in shaping 
prescribing behaviours; filling the knowledge gaps in antibiotic prescribing was seen to 
be essential in changing the personal preferences of prescribers by non-clinical 
managers.  
 To ensure implementation of the target-driven antibiotic stewardship policies, 
The Campaign also introduced measures to monitor and rectify prescribing behaviours 
and to create the necessary behaviour change. A comprehensive review of prescription 
records was conducted by pharmaceutical affairs, who were also tasked with 
monitoring inpatients along with prescribers and providing advice on case management 
since The Campaign. The less frequent, but far more detailed, patient history review, 
which permitted much closer scrutinization of prescribing behaviours, was conducted 
by Medical Affairs to “reveal every detail about antibiotic use especially during surgery” 
and “identify where improvements could be made over the prescribing process and 
inform prescribers what specifically they could do differently”, complementing 
prescribing reviews by “revealing specific behaviour change required” (Non-clinical 
manager M9). It created “huge pressure for prescribers to be more careful with 
prescribing” (Prescriber P6).   
 Plenty of training by health officials and experts from large tertiary hospitals was 
organised by medical affairs for prescribers. Whereas training tended to focus on 
theoretical and practical knowledge about antibiotic prescribing prior to The Campaign, 
more sessions were devoted to explaining behaviour change in relation to The 
Campaign and prescribing targets after its commencement. Examinations were 
introduced after The Campaign ended as a means to assess and maintain prescribers’ 
qualifications and authority to prescribe antibiotics. However, knowledge alone was 
Chapter 9. Policy Implementation at the Hospital Level, Part II 
216 
 
insufficient to drive behaviour change, as prescribers and especially patients were most 
concerned about treatment results. Therefore, illustrating the impact of the stewardship 
policies being proposed through data and evidence became crucial. In this case, 
evidence and prescribing behaviour formed a positive feedback loop that reinforced 
behaviour change: better adherence to guidelines was understood by manager-
prescribers and prescribers from all the specialisations as good practice, because the 
guidelines were “standardised and evidence-based and supported by national statistics 
and data” (Prescriber P7). In the meantime, the hospital’s own data during The 
Campaign reassured prescribers of their fear of lack of effectiveness in infection control 
and patient dissatisfaction:  
“We all know the theories, but it’s all about the data showing whether it works. 
At the beginning everyone was apprehensive about not using antibiotics, but we 
had to do it because the policies were to be obeyed. When the data showed 
that using fewer antibiotics didn’t impact on key outcome indicators such as 
duration of hospital stay, duration of symptoms, rate of infection or 
complications, prescribers became confident and nothing more needed to be 
said. Prescribers accept and embrace the concept of antibiotic stewardship 
willingly.” (Manager-prescriber M6) 
 “Patients only want to see effective treatment outcomes. They don’t actually 
care about what or how much antibiotics they’re given. If the treatment plans 
can ensure that pains and infections go away as we expect, then prescribers’ 
authority remain intact and patients are happy. Plus its great for their health 
because they’re exposed to fewer antibiotics.” (Prescriber P7) 
 
Individual level factor: patients’ expectations and demands 
 As patient-facing service providers, one of the biggest challenges for 
prescribers was juggling between policy requirements, work pressure and patients’ 
expectations and demands. As highlighted earlier in the discussion of the impact of 
differences in policy context on patients’ reception of differential treatment, patients’ 
expectations and demands were difficult to manage; however, this was not something 
that The Campaign sympathised with, and prescribers often had to find ways to cope 
with pressure from patients, which was reported to be sometimes extreme. Importantly 
though, the nationwide implementation of The Campaign helped diffuse the tension 
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between prescribers and patients by establishing formal rules for antibiotic stewardship 
that prescribers could defer to. On top of that, greater attention to patient education 
through mass media and clinical consultation helped to create new social norms.  
Prescribers observed that older patients, parents and migrant workers tended to 
be more adamant in insisting on antibiotic treatments and their opinions were often less 
malleable. Their expectation of antibiotics stemmed from their understanding about 
antibiotics being anti-inflammatories that were effective against common cold, and they 
came up with an expectation of getting antibiotics to improve their symptoms. The 
younger generation, however, were perceived to be better educated and had adequate 
exposure to science through internet and social media, and hence were much better 
versed in rational antibiotic use and antibiotic resistance.  
In the outpatient setting, where patients were an active part of the consultation 
process, tensions between prescribers and patients were said to frequently arise during 
The Campaign as a result of patients’ expectation for antibiotics not being met: 
“Parents and grandparents are highly protective of their kids, and if they don’t 
see instant improvement in their kids’ conditions and the prescriber still refuses 
to use antibiotics, they would gang up on the prescriber to demand it. It’s too 
much pressure on the prescriber.” (Non-clinical Manager M3) 
“Once there was a patient who came here and demanded antibiotics. We said 
we couldn’t prescribe them. He then said, I won’t leave without antibiotics. In 
the end the impasse lasted for hours; we kept telling him we couldn’t prescribe 
antibiotics, and he just sat there protesting.” (Manager-prescriber M8) 
To appease the patients, the prescribers were more willing to prescribe 
antibiotics than educating patients before The Campaign due to their very high work 
load and the limited time they had for each patient: 
“In the past, prescribers would try to be efficient and keep everyone happy by 
prescribing antibiotics; patients were happy to get what they wanted, and 
prescribers themselves were happy as they could then move on to the next 
1000 things. A prescriber sees about 60 patients a day in outpatient clinics and 
up to 120 patients a day if they’re on A&E rotation. There’s little time to 
communicate with patients more.” (Manager-prescriber M1) 
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 This tension also led to defensive prescribing in surgical departments, where it 
was the most intense. This was due to patients associating perceived lack of antibiotic 
use with a prescriber’s negligence in cases of post-operative infections:  
“Before The Campaign I’d say overuse of antibiotics in surgeries was normal. 
Surgeons especially were really worried about post-operative infections and the 
potential attacks from patients because of that: we’ve already seen critical 
incidents where knife-wielding, gasoline-soaked patients threatened and nearly 
managed to cause prescribers substantial bodily harm.” (Manager-prescriber 
M7)  
In this sense, manager-prescribers and prescribers felt that The Campaign 
helped dissipate the tension by introducing education at the societal level and initiating 
widespread implementation of antibiotic stewardship that formalised and equalised 
prescribing practices. Mass media education about antibiotic use and antibiotic 
resistance became prevalent, which significantly helped buttressing the hospital’s own 
messaging through patient seminars and health posters and shifted the public’s 
perception of antibiotic use at a fundamental level. Extensive implementation reduced 
overall differences in policy context, so that when “patients found out they weren’t 
getting antibiotics easily from anywhere and were asked by every prescriber to take a 
blood test instead, they realised this was the new norm and gradually came to accept 
it” (Manager-prescriber M10). This led to prescribers being more proactive and 
successful at educating patients during clinical consultation, as patients were more 
willing to listen to prescribers during The Campaign. However, patient demand 
occasionally was “too ingrained” and prescribers felt they had little choice but to satisfy 
their requests. More importantly, stronger emphasis from the government and the 
hospital on guideline adherence, exemplified by multiple instances where the hospital 
“supported prescribers’ decisions of not to prescribe antibiotics and argued for 
prescribers when patients sought explanation from senior management” (Manager-
prescriber M7) encouraged prescribers to see stewardship practices and rational 
prescribing as a new form of defensive medicine:  
“True, these policies and rules are very constraining for the prescriber, but then 
it’s also about managing risk. We prescribers need to protect ourselves. if a 
patient is saying no to something I propose, I’d ask them to sign their refusal.” 
(Manager-prescriber M6) 
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“If extensive post-operative infections occurred under these new guidelines, 
then we would simply report them and not worry about them like before. We’re 
now doing everything by the book and all the records are here. If patients were 
to sue us, we have sufficient evidence to show we’re simply doing our job as 
told by the rules and committed no wrongdoings.” (Prescriber P7) 
“All the tests that we run, all the detailed electronic records that we spend a lot 
of time to write is worthwhile: all of these are our best protection against 
potential litigation.” (Prescriber P5) 
 The desire to obtain antibiotics on the part of the patient and the prescriber-
patient tension reported by prescribers above did not come through in the patient 
interviews, which were conducted in the outpatient waiting areas after patients were 
approached and recruited on the day of fieldwork. Overall, the 11 patients interviewed 
were not particularly engaged with the interviewer. Within this patient sample, there 
seemed to be a stark disconnect between the common cold tracer and a patient’s 
reported use of antibiotics. None of the patients felt that it was necessary to go to a 
hospital because of common cold unless they were subjected to persistent and notably 
severe symptoms, and none of them reported antibiotic use for mild common cold, with 
over-the-counter symptomatic medications being their first choice.  
This reluctance to visit hospitals for minor diseases was in part due to patients 
being put off by what they perceived to be “protracted diagnostic procedures” before 
getting treatments if they did choose to go to a hospital, which they deemed to be 
“unnecessary”, “bothersome” and “costing extra money”. Some patients observed 
increasing use of more diagnostic tests in hospitals in Shanghai. Whereas in the past 
prescribers would “prescribe even if we were not that ill”, now they instead “order 
patients to do blood tests for minor things like common cold and won’t prescribe 
without test results”. The contrast in practice between Shanghai and other provinces 
were stark according to patients from outside Shanghai, where the consultation 
process for common cold was “straightforward, where prescribers look at the 
symptoms and proceed to prescribing”. Aside from the need to obtain molecular 
evidence from blood tests, some patients felt that prescribers increasingly “do things by 
the book and get a trail of evidence to protect themselves” as they were “afraid of 
getting sued by patients”. This increase in use of diagnostic blood tests accompanied a 
decrease in antibiotic prescribing, according to 5 of the patients. In their experience, 
prescribers in Shanghai were “much less ready to prescribe antibiotics than before”. 
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Most patients did not expand on the reason why that was so, with only one patient 
suggesting that prescribers’ hands were “tied by the social insurance regulators, so that 
they in turn restrict provision of pharmaceuticals to patients”.  
Patients had limited understanding about antibiotics, but at the same time they 
were clearly aware of the negative impact of antibiotic use. When pressed about 
antibiotic use, all patients responded that there was no need to take antibiotics unless 
one had “serious and unbearable discomfort”, which did not include “self-limiting 
diseases like common cold”, or at least when its symptoms were mild. However, their 
understanding about antibiotics notably varied, and some was highly questionable. 
Although all patients claimed to know of antibiotics as a class of pharmaceuticals, 5 out 
of 11 patients said they did not know anything antibiotics apart from the name. Of the 
remaining 6 patients who claimed to know something about antibiotics, their 
descriptions of how antibiotics worked were considerably inaccurate regardless of their 
background: all of them mentioned antibiotics were used to suppressed inflammation of 
some kind (including a medical school student), and only 3 of them talked about their 
actions on pathogenic bacteria.   
Interestingly at the same time, this inadequate level of understanding was 
juxtaposed with heightened awareness of risk associated with antibiotic use. Most of 
the patients – 8 of them – were conscious about the “harmful side effects” of antibiotics, 
positing that overuse of antibiotics when “one is not too ill” would “destroy balance in 
the immunity”, “kill good and bad bacteria altogether”, “lead to resisting bodies”, and 
“eliminate effectiveness of antibiotics so that they don’t work in severe diseases”, which 
they reported to have read and learned about through mass media including TV, 
internet and newspaper, targeted health promotion posters in the community or word of 
mouth from prescribers, relatives and friends. Even though the full scientific insight was 
clearly not effectively conveyed, the central message of “antibiotics are bad” as well as 
some of the terms and discourse around the issue of rational antibiotic use did seem to 
have reached the public through educational measures in The Campaign.  
However, it was difficult to gauge the extent to which patient demands played a 
role in the prescribing process. Only 1 patient explicitly acknowledged that they would 
actively request antibiotics from the prescriber when they did visit the hospital for 
severe common cold, with the rest saying that they would listen to whatever the 
prescriber said and take whatever they prescribed; however, that may not be the case, 
as patients could mask their opinions about interaction with prescribers. There was a 
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risk of social desirability bias in the patients’ responses; although this bias could apply 
to other areas of the enquiry involving reported behaviours of antibiotic use, patients 
were likely to be much more conscious about their social image as portrayed by 
interpersonal interaction than their choice of commonly available pharmaceuticals.  
The potentially significant role of patient demand and expectations was 
underlined by two things. Firstly, all patients claimed that they would only opt to visit 
hospitals when they felt sufficiently ill, at which point their demands for pharmaceutical 
treatments were more likely to be strong than weak. Secondly, even though patients 
readily talked about the harms of antibiotics, 3 of them expressed special concern for 
children, who they considered to be physically weaker and less resilient, and thus more 
likely requiring timely treatments by antibiotics than adults. 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
In capturing the perspectives of all levels of actors – non-clinical managers, 
manager-prescribers, prescriber and patients – within a single hospital typical to an 
urban healthcare setting in China, the case study presented in this chapter thoroughly 
analysed the implementation of The Campaign through a bottom-up approach that 
focused on the perceptions and experience of frontline implementers. As “street-level 
bureaucrats”,  manager-prescribers and prescribers had to cope with the demands of 
the top-down policies of the Campaign, and reconcile requirements of The Campaign 
to reduce antibiotic prescribing with the demand that arose from their clinical work 
(Winter, 2006: 153). As the activities of the street-level bureaucrats would effectively 
become the policies that they were charged to implement (Hill and Hupe, 2002: 52), 
how the prescribers reacted to and addressed with gaps between policy expectation 
and constraints imposed by contextual factors became crucial to effective policy 
implementation.  
The case study demonstrated that contextual factors at system, hospital and 
individual levels heavily influence policy implementation at the secondary hospital 
studied. Some contextual factors – such as the existing and incoming policies to rectify 
financial incentives to prescribe, and the mentor-mentee relationship between senior 
and junior prescribers – were helpful in generating necessitating changes in prescribing 
behaviours for policy implementation. Other contextual factors – exemplified by 
perceivable differences in policy context in respect of regions and levels of healthcare, 
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and diagnostic uncertainty that complicated prescribing decisions – could impede 
effective policy implementation.  
The case study also analysed how The Campaign itself interacted with those 
contextual factors to generate changes in prescribing behaviours. Overall, 
implementation The Campaign had a positive effect on aligning contextual factors to 
better enable rational prescribing behaviours. The Campaign helped to reinforced 
contextual factors that were beneficial for policy implementation: punitive measures 
and financial penalties further deterred incentives to prescribe; target management 
further strengthened the authority of senior prescribers in regulating the prescribing 
practices of junior prescribers. To some extent, it also helped to reconfigure contextual 
factors that were not originally favourable for driving rational prescribing: nationwide 
implementation promoted better antibiotic stewardship across geographic regions and 
reduced differences in policy context; effective monitoring of prescribing and resistance 
patterns contributed to an evidence-based approach to training and capacity building, 
which improved prescribers’ knowledge and understanding of rational prescribing.  
Notably, The Campaign did not fundamentally change other contextual factors. 
In some cases, contextual factors were sufficiently entrenched to be immune from the 
effect of The Campaign. The Campaign did not introduce resources or technology to 
improve diagnostic uncertainty, creating challenges for prescribers to adhere to rational 
prescribing guidelines as they had to rely on their judgement and experience instead. 
Despite contributing to shifting public opinions about antibiotics, The Campaign was 
unable to tackle the deeper social and cultural causes for patients’ expectation and 
demand for antibiotics.  
In other cases, the interactions between The Campaign and contextual factors 
were complex, making it difficult to determine whether The Campaign was an 
appropriate approach to encouraging rational prescribing. One prominent case in point 
was the need to balance top-down policy requirements of The Campaign with the 
specialised and dynamic needs for antibiotics in various clinical departments. Without 
clear instructions to adapt the target approach for different clinical settings and the 
evidence required to support them, The Campaign could risk negatively affecting 
established clinical practices.  
In this light, it can be argued that the role of the internal negotiation process for 
redistributing quota for antibiotic prescribing across departments was crucial in helping 
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to bridge the gap between central policy requirements and local clinical needs. On the 
one hand, this internal flexibility was managed and coordinated by Medical Affairs from 
the top within the hospital, which ensured an orderly communication process across all 
clinical departments. On the other hand, it provided crucial grounds for manager-
prescribers to feed frontline concerns into the implementation process from the bottom, 
which further enabled all prescribers to build a common understanding about The 
Campaign at an operational level that closely related to their daily work and needs. 
Having examined the implementation of The Campaign at central and hospital 
levels in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, the next chapter will bring together findings from those 
chapters and draw conclusions. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis has studied the subject of policy implementation through a case 
study of the implementation of The Campaign, a set of antibiotic stewardship policies 
enforced in China between 2011 and 2013. In this chapter, the findings and 
conclusions of the empirical research, which were presented in Chapters 7 (Policy 
Implementation at the Central Level), 8 and 9 (Policy Implementation at the Hospital 
Level Parts 1 and 2), are summarised in relation to the research aim and objectives set 
out at the very beginning. The strengths and limitations of the research methodology 
employed as described in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Methods) are scrutinised. The 
research findings are then discussed in relation to their contribution to, and relationship 
with the existing knowledge, which was described in chapters 1 (Introduction), 2 
(Theoretical Background), 3 (Literature Review), 4 (Healthcare System Background) 
and 5 (National Policy Context). Finally, implications for policy and future research are 
discussed.  
 
10.2 Summary of findings in relation to research aim and objectives 
The subject of this thesis was policy implementation. Specifically, the overall 
aim of this research was to explore and analyse the implementation of The Campaign 
in China from 2011 and 2013 at the central and the hospital levels. In order to achieve 
this aim, this thesis set out three objectives and commensurate questions to be 
addressed under each of them: 
Objective 1: to understand the national policy context of antibiotic stewardship policies 
in China 
a. What reasons led to actions on antibiotic use in hospitals?  
b. What were the antibiotic stewardship policies to date? 
c. Who were the key actors at the central and the hospital levels? 
d. How did The Campaign relate to the overall policy context?  
Objective 2: to understand the context in which the implementation of The Campaign 
took place 
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a. What did the system level context comprise? 
b. What did the hospital level context comprise? 
c. What did the individual level context comprise? 
Objective 3: to explore and analyse the implementation process of The Campaign 
a. How was The Campaign implemented at the central level? 
b. How was The Campaign implemented at the hospital level? 
These objectives were addressed through reviews of literature on policy 
implementation (Chapter 2), the tentative impact of The Campaign and the background 
of China’s healthcare system (Chapter 4), review of literature and policy documents on 
the national policy context (Chapter 5), and empirical research on the implementation 
of The Campaign concerning and policy implementation at the central (Chapter 7) and 
the hospital levels (Chapters 8 and 9).  
This thesis has argued that the mandatory nature of The Campaign was 
conditioned by the national policy context, which saw its conception as a way to 
strengthen the implementation of previous iterations of antibiotic stewardship policies. 
Inevitably, context and process were deeply intertwined: contextual factors at the levels 
of healthcare system, hospital and individual strongly influenced the scope and 
capacity for policy actions at both the central and the hospital levels, so that the 
implementation strategies had to be adjusted accordingly either to accommodate or 
counteract the influence of these factors. Different elements contributed to the 
implementation process at the central and the hospital levels respectively. Whereas 
vital aspects of policy implementation at the central level were dictated by the central 
government through measures that helped exerting and reinforcing central control, 
many aspects of policy implementation at the hospital level were products of a mixture 
between the alignment with the central government and the coordination and 
leadership by the management of the hospital, instead of being faithful mirrors or 
simple extensions of the activities led by the central government.   
The first objective of the research was to understand the national policy context 
of antibiotic stewardship policies in China. Through a retrospective review of literature 
and policy documents, it was found that antibiotic stewardship had become a major 
aspect of health policy in China in the early 2000s due to concerns about the impact of 
irrational antibiotic use on rising antibiotic resistance inside and outside the country, 
which subsequently stimulated a series of policy responses under the policy areas of 
Chapter 10. Conclusion 
226 
 
healthcare quality and safety, and control of hospital-associated infections. Continuous 
policy actions had been set out to improve surveillance, technical capacity of medical 
professionals, rational antibiotic use, and legal institutions for antibiotic stewardship. At 
the central level, these actions were initiated and carried out by the central 
government, in conjunction with government-affiliated research and expert groups and 
academic and professional associations. At the hospital level in the national tertiary 
hospital, they were followed through by the managerial actors and interdisciplinary 
teams of prescribers, clinical pharmacists and microbiologists that they led. However, 
hindered by the gradual progress of policy development and a lack of mandatory 
enforcement, the implementation of the early policies was unsatisfactory. As a result, 
The Campaign was introduced to inject urgency and impetus into strengthening policy 
implementation. This set a top-down tone in the overall implementation of The 
Campaign.  
The second and third research objectives sought to understand the context and 
process of policy implementation, and they were addressed through two phases of 
fieldwork: Phase 1 fieldwork explored the perspectives of multiple actors at central and 
hospital levels on policy implementation; Phase 2 fieldwork employed the case study 
method to study the implementation of The Campaign at an ordinary secondary 
hospital in urban Shanghai, and examined how top-down and bottom-up 
implementation took place and how context and process of implementation were 
intertwined within a single hospital setting from the perspectives of all the actors 
concerned. Findings from both phases of fieldwork in relation to objectives 2 and 3 will 
be discussed below.  
 
Contextual factors influencing policy implementation 
At the system level, impacts of the existing healthcare reforms on rational 
antibiotic use, the patterns in healthcare service delivery in the tiered hospital system, 
and the capacity of different levels of healthcare providers to implement antibiotic 
stewardship policies were crucial factors that shaped the policy approach of The 
Campaign from the perspective of the central level, which, in response, took a 
justifiable focus on secondary and tertiary hospitals for several reasons. Firstly, at the 
primary care level, access to antibiotics became limited, and the financial incentives to 
prescribe antibiotics became nullified due to the implementation of the Essential 
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Medicines policy package, which stipulated that pharmaceuticals were to be sold at 
zero-mark-up, and commensurate government subsidy for primary care providers were 
to be introduced. Secondly, most of the healthcare services in China were provided by 
secondary and tertiary hospitals, in which pharmaceutical sales remained a main 
source of revenue. Thirdly, only higher-level hospitals were equipped with the human 
and technological resources that met the requirements for implementing antibiotic 
stewardship policies. However, enabled by the successful expansion of social health 
insurance coverage in China, exacerbated by the lack of alternative options to hospital-
based healthcare delivery and reinforced by patients’ strong preference for better 
prescribers and technology available in higher-level hospitals but not in primary care 
providers, secondary and especially tertiary hospitals became severely overcrowded, 
and their capacity became highly overstretched, which posed significant challenges to 
policy implementation at the hospital level. In order to counter the huge healthcare 
demand, the national tertiary hospital introduced several measures to divert patients 
with minor conditions or inquiries away from hospital-based care, including cancellation 
of provision of intravenous infusion services in the outpatient department, and 
introduction of prescription consultation services in parallel to clinical consultations.  
At the hospital level, the determining influence of both the external environment 
and internal structures, including financing arrangements, hospital settings and clinical 
specialties, over the scope and means of policy interventions meant that adaptation of 
policy in local implementation was necessary if not unavoidable. In the national tertiary 
hospital, corresponding measures were set out to address some of these hospital level 
factors. Some of the key policies of The Campaign were adjusted and relaxed 
according to the specific needs of different clinical specialties where stringent 
regulations might not be in the best interest of the patients, such as in emergency 
medicines. Furthermore, the characteristics of the national tertiary hospital proved to 
provide an enabling environment for policy implementation, as its income generation 
largely depended on high-tech services rather than prescribing, and its traditional ethos 
had a strong emphasis in upholding medical ethics and pursuing international 
excellence.  
At the individual level, the importance of prescribers’ and patients’ 
understanding of rational antibiotic use to effective policy implementation was 
overshadowed by the influence of deteriorating prescriber-patient relationships, in 
which prescribers often had to yield to patients’ demands. By offering solutions outside 
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conventional medicines, local alternative medicines exemplified by TCM could offer a 
useful buffer for patients’ demand for pharmaceuticals in cases where the conditions 
and symptoms were not severe. However, the practice of polypharmacy involving TCM 
could raise another concern about its appropriateness in terms of rational use of 
medicines in general. In the national tertiary hospital, continuous training for 
prescribers was helpful in improving antibiotic use. Particularly, the introduction of an 
information technology system in the management of antibiotic prescribing offered an 
interface to validate prescribers’ prescribing decisions and ensuring equal standards for 
all the patients, which was instrumental in reducing the tensions between prescribers 
and patients due to the discrepancies between prescribers’ prescribing decisions and 
patients’ demands.  
 
Policy implementation at the central and hospital levels  
At the central level, data from interviews with key informants representing the 
actors at the central level revealed strong characteristics of top-down implementation, 
most conspicuously marked by the dominance of the central government during the 
implementation of The Campaign. The perceived necessity of such a hands-on 
approach by the actors at the central level was a direct response to the lack of 
progress in the implementation of the preceding policies. In this process, a new legal 
mandate was created to further assert central dominance. Despite extensive 
engagement with, and reliance on other state and non-state actors such as 
government-affiliated research groups and professional associations in carrying out 
training, building networks and gathering resources required for policy implementation, 
the dominant role of the central government was indubitably unchallenged. Effective 
coordination and collaboration of multiple actors were achieved through the central 
government retaining its control over all the relevant actors concerned, as some 
branches of the government-affiliated research groups had dual functions within 
professional associations. The line of accountability between central level and hospital 
level actors in policy implementation was reinforced by the target approach and the use 
of multiple “redundant” independent regulatory mechanisms on antibiotic use. The 
target approach, which introduced numeric targets, ranking and intelligence systems to 
track key indicators and measure them against desired thresholds, was associated with 
a strong punitive aspect in the event of failure, effectively raising awareness of 
antibiotic stewardship at the same time. Multiple regulatory mechanisms, such as by 
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social insurance payers and hospital accreditation auditors, also regulated antibiotic 
use in their own right in parallel to The Campaign, further diversifying the forms of 
accountability reinforcement. At the same time, decentralisation in policy 
implementation was deemed both to be necessary and unavoidable in China due to the 
huge size of the country and the high levels of heterogeneity at local level. A level of 
autonomy was therefore appropriately delegated to the local actors, which raised 
questions about the level of control that the central actors could retain in the long term 
after The Campaign.  
At the hospital level, policy implementation was first studied at the national 
tertiary hospital, a leading hospital in China. Besides taking the initiative to address the 
contextual factors that influenced policy implementation, the managerial actors at the 
national tertiary hospital also focused on several organisational elements vital to 
effective policy implementation. Despite recognising the positive influence of The 
Campaign in helping legitimising and formalising antibiotic stewardship and creating an 
enabling implementation environment, the actors in the national tertiary hospital 
constantly stressed the vital importance of the continuity of antibiotic stewardship 
policies prior to The Campaign in leading to early prioritisation of rational antibiotic use, 
and the development of the necessary human resources for antibiotic stewardship – 
particularly clinical pharmacists – long before The Campaign commenced. Much time 
and resources were also dedicated to building trust and collaborative relationships 
between clinical pharmacists and prescribers. The strong leadership of the managerial 
actors in early policy implementation also showed that there was a level of top-down 
implementation at the hospital level, which preceded The Campaign and its associated 
target approach. This was reflected in the organisational structure, in which the 
Department of Medical Affairs was given a leading role over other departments in 
overseeing antibiotic stewardship policies, and the Drug and Therapeutic Committee 
was formed to coordinate experts and working groups of different clinical specialties 
and disciplines.  
With a focus on managerial perspectives of policy implementation at central and 
hospital levels, phase 1 fieldwork showed that if the essential premises of sustained 
policy development, a responsive healthcare system constantly adapting to contextual 
challenges, a competent and collaborative central government, and effective 
decentralisation supported by capable and resourceful local actors (such as the 
national tertiary hospital) were fulfilled to the extent described by the actors 
Chapter 10. Conclusion 
230 
 
interviewed, top-down measures that emphasised accountability using the target 
approach and harnessing multiple existing regulatory mechanisms could create the 
necessary impetus for effective implementation of The Campaign in China. However, 
as policy implementation took place within a complex and dynamic healthcare system, 
effective top-down implementation required a refined and realistic policy scope, and the 
necessitating change in prescribing behaviour had to effect through the fundamental 
drivers of antibiotic prescribing by frontline implementers. In other words, an 
understanding of the bottom-up process of policy implementation, especially how 
frontline implementer perceived and experienced the interactions between top-down 
measures, contextual factors and changes in prescribing behaviours would be 
essential to analysing top-down implementation.  
Therefore, in order to explore the bottom-up perspective further and analyse the 
interaction between top-down and bottom-up forces of policy implementation, phase 2 
fieldwork focused on an ordinary secondary hospital in Shanghai, where all the actors 
involved in policy implementation – from managers to prescribers and patients – were 
sampled and interviewed.  
At the hospital in Shanghai, exemplar features top-down features of 
implementation including clear line of accountability, target approach, punitive 
measures and redundancy – all consistent with those at central level implementation – 
were salient, and they were implemented by the department of medical affairs, which 
was central to all managerial activities within the hospital. From the perspectives of the 
interviewees, these measures were faithfully followed and largely worked as intended 
by the policy, although ambiguities remained amongst the interviewees with respect to 
the extent to which punitive measures were enforced. The enhancement, accentuation 
and prioritisation of these top-down measures in their stringency and enforcement, 
rather than these measure per se, were perceived by the interviewees to be the direct 
product and legacy of The Campaign. However, the perceived changes in antibiotic 
prescribing practices were the result of the interaction between top-down policies and 
local contextual circumstances rather than a linear consequence of the implementation 
of The Campaign. Local implementers were faced with challenges pertinent to system, 
organisational and individual levels.  
 At the system level, varied regional and healthcare policy context created 
difficulties for managers and prescribers to manage the same prescribing patterns vis-
à-vis hospitals in other regions or of higher tiers when patients were free to move 
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across different hospitals and expected similar treatments throughout. At the 
organisation level, prescribing behaviours could be exposed to and influenced by 
entrenched financial incentives, which were not removed on a systemic level during 
The Campaign. In addition, prescribing behaviours were also shaped by the mentoring 
relationship between manager-prescribers and prescribers, where senior prescribers 
passed on their knowledge and experience. Furthermore, diagnostic limitations and 
uncertainties gave rise to cases where prescribers inevitably had to rely on their 
experience and judgement rather than wait for definitive evidence. Finally, varied 
demands for antibiotic use across drastically different clinical scenarios meant that 
manager-prescribers, in representing their own department’s interest in achieving 
prescribing targets, had to liaise with one another indirectly through the mediation of 
medical affairs in a dynamic exercise that led to redistribution and harmonisation of 
targets at the departmental level within the hospital. At the individual level, prescribers’ 
knowledge and experience mattered as much as patients’ expectations and demands, 
and the sometimes volatile and brittle relationship between prescribers and patients in 
the society at large laid ground for occasional but potentially heated and acrimonious 
disputes that could overshadow a prescriber’s decision whether to prescribe.  
 Implementation of The Campaign addressed and mostly positively influenced 
some of these contextual factors to create a better environment to encourage rational 
antibiotic use. At the system level, managers and prescribers felt that The Campaign 
created a more even policy context across China on antibiotic use and strengthened 
implementation in previously, even though differences in regional and healthcare policy 
context remained. At the organisation level, The Campaign introduced measures that 
aimed to counteract financial incentives to prescribe and solidified the authority of 
senior prescribers in order to create fundamental changes in prescribing practices. At 
the individual level, training of prescribers and improved collaboration between 
prescribers and other healthcare professionals, especially clinical pharmacists, were 
vital to improving prescribers’ understanding of the theory, evidence and practice of 
rational antibiotic use. Public education since The Campaign on rational antibiotic use 
helped recalibrating patients’ expectation, which was further boosted by proactive 
education from the prescribers especially during clinical consultations.  
 However, structural challenges engendered by contextual factors at central and 
hospital levels described in the earlier part of the research, which led to The 
Campaign’s policy approach to focus only on the more resourceful and capable higher-
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tier hospitals, had also constrained policy implementation at the secondary hospital in 
Shanghai. Although capable of providing a range of healthcare services for the local 
community, the secondary hospital studied was not a match to the national tertiary 
hospital in Beijing – or any other tertiary hospital – in terms of capabilities and 
resources. Despite having a strong focus on the top-down activities to regulate 
antibiotic use and prescribing, the secondary hospital lacked the necessary resources 
to contribute to wider surveillance activities, engage clinical pharmacists to the extent 
seen at the national hospital in Beijing, or vastly improve limitations in their 
microbiology capabilities. In highlighting the complexities in policy implementation at a 
fairly typical hospital in urban China, findings of the case study also underline the 
importance of drawing attentions away from “the Centre” in order to have a grounded 
and functional understanding of the process and challenges of policy implementation in 
a dynamic healthcare system such as China’s, and illustrates the necessity for even 
top-down implementation to consider its impact on contextual factors and subsequent 
behaviours for it to be a success.  
 
10.3 Critique of the methodology 
The major limitation of phase 1 fieldwork mainly concerned the selection of 
study sites and the recruitment of interviewees. Firstly, despite the fact that other key 
informants including academics and a former specialist in the pharmaceutical industry 
provided supportive accounts of government policy, analysis of policy implementation 
at the central level heavily relied on the accounts from a few government officials from 
the central government. Although their accounts could be triangulated with policy 
documents to a limited extent, there were no other empirical data sources that could 
permit triangulation to further establish the validity of the qualitative data as discussed 
in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Methods). Whilst this could be considered an inevitable 
issue due to lack of existing research, triangulation could be established based on the 
counter narratives about central level implementation from nested subgroups that were 
focused on hospital level implementation, and from existing policy literature on policy 
implementation at the central level in general. Furthermore, the researcher’s role in 
international meetings on antibiotic policies in China provided unique insight about 
policy actors at the central level, and opportunities to establish access to high-level 
officials and officers directly and very closely involved in the implementation of The 
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Campaign. In this regard, data collection at the central level in this research could be 
considered a strength.  
Secondly, policy implementation at the local level was represented only by the 
hospital level; most conspicuously, the lack of representation of local government 
created a significant disconnect between the central and the hospital levels. The only 
reason for not including a local government in the study of this level was the lack of 
access. In order to mitigate the impact of this limitation, the researcher took measures 
to enhance the connection between the central level and the hospital level through 
careful selection of study sites. A step to reduce the disconnect in the administrative 
hierarchy was sampling hospitals from Beijing, where the central government was 
located. Although none of the hospitals sampled were directly owned by the central 
NHFPC (again due to lack of access), they were more closely located and more heavily 
influenced by the centre due to their proximity to the epicentre of national policies. 
Another crucial step to establish direct connections between the central and the 
hospital levels was selecting a leading hospital in China that had worked with the 
central government and international organisations in antibiotic stewardship policies to 
study implementation at the hospital level.  
This can also lead to criticism about the selection of the national tertiary 
hospital. Even though the rationale for its selection was to establish a connection 
between the study of implementation at the central and the hospital levels, the national 
tertiary hospital was one of the least typical hospitals in China in terms of available 
resources, technological capabilities and national and international reputation. Given 
that it was unlikely that other hospitals would have similar levels of resources, 
capability and close relationship with the central actors, implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in other cases would be less optimal in comparison, putting in 
serious question whether policy implementation at this hospital represented an 
example of policy implementation at a typical hospital in China.  
Thirdly, the sampling of managerial-level actors, which took place in the 
national tertiary hospital, became separated from the sampling of prescribing-level 
actors, which took place in other hospitals in Beijing. Again, this issue arose because of 
lack of access to prescribing-level actors in the national tertiary hospital. The 
immediate consequence of the disconnect between the two levels of actors was that 
the study of implementation processes in the national tertiary hospital relied only on the 
accounts from the managerial actors. This in itself was not necessarily problematic, as 
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a number of existing studies at the hospital level also focused on managerial actors 
only; after all, antibiotic stewardship was a specialist activity organised by higher levels 
of the hierarchy within a hospital. From a bottom-up perspective that sought to 
encompass patients’ experience, it could have been beneficial to include prescribing-
level actors in the analysis of implementation in the national tertiary hospital. Since that 
was not possible, the researcher went for the next-best alternative, seeking instead to 
substantially enrich the analysis of the wider implementation context in China and 
Beijing by ensuring that the sampling hospitals and prescribing-level actors – 
prescribers and patients – reflected a wide range of characteristics commonly seen in 
urban Beijing. In doing so, it became possible to situate implementation in the national 
tertiary hospital in a description of the wider healthcare system context that was 
comparable and compatible with the descriptions in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System 
Background).  
Another criticism of this research may concern the ways through which the 
policy of interest was analysed. As described in Chapter 5 (National Policy Context), 
the subject of interest in this research – The Campaign – comprised a list of Key 
Policies on antibiotic stewardship. In this research, The Campaign was analysed as a 
whole, and regarded as a representation of all the major and recent antibiotic 
stewardship policies in China. Individual policy components, such as restricting the 
antibiotic formulary and formulary restriction, were not used as individual tracer 
policies. It is worth noting that both approaches to analysing implementation – treating 
antibiotic stewardship as a single concept covering a specified range of policies and 
activities, or focusing on one or several individual policy components – were equally 
viable and not in conflict with each other, as demonstrated by existing studies 
summarised in Chapter 3 (Literature Review). Whilst each approach had its own 
merits, this research favoured the broad-brushed approach over the tracer policy 
approach out of practical need. On one level, there was a lack of detailed description of 
the policy context of antibiotic stewardship in China in the existing literature, so that 
exploratory research was required at a more fundamental level. On another level, the 
researcher’s background and experience in policy analysis, health systems research 
and biological sciences could be better utilised in the more general approach to 
understanding policy implementation, which was comparatively less demanding in the 
understanding of clinical issues vital to the analysis of individual policy components.  
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Some of the major methodological shortcomings in the analysis of hospital level 
implementation in phase 1 fieldwork were addressed and rectified in the case study in 
phase 2 fieldwork. Overall, the case study achieved a thorough investigation of a 
relatively small hospital by sampling a significant number of hospital actors from clinical 
and non-clinical departments that were highly relevant to antibiotic prescribing and 
implementation of The Campaign.  
The key improvement of the case study was that it sampled all levels of actors 
involved in the implementation of The Campaign at the secondary hospital in Shanghai, 
including senior non-clinical managers who performed key managerial functions, 
manager-prescribers that were senior departmental leads, more junior prescribers, and 
patients. All these actors were sampled from the same healthcare setting, which 
enabled a more comprehensive analysis of policy implementation than the study 
conducted at the national hospital in Beijing. More importantly, the secondary hospital 
studied represented an example of a much more ordinary and typical healthcare setting 
in urban China, and lessons learned from the case study here were likely to be 
applicable to many more hospitals of similarly modest scale.  
Furthermore, the case study improved on the way qualitative data was 
collected. As opposed to phase 1 fieldwork, where more than 1 types of interviews for 
data collection were employed, the case study in phase 2 fieldwork consistently made 
use of the semi-structured interview as the only instrument. The instruments for each 
type of interviewee – non-clinical managers, manager-prescribers, prescribers and 
patients – were designed to match one another in themes and questions. This resulted 
in a more controlled and systematic approach in data collection and ensured that data 
collection was not biased by process disparities, and also resulted in a more systematic 
examination of key themes.  
The way the themes and the overall enquiry was designed was another 
significant area of improvement. Whereas The Campaign as an overarching concept 
was used in a vague manner to extract data in the interviewees conducted in phase 1 
fieldwork, the instrument for the case study in phase 2 fieldwork was purposefully 
designed to enable systematic examination of the individual policy components of The 
Campaign; fine details of those policies were discussed with all levels actors from the 
hospital, including managers, manager-prescribers, prescribers and patients. The 
redesigned instrument was therefore instrumental to the bottom-up analysis in the case 
study.  
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But there was still room for even further improvement in the case study. The 
major setback faced by the case study was the lack of sufficiently in-depth patient 
interviews, which had been a problem in earlier fieldwork. It could be concluded that 
sampling and interviewing patients in the waiting area of a hospital was not an effective 
strategy to obtain in-depth data. Overall, the willingness and ability of patients to 
engage with the research topic was modest without prior recruitment and debriefing. 
Bias in data was an unavoidable issue, as patients were likely to be more prone to 
having social desirability bias when interviewed in an open setting.  
Besides the limited use of patient data, the case study also suffered from the 
lack of means to triangulate qualitative data in general. As quantitative data on 
antibiotic prescribing could not be obtained from the secondary hospital in Shanghai, 
the case study relied solely on actors’ retrospective accounts in understanding changes 
in antibiotic use and prescribing behaviour during The Campaign. Although relevant 
literature on the quantitative trends in antibiotic prescribing in Shanghai provided a very 
useful context (Lin et al., 2016), the absence of descriptive data from the primary data 
source meant that conclusions from the case study had to be seen in a more critical 
light, especially in considering how it informed the existing understanding of the 
hypothesised role of The Campaign in reducing antibiotic use or the lack thereof 
described in Chapter 3 (Literature Review). However, the findings of this research were 
ultimately situated amongst a wide range of existing literature; as demonstrated by the 
discussion section of this chapter, their high compatibility with existing knowledge could 
be easily established through comparison with literature on implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship policies in different parts of the world, prescribing behaviours, healthcare 
system reforms and health policy implementation in China.  
 
10.3 Contribution of the thesis 
Whilst antibiotic stewardship is becoming a subject of increasingly intense 
interest against a background of alarming levels of antibiotic resistance in China and 
across the world, there has been little research addressing the implementation of 
antibiotic stewardship policies. Considering the gaps in research as described in 
Chapters 1 (Introduction) and 2 (Theoretical Background and Literature Review), this 
thesis has made three original contributions.  
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Firstly, this thesis has made a unique contribution to the understanding of 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China. By analysing policy 
documents and describing in detail how antibiotic stewardship policies in China were 
aligned with the actors responsible for carrying out policy actions, the thesis enriches 
existing reviews of national policy context (Xiao & Li, 2015; Cui et al., 2017). Having 
examined existing evidence of the impact of The Campaign at national, regional and 
hospital levels described in Chapter 3 (Literature Review), the thesis establishes that 
there is an inadequate level of understanding of whether and how The Campaign 
reduces antibiotic use in hospitals in China. Despite evidence from evaluative studies 
and studies of prescribing trends suggesting a decrease in antibiotic prescribing, these 
studies’ attempts to correlate the observed trends with the implementation of The 
Campaign between 2011 and 2013 failed to attribute clear causality in the proposed 
relationship. Furthermore, none of these studies examined how the proposed effect of 
The Campaign might have been achieved due to policy implementation. To address 
this gap in knowledge and provide an in-depth analysis of the implementation of The 
Campaign, this thesis drew on a wide range of empirical data sources, from 
government officials to prescribers and patients at the central and the hospital levels, 
adding significantly to the scarce existing research in this area (Wang et al., 2016; Jin 
et al., 2011) by providing a detailed account of how policy implementation interacted 
with contextual drivers of antibiotic prescribing described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare 
System Background).   
Secondly, this thesis has made a unique contribution to the understanding of 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in general. Building on the insight from 
existing cross-sectional studies (Hersh et al., 2009; Pope et al., 2009; Johannsson et 
al., 2011; Doron et al., 2013; James et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2015; Bryant, 2015; 
Enani, 2016; Wolf et al., 2016) and qualitative case studies (Charani et al., 2013; 
James et al., 2015; Jeffs et al., 2015; Cotta et al., 2015; Bailey, Tully & Cooke, 2015; 
Liu et al., 2011a; Li et al., 2014b), which mostly focused on important factors, 
especially barriers, to the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies at the 
hospital level, this research explored and analysed factors crucial to the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies at both the central and the hospital 
levels through a detailed case study. In providing a cogent analysis of context, process 
and their interactions, this research was one of the first to apply a framework based on 
implementation theory in the analysis of antibiotic stewardship policies. In so doing, this 
research presented an ambitious attempt to bridge the literature on several different 
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topics, including policy implementation, antibiotic stewardship, healthcare system and 
reform, and prescribing behaviours, and demonstrated a viable approach to analysing 
the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies and a way to make clear sense of 
a wide range of existing research in relation to policy implementation.  
Thirdly, this thesis has made a contribution to the understanding of 
implementation of health policies in China. Echoing existing studies (Duckett, 2001; 
Tolhurst et al., 2004; Schwartz & Evans, 2007; Dong, Christensen & Painter, 2014; 
Xiao et al., 2013b), this research provided further examples and evidence to 
understand the governance of healthcare and the implementation of health policies at 
different levels in China, which took place in a dynamic background of healthcare 
reforms and diverse local contexts. Whilst antibiotic prescribing has been frequently 
used as a tracer to understanding healthcare service provision and healthcare reforms 
in China (Reynolds & McKee, 2009), this research presented policy implementation as 
another angle to further reveal the complexities in the interplay between context and 
process in China’s healthcare system and reform. 
 
10.4 Discussion and implications of the findings 
This section discusses findings with respect to the conceptual map set out in 
Table 6-11 in Chapter 6 (Study Design and Methods). Drawing on existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on policy implementation reviewed in Chapters 2 (Theoretical 
background), 3 (Literature review), 4 (Healthcare System Background) and 5 (National 
Policy Context), this section first reflects on the fundamental theoretical framework 
upon which the thesis is established and examines critically the use of implementation 
theory in this research. It then discusses the strengths and weaknesses of The 
Campaign in relation to the drivers of inappropriate antibiotic use at system, 
organisation and individual levels. Finally, implications of the findings for policy and 
future research are outlined. 
 
Use of implementation theory in the research 
In order to conduct the analysis, this thesis has applied implementation theory – 
particularly, top-down and bottom-up approaches to understanding policy 
implementation – in the analysis of implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies. 
Chapter 10. Conclusion 
239 
 
The theoretical framework set out in Table 2-1 in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background) 
was in general highly useful for the analysis in this research for several reasons. 
Firstly, the fundamental assumptions associated with the top-down and the 
bottom-up perspectives of policy implementation were useful for conceptualising the 
two levels of implementation examined in this research – the central and the hospital 
levels – in which the assumptions of the two contrasting perspectives were met to 
different degrees. Whilst key assumptions for the top-down perspective including the 
processual view of policy implementation, the linear and rational model for 
implementation and the dominance of “the Centre” were strongly echoed at the central 
level, they were much less conspicuously reflected at the hospital level. In part, this 
also highlighted the contrasting ways that the actors at the two different levels viewed 
The Campaign: whereas the central actors saw The Campaign as a special segment of 
antibiotic stewardship policies, the hospital actors saw it as part of a long list of their 
daily work.  
Secondly, theoretical elements associated with both perspectives provided 
helpful insight in the design and analysis of the research. Consistent with the 
description in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Background), elements associated with the top-
down perspective, exemplified by the concepts of control, accountability, target 
approach and redundancy, provided significant explanatory power in the analysis of 
policy implementation. Themes emerged from the empirical data lent themselves 
conveniently to these elements not only at the central level, but also at the hospital 
level, where they were manifested in a smaller and more confined scale. Elements that 
were pertinent to the bottom-up perspective informed the identification of interviewees, 
and helped uncovering their relationships and perspectives based on their accounts as 
frontline implementers rather than formal descriptions.  
Thirdly, the theoretical framework offered a cogent framework to describe the 
complex interaction between context and process across different levels of 
implementation, which previous research did not achieve. By clarifying the theoretical 
treatment of context and process, it became possible to make clear distinction between 
influential elements that were outside and inside of the range of activities intrinsic to 
policy implementation, and how these elements interacted. An example to demonstrate 
the usefulness of this approach was the analysis of policy implementation at the 
hospital level, in which the implementation process was shown to include measures 
that directly addressed contextual factors. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of 
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different levels of contextual factors was crucial to the understanding of the interaction 
between context and process at different levels of implementation. At the central level, 
policy implementation was influenced by macro level contextual factors only, including 
the national policy context and system level contextual factors pertinent to China’s 
healthcare system. This contrasted with the case of policy implementation at the 
hospital level, which was influenced by micro level contextual factors including hospital 
level and individual level contextual factors as well as the macro level factors.   
To observe characteristics of top-down and bottom-up implementation 
separately, this thesis opted to combine the use of both perspectives in a comparative 
way rather than employ synthetic theoretical approaches. Doing so inevitably created 
tension within the theoretical framework, as the two theoretical perspectives seemingly 
opposes each other. Given their varying assumptions, emphases and affinities to 
different levels of implementation, the application of the top-down approach was not in 
total harmony with that of the bottom-up approach in this research, and combining 
these theoretical approaches without mediation and resolution of the inherent tension 
could have resulted in a disjointed analysis. 
The top-down approach focused on the central level implementation and had an 
intrinsic inclination for analysing the expected policy process and outcomes; this being 
the point of reference, deviations from the intended paths of implementation were 
judged to be less than ideal. The preconditions for “perfect” implementation (Hogwood 
& Gunn, 1984) were a paragon of this angle to analysis. This perspective was 
undeniably useful for this research due to the fact that The Campaign was centrally 
conceived from the beginning with the purpose to set new standards for antibiotic use, 
and that its mechanism of implementation was largely reliant on the power differential 
in administrative authority between the central and the local actors; nevertheless, 
analysing how context and process might not lend itself to the ideal top-down 
implementation could provide an opening for the analysis of how policy implementation 
took place in a “messy” real world environment, and Chapter 7 (Policy implementation 
at the Central Level) showed that even effective top-down implementation could be at 
variance with what the theory judged to be ideal. The strong normative stance 
associated with the top-down approach could in effect hinder the exploration of fine 
details in implementation activities.    
The bottom-up approach complemented the limitations of the top-down 
approach by providing a much needed focus on the more microscopic issues in policy 
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implementation. Its starting point from the perspectives of individuals guided the 
research process: the sampling of suitable interviewees relied on gatekeepers, 
especially those at the hospital level, to identify relevant actors based on understanding 
of the networks and relationships within the organisation from their experience instead 
of directly from the formal structure outlined in official sources (Hjern & Porter, 1981). 
Moreover, by placing emphasis on the perceptions and experience of frontline 
implementers in how things worked on the ground rather than dwell on the concerns of 
the central actors on how the policies were meant to play out, the bottom-up approach 
was critical to making sense of how the interplay between dynamic contextual factors 
and the top-down implementation process dictated by The Campaign influenced each 
other, and how they combined to influence behaviours in antibiotic use and prescribing. 
However, even though the bottom-up approach facilitated a thorough analysis of the 
heterogeneity and idiosyncrasy in decentralised implementation of central policies at 
the hospital level (particularly demonstrated by the case study in Chapter 9, Policy 
Implementation at the Hospital Level, Part II), its emphasis on individual incentives and 
behaviours could easily stray away from the analysis of high-level policy structures 
such as The Campaign, which was the central frame of reference for this policy 
analysis.  
Therefore, a conceptual framework or theory was therefore highly necessary to 
bridge the between top-down and bottom-up perspectives and between context and 
process of policy implementation in an explanatory framework of the influencing factors 
of antibiotic use in hospitals at the system, organisation and individual levels, which 
was first described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background) and will be described 
again in the next section. By providing a focal point of analysis in the influence on 
prescribing behaviours, the framework provided a bridge in the theory-driven thematic 
analysis to allow top-down characteristics and bottom-up themes to reconcile and 
combine, and directed the two seemingly opposing perspectives towards a meaningful 
and critical analysis of and for The Campaign. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of The Campaign  
As the influencing factors of antibiotic use in hospital were also levers of 
behaviour change, the use of a conceptual framework describing the determinants of 
antibiotic use in hospitals at system, organisation and individual levels became central 
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to the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the policy implementation in 
relation to the extent they mobilised and changed some of these factors. This 
framework, which was first described in Chapter 4 (Healthcare System Background), is 
enhanced by findings of the research in the form below in Table 10-1. Using the 
framework as a reference, some of the major strengths and weaknesses of the policies 
of The Campaign, which were detailed in Chapter 5 (National policy context), will be 
discussed with respect to the drivers of antibiotic use from the perspectives of 
healthcare providers and users at different levels. 
Level of 
determinants 
Factors that mainly influence 
providers 
Factors that influence both users and 
providers 
System Governance, organisation, financing and 
delivery of healthcare in the health 
system; major policies and regulations in 
healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors; 
role and influence of the pharmaceutical 
sector 
Cultures, beliefs, values and medical 
universes in different societies; 
availability, accessibility and quality of 
healthcare services and medicines 
Organisation Governance, organisation, financing and 
delivery of healthcare in hospitals; 
organisational policies and regulations 
specific to hospitals; interactions with the 
pharmaceutical sector 
Availability, accessibility and quality of 
healthcare services and medicines local 
to patients 
Provider-user 
interpersonal 
 Interactions and relationships between 
doctors and patients 
Individual  Personal background, experience, and 
socioeconomic characteristics; 
interactions with other actors in the health 
system; level of medical knowledge; 
attitudes and expectations towards 
healthcare and medicine use 
Table 10-1 Expanded table of influencing factors of hospital antibiotic use (Hanson et al., 2018) 
   
Overall, it was clear that The Campaign in itself aimed at mainly addressing the 
drivers of antibiotic use that mainly influence providers in the healthcare system at the 
level of organisation (hospitals) and individual (healthcare professionals, particularly 
prescribers). First described in Table 5-4 in Chapter 5 (National policy context), these 
policies sought to reinforce accountability through using restrictive prescribing targets 
and financial penalties for failure to meet these targets on the part of both the hospital 
and the prescribers, where the target system of numeric thresholds was enabled by an 
intelligence system for gathering surveillance data on antibiotic use and resistance, 
was the basis for a ranking system created to shame low-performing actors. These 
measures were supported by restrictive measures that constrained the availability and 
accessibility of antibiotics in procurement and prescribing authority, and capacity 
building measures aimed at improving knowledge, capability and collaboration across 
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all the relevant healthcare professionals, especially prescribers. These policy elements 
indeed addressed the crucial challenges in implementing antibiotic stewardship policies 
identified through Chapter 3 (Literature Review) and summarised in Table 3-1. Not only 
were these policies in line with mainstream antibiotic stewardship policies, the tentative 
effectiveness of some of the individual policy elements of The Campaign such as public 
reporting, multidisciplinary involvement in antibiotic stewardship and formulary 
restriction were also described (Hua, 2016; Zhou et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2014; Wang 
et al., 2014b; Yang et al., 2014; Bao et al., 2013). 
However, the fact that the policies of The Campaign were fine in principle did 
not necessarily mean that the policy design or implementation were fully informed by 
evidence. For a start, it was unclear whether the policy approach to target higher-level 
hospitals, especially tertiary hospitals, was a product of thorough research or simply 
based on an intuitive understanding about the working of China’s tiered healthcare 
system like the high-level informants described. Additionally, it was also unclear how 
the specific target prescribing levels, or the numbers of antibiotics allowed in the 
formularies in hospitals specified in The Campaign were derived, or how they were 
justified. Furthermore, it was unclear whether sufficient considerations and instructions 
had been given for policy implementation in different clinical contexts, where hospital 
actors coped with ambiguities in the policy and necessity to deal with clinical 
challenges through operating with a level of permitted discretion. Ultimately, without 
proper evaluative studies, it was unclear whether the policies really worked as intended 
in containing antibiotic resistance in hospitals and in communities, and how well they 
worked.  
More importantly, it is crucial to assess the role of The Campaign in influencing 
drivers of antibiotic use by placing it in the broader healthcare reform context in China. 
Though it was worth noting that many actors did perceive The Campaign to be an 
influential driving force in shaping a more standardised policy environment around 
prescribing practices across the country, it would be farfetched to consider The 
Campaign to be an instigator of those sweeping changes that the actors so palpably 
perceived. Just as antibiotic prescribing was merely a symptom of some of the ills of 
China’s healthcare system, The Campaign as a single-issue policy solution that sought 
to regulate only one aspect of healthcare provision in antibiotic use in hospitals was no 
more than a part of the government’s overall agenda to facilitate fundamental 
healthcare reforms, as its policies did not intend to change the contextual factors that 
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shaped and influenced prescribing behaviours. This is considered to be the main 
weakness of The Campaign.  
It was fortuitous that in some cases, policy implementation was helped by some 
of those contextual characteristics; in other cases, it gravitated towards problems that 
were entrenched in the healthcare system and succumbed to those forces. In terms of 
governance, implementation of The Campaign largely relied on the fact that hospitals in 
China were public institutions subjected to the government’s administrative control, 
evaluation and management. Even though the extent of dominance of the state 
exemplified by China’s political system was not a necessary condition for top-down 
implementation per se, the presence of it was undoubtedly very helpful to The 
Campaign, where this central dominance was effectively translated into a force for 
changing specific areas of healthcare practices to good effect. Additionally, the 
participation of non-state actors such as professional bodies provided an alternative 
venue for channelling state policies.  
However, despite the power held by the Centre, effective implementation of The 
Campaign was not a given, as it largely rested upon other factors being aligned with its 
aims. These factors were responsible for the policy approach of The Campaign to 
focus only on higher-level hospitals, the highly heterogeneous and decentralised policy 
contexts faced by different hospitals, and the plurality in policy implementation.  
In terms of organisation and delivery, the chasm between primary care and 
higher-level hospitals persisted, so did the uneven distribution of resources across 
social, economic and geographical divides in the country. The insufficiencies here are 
addressed by ongoing initiatives to build a more functional primary care system and 
more effective gatekeeping and referral systems. However, the deeper structural 
issues that led to the divide between primary care and higher-level hospitals – including 
imbalances in capacity building, workforce generation and healthcare resource 
distribution – will require drastic improvement over a long term. Furthermore, the 
impact of well-intentioned health reform policies on antibiotic prescribing was unknown. 
The essential medicines policy severely capped the types of pharmaceuticals available 
at the primary level and could prove to be counter-productive to the effective provision 
of healthcare, as it restricted access to antibiotics without actively encouraging rational 
use of antibiotics per se. Increasing purposeful exchanges and referrals of patients 
between different level hospitals for surgical treatments could have significant 
implications for both infection control and antibiotic use. 
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Similarly, in terms of financing, the rooting out of financial incentives to 
prescribe needed time. On the one hand, policy implementation was buoyed by the 
implementation of synergistic prior reforms like the zero-mark-up policy, and assisted 
by stringent cost-controlling regulations rolled out both by social insurance payers and 
assessors of healthcare quality. On the other hand, malpractices by prescribers at a 
personal level became targets of a wider anti-corruption reform. The continual rolling 
out healthcare reforms to de-escalate the importance of pharmaceutical sales in 
revenue generation in hospitals and to dissociate revenue generation from healthcare 
provision in the healthcare system as a whole since The Campaign began, and the 
high-profile action against multi-national pharmaceuticals for their involvement in 
corrupting prescribers showed the government’s resolution to tackle one of the most 
fundamental and difficult challenge in China’s healthcare system in the financial 
incentives to prescribe. As these measures progressed, the jury was out.  
 Finally, at the individual level, The Campaign’s overwhelming focus on 
healthcare professionals, especially prescribers, would not have shifted prescribing 
patterns without relevant health promotional campaigns that gradually changed the 
perception of antibiotics by the general public. The intended rectifying effect of The 
Campaign on prescribers came from four fronts: improvement in knowledge and 
understanding; frequent reviews of prescribing; career and financial disincentives to 
prescribe; and reinforcement of the hierarchical managerial culture and its impact on 
building new behavioural patterns. But from the prescriber’s perspective, one the 
biggest incentives to follow through antibiotic stewardship was that of self-protection 
against potential dissent from patients. Whilst The Campaign in itself did nothing to 
tackle the persistent issue of deteriorating prescriber and patient relationships in China, 
the highly publicised nationwide operation to set a new healthcare standard across the 
whole country offered prescribers a new line of defence in adhering to the 
government’s order.  
At the same time, relevant but unrelated public media campaigns started to 
change patients’ understanding of antibiotics but not the social constructs that 
governed patient expectation. Even as patients’ self-perceived demand for healthcare 
services and pharmaceuticals remained high, their attention began to shift from 
antibiotics to other alternatives as they started to become aware of the “negative 
effects” of antibiotics which, in some cases, became even more accentuated in 
comparison to alternatives, especially TCMs. Whilst the media promotion no doubt 
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played a strong part in shaping new public opinions that helped relieved pressure on 
antibiotic use, the extent to which patients truly grappled with the medical 
understanding was questionable: patients who held hold negative opinions about 
antibiotics did not necessarily know anything about antibiotics at all. Therefore, at a 
deeper level, the fundamental expectation of antibiotics by patients largely remained 
unchanged in less clear-cut cases where they experienced strong symptoms, and 
where diagnoses were less certain and alternatives were not available; for prescribers, 
this could spell trouble as they faced many cases that were not clear-cut on a daily 
basis. 
 
Implications for policy and research 
The implications of the findings will be described in three areas: implications for 
the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies; for broader healthcare reforms 
and policies in China; and for future research.  
 
Implications for the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies 
The implementation gap remained one of the biggest challenges in an effective 
national and international response against antimicrobial resistance, and lessons from 
The Campaign have shed light on how this gap may be addressed.  
Even the most top-down form of central-led implementation should be based on 
sustained development of national antibiotic stewardship policies, and healthcare 
reforms that seeks to improve healthcare quality and safety whilst continuously 
improving and balancing access, affordability and resource distribution. Given sufficient 
progress in achieving the necessary conditions, central government should play a 
crucial role in revitalising policy implementation. Top-down national campaigns using 
the target approach can be effective in providing the decisive impetus and momentum 
for initiating actions and driving progress in the short term. However, not all countries 
share China’s political and health administrative systems, which are especially adept in 
delivering top-down implementation and mobilising civil organisations to that effect; 
whether China’s experience could be replicated elsewhere will also depend on the 
extent to which similar top-down activities are politically feasible in a given country 
setting. Regardless of the political system, concerted actions across multiple 
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departments would be needed to ensure an effective response against the 
multisectoral problem of antibiotic resistance.  
In addition, reiterating what has been widely noted, synergy will be required 
between healthcare system strengthening and reinforcement of operational aspects 
and resources available at the local level. Much as implementation of antibiotic 
stewardship at the hospital level is a technical exercise that required prioritisation and 
planning, capacity and team building, coordination and execution, hospitals should 
respond proactively to the challenges in implementation in a similar way to how they 
respond to challenges in healthcare service provision. Crucially, responsibility for 
antibiotic stewardship should not solely rest on prescribers: strengthening of clinical 
pharmacology and microbiology, especially diagnostic technology, is highly necessary 
to build an effective multidisciplinary team to jointly ensure rational antibiotic use. After 
all, implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies is part of service provision itself. 
From a bottom-up perspective, frontline implementers of antibiotic stewardship, 
especially prescribers, should be given a bigger say in antibiotic stewardship at the 
organisational level, so that policy implementation is not reduced to a numbers 
exercise at the peril of endangering clinical practice. As national policies tend to be 
broad and directional and consequently could be lacking in consideration of nuances in 
hospital settings, insights from, and effective mechanisms established by hospital 
actors are vital in overcoming implementation challenges and maintaining standards of 
clinical practice. Moreover, it would be worth considering whether prescribing 
behaviour could be better incentivised, and the target approach better achieved 
through the use of a combination of rewards and punishments than the use of 
punishments alone. Whilst the negative marking system associated with The Campaign 
and other hospital audit exercises created sharp awareness amongst hospital actors to 
reduce antibiotic use, having all sticks but no carrots could have implications on the 
overall morale of healthcare workforce in the long term.  
 As patient-related factors continue to influence antibiotic prescribing, much 
more attention is needed to shift the perceived demand of antibiotics from patients. 
Despite the primacy of education, the impact of social and media campaigns in 
changing patients’ perceptions should not be underestimated: if patients could be 
genuinely persuaded that taking antibiotics without doctors’ instructions is a very bad 
idea, the extent to which they are versed with the scientific explanations may not matter 
as much.   
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Last but not least, the lack of understanding of The Campaign’s impact on 
antibiotic use and the epidemiological and economic burden of antibiotic resistance can 
only be addressed by methodologically rigorous evaluations based on official data. To 
permit better understanding and enable the sharing of China’s experience in 
implementing antibiotic stewardship to other countries, greater transparency in the 
policy process and better availability of data is required.  
 
Implications for the broader healthcare policies and reforms in China 
In this research, The Campaign also acted as a lens to understand policy 
implementation in the healthcare system in China. It was clear that standalone 
measures to change prescribing would be futile without the support from fundamental 
reforms in health systems to change influencing factors of antibiotic use at all levels, 
and The Campaign’s perceived success in implementation was linked to previous and 
ongoing reforms in healthcare financing and delivery, which continue to move in a 
positive direction.  
In the post-Campaign period, adjustments to the central-led strategy for policy 
implementation and the focus on higher-level hospitals will be necessary, especially 
because of the dynamics present in its complex and decentralised healthcare system. 
For secondary and tertiary hospitals, the substantial influence of local actors on policy 
implementation and the determining role of healthcare financing in defining the scope 
means that further reforms to strengthen healthcare financing will be indispensable in 
order to guarantee effective implementation in the longer term. At the same time, 
continuous efforts will be required to reduce the role of the prescription of 
pharmaceuticals in the provision of healthcare through, most fundamentally, 
dissociating prescribing from revenue generation. Furthermore, much work will be 
required at the primary care level in the near future as primary care providers, which 
are not the main subjects of The Campaign and are much less equipped to implement 
antibiotic stewardship, becomes enrolled in upcoming plans for policy implementation. 
Besides the difficulties in putting in place a viable plan for the surveillance of antibiotic 
use and resistance in resource-limited settings, a major challenge for policy 
implementation at the primary care level concerns the on the challenges in the ongoing 
primary care reform in China. Aimed at improving and redefining primary care, the 
reform has been a work in progress. On the one hand, existing policies, exemplified by 
the policy package of essential medicines, have restricted the services at the primary 
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care level by limiting pharmaceuticals available at this level and replacing the focus on 
healthcare service provision with public health service provision, on the basis that more 
expensive and advanced pharmaceuticals and services were not necessary at this 
level. On the other hand, measures are being introduced to improve the capacity of 
primary care providers in an attempt to persuade patients to utilise primary care instead 
of higher levels of healthcare where possible. This effectively creates a persistent 
paradox, as the most capable prescribers are still much more attracted to the career 
prospects at higher-level hospitals, and patients are attracted to the better prescribers. 
A fundamental solution to this paradox and establishing a functional tiered-healthcare 
system in China will be needed. 
 
Implications for future research 
 The findings of this research shed light on two aspects of future research. In 
terms of research on the implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies in China, it 
will be useful to examine policy implementation in more typical settings in the country. 
Comparative case studies within China will be needed to further illuminate the influence 
of context on process at both the central and the hospital levels, and establish other 
crucial factors to policy implementation. Thorough understanding of these factors can 
inform methodological studies, as the development of process indicators for the 
implementation of antibiotic stewardship policies is in demand at the moment. In order 
to support this type of study, in-depth studies of individual policy, and proper 
theoretical-based studies in other countries will be required. To enable measurement of 
policy implementation, which is fundamental to introducing the target approach and 
monitoring and evaluation of policy in general, it will be highly necessary to find ways to 
improve surveillance of antibiotic use and resistance, especially in resource-poor 
settings. As highlighted in the discussion about use of theory, the use of a conceptual 
framework can effectively bridge top-down and bottom-up perspectives in future 
studies and bring focus to the organisational level processes.  
This work also has more general application to healthcare system research. 
Much research is needed to better understand the interaction between healthcare 
policies and antibiotic stewardship, and their impact on antibiotic use. In particular, the 
potential unintentional consequences of healthcare and antibiotic stewardship policies 
on antibiotic use have largely gone undetected. Whilst past reforms encourage 
overuse, new reforms could push antibiotic use to another extreme by discouraging 
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prescribers from making the best decisions in the patient’s interest. For example, cost 
containment in social insurance reimbursement could lead to undertreatment; 
increasing collaboration across secondary and tertiary hospitals could strain the tighter 
policy restrictions on antibiotic use in secondary hospitals; restricting antibiotic access 
at primary level could drive more patients towards higher-level hospitals, where they 
were more likely to be exposed to antibiotic resistance; strengthening of existing 
bureaucracy and hierarchy within the hospital and across government and hospitals 
could lead to loss of physician autonomy; one-dimensional assessment of the 
outcomes of complex medical practices could create uniform use patterns that do not 
reflect local epidemiological needs; and over-simplification of the message for antibiotic 
stewardship could lead to patients’ misunderstanding of antibiotics.   
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